United States v. Young

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 97-4401
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
WILLIAM LUTHER YOUNG, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Deborah K. Chasanow, District Judge. (CR-
96-393-DKC)
Submitted: October 31, 1997 Decided: December 3, 1997
Before ERVIN and WILKINS, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James K. Bredar, Federal Public Defender, Beth M. Faber, Chief
Assistant Federal Defender, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant.
Lynne A. Battagalia, United States Attorney, Deborah A. Johnston,
Assistant United States Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
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PER CURIAM:
William Luther Young, Jr. appeals his conviction and sentence
for interstate travel with intent to engage in a sex act with minor
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) (1994). Appellant contends that
the statute: (1) exceeds Congress’s authority under the Commerce
Clause; (2) is unconstitutionally vague; (3) impinges upon consti-
tutionally protected behavior; and (4) does not require the neces-
sary overt act.
Appellant, who was residing in Pennsylvania, established
contact through the Internet with a 12-year old Maryland girl. He
traveled to Maryland to meet her, at which time he had sexual
contact with her. He traveled again to Maryland to meet her and was
arrested. The Appellant moved to dismiss the indictment, raising
the same issues raised in the instant appeal. The district court
denied the motion. The Appellant then pled guilty and was sentenced
to 12 months' imprisonment and three years of supervised release.
We affirm Appellant's conviction and sentence on the reasoning
of the district court as expressed in its comprehensive memorandum
opinion denying Appellant's motion to dismiss the indictment.
United States v. Young, No. 96-CR-393 (D. Md. Feb. 18, 1997). We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
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AFFIRMED
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