United States v. Brown

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 96-4406
RAYMOND ANTHONY BROWN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Salisbury.
N. Carlton Tilley, Jr., District Judge.
(CR-95-45)
Submitted: May 1, 1997
Decided: May 12, 1997
Before WIDENER and MURNAGHAN, Circuit Judges, and
PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.
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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
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COUNSEL
Thomas N. Cochran, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro,
North Carolina, for Appellant. Walter C. Holton, Jr., United States
Attorney, Michael F. Joseph, Assistant United States Attorney,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
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OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Raymond Anthony Brown pleaded guilty to being a felon in pos-
session of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A.§ 922(g)(1) (West
Supp. 1996). Brown was sentenced to 180 months in prison, to be fol-
lowed by five years of supervised release. He appeals, asserting that
Congress exceeded its powers under the Commerce Clause in enact-
ing § 922(g)(1). We affirm.
In 1989, Brown was convicted in a New York state court of
attempted robbery in the second degree, a felony. The indictment in
this case charged him with possessing a .357 caliber Taurus revolver
on May 11, 1994, in the Middle District of North Carolina. That fire-
arm is not manufactured in North Carolina and must have traveled in
interstate commerce.
Brown bases his challenge to § 922(g)(1) on United States v.
Lopez, ___ U.S. ___, 63 U.S.L.W. 4343 (U.S. Apr. 26, 1995) (No. 93-
1260). In Lopez, the Supreme Court invalidated 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 922(q)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1996), which made possession of a fire-
arm within 1000 feet of a school a federal offense. Lopez, 63
U.S.L.W. at 4343. The Court struck down the conviction in part
because the statute "contains no jurisdictional element which would
ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in
question affects interstate commerce." Id. at 4347.
Unlike the statute at issue in Lopez, § 922(g)(1) contains the requi-
site jurisdictional element because it applies only to firearms having
"an explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce." Id.
This court recently joined the unanimous ranks of the courts of
appeals in concluding that Congress did not exceed its power under
the Commerce Clause in enacting § 922(g)(1). United States v. Wells,
98 F.3d 808, 811 (4th Cir. 1996) (collecting cases). The "in or affect-
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ing commerce" requirement of § 922(g) satisfies the jurisdictional ele-
ment that the statute at issue in Lopez lacked and meets the minimal
nexus required for the Commerce Clause. Id. (citing Scarborough v.
United States, 431 U.S. 563, 575 (1977)). Consequently, Brown's
argument is foreclosed by our decision in Wells .
Accordingly, we affirm Brown's conviction. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately pres-
ented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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