United States v. Antone Figuried

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4263
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
ANTONE FIGURIED,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. N. Carlton Tilley,
Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:12-cr-00098-NCT-1)
Submitted: November 26, 2013 Decided: May 8, 2014
Before NIEMEYER, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Robert L. McClellan, IVEY, MCCLELLAN, GATTON & TALCOTT, L.L.P.,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United
States Attorney, Terry M. Meinecke, Assistant United States
Attorney, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Antone Figuried appeals his conviction and
twenty-seven-month sentence for possession of counterfeit
federal reserve notes, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 472 (2012).
Figuried challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the
application of an enhancement for obstruction of justice under
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) § 3C1.1 (2011), and
the absence of an acceptance of responsibility downward
adjustment under USSG § 3E1.1. We affirm.
Figuried first contends that the district court erred
in denying his Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 motion because the Government
produced insufficient evidence to support his conviction by
failing to demonstrate intent to defraud. “We review de novo
the district court’s decision to deny a . . . Rule 29 motion for
judgment of acquittal.” United States v. Royal, 731 F.3d 333,
337 (4th Cir. 2013). We review the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting a conviction by determining whether, in the light
most favorable to the Government, there is substantial evidence
in the record to support the conviction. United States v.
Lespier, 725 F.3d 437, 447 (4th Cir. 2013). “Substantial
evidence is . . . evidence that a reasonable finder of fact
could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion
of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United
States v. Hager, 721 F.3d 167, 179 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal
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quotation marks omitted). Reversal for insufficient evidence is
appropriate only in cases where the Government’s failure to
present substantial evidence is clear. Id.
Figuried was convicted of possession of counterfeit
federal reserve notes. To obtain a conviction, “the Government
was required to prove . . . : (1) that [Figuried] possessed
counterfeit money; (2) that, at the time of such possession, he
knew the money [was] counterfeit; and (3) that he possessed the
counterfeit money with the intent to defraud.” United States v.
Leftenant, 341 F.3d 338, 347 (4th Cir. 2003). Figuried does not
dispute that he possessed the money or that it was counterfeit.
Instead, he argues that the Government failed to prove any
intent to defraud.
We cannot agree. The Government adequately proved
that Figuried had an intent to defraud. The evidence showed
that the counterfeit money was hidden in a dresser drawer at
Figuried’s grandmother’s home, away from the $14,000 in genuine
currency Figuried had in his room. See United States v.
Armstrong, 16 F.3d 289, 292 (8th Cir. 1994) (stating that
separation of counterfeit bills from genuine bills is evidence
from which jury may infer guilty knowledge and intent to
defraud). Further, the amount of money possessed by Figuried is
indicative of intent to defraud, especially where testimony
established that the counterfeit bills were passable. See
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United States v. Lemaire, 712 F.2d 944, 948 (5th Cir. 1983)
(“[P]ossession of a substantial amount of counterfeit money
might be grounds for inferring knowledge and intent to
defraud.”). Moreover, Figuried’s inability to explain credibly
how he obtained possession of the counterfeit money, or why he
kept it, was significant. “Relating implausible, conflicting
tales to the jury can be rationally viewed as further
circumstantial evidence indicating guilt.” United States v.
Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 867 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc); see also
United States v. Callanan, 450 F.2d 145, 148 (4th Cir. 1971)
(“Guilty knowledge and willfulness may be inferred from . . .
false explanations . . . .”). Although the evidence supporting
intent is circumstantial, we conclude that, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the Government, the evidence is
sufficient to sustain Figuried’s conviction. See Hager, 721
F.3d at 179.
Figuried next attacks his sentence, contending that he
was improperly assigned an obstruction of justice enhancement
under USSG § 3C1.1. “In assessing whether a sentencing court
properly applied the Guidelines, we review the court’s factual
findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.”
United States v. Osborne, 514 F.3d 377, 387 (4th Cir. 2008). A
defendant merits a two-level obstruction of justice enhancement
where he “willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to
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obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with respect
to the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant
offense of conviction, and (2) the obstructive conduct related
to (A) the defendant’s offense of conviction and any relevant
conduct; or (B) a closely related offense.” USSG § 3C1.1. As
the application notes clarify, the enhancement applies to
perjury. USSG § 3C1.1 cmt. n.4(B). The district court found
that the defendant gave false testimony under oath “concerning a
material matter with the willful intent to provide false
testimony, rather than as a result of confusion, mistake, or
faulty memory.” United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 94
(1993); United States v. Smith, 62 F.3d 641, 646-47 (4th Cir.
1995). The district court also properly found that the
obstruction of justice enhancement was separately justified
because Figuried removed his ankle monitor and absconded from
house arrest while awaiting sentencing. See USSG § 3C1.1 cmt.
n.4(E). Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did
not clearly err in applying the enhancement for obstruction of
justice.
Finally, the district court’s denial of a downward
adjustment for acceptance of responsibility is also without
error. Under § 3E1.1, a defendant may receive an offense level
reduction by clearly demonstrating acceptance of responsibility
for his offense. Here, Figuried argued that he accepted
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responsibility for possession of the counterfeit money.
Although Figuried contends this clearly demonstrates his
acceptance of responsibility, his argument is underminded by the
fact that he proceeded to trial and placed his factual guilt at
issue on the element of intent to defraud, and especially so
when he received an enhancement for obstruction of justice. See
USSG § 3E1.1 cmt. nn.2, 4; see United States v. Smoot, 690 F.3d
215, 224-25 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 962
(2013). As a result, Figuried fails to demonstrate that the
district court erred in declining to apply an offense level
reduction under § 3E1.1 for acceptance of responsibility.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid in the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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