Goins v. Warden, Perry Correctional Institution

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-6407
EDMUND GOINS,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
WARDEN, PERRY CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION,
Respondent - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Orangeburg. J. Michelle Childs, District
Judge. (5:12-cv-00267-JMC)
Argued: May 14, 2014 Decided: June 18, 2014
Before GREGORY and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: Robert Dressel, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA SCHOOL OF LAW,
Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant. James Anthony Mabry,
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF SOUTH CAROLINA, Columbia,
South Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Stephen L. Braga, Kevin
Cope, Ethan Simon, Third Year Law Student, Jacky Werman, Third
Year Law Student, Appellate Litigation Clinic, UNIVERSITY OF
VIRGINIA SCHOOL OF LAW, Charlottesville, Virginia, for
Appellant. Alan Wilson, Attorney General, John W. McIntosh,
Deputy Attorney General, Donald J. Zelenka, Senior Assistant
Deputy Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF SOUTH
CAROLINA, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Edmund Goins (“Appellant”), an inmate in the
custody of the state of South Carolina, petitions for a writ of
habeas corpus in connection with his life sentence for assault
and battery with intent to kill (“ABWIK”). He argues that his
trial counsel was ineffective under Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668 (1984), for failing to present evidence of his
mental health issues in order to negate the mens rea required
for an ABWIK conviction.
On state habeas review, the South Carolina Court of
Appeals rejected Appellant’s ineffective assistance claim,
reasoning that his counsel’s failure to present the mental
health evidence could not have prejudiced the outcome of his
trial because South Carolina does not recognize a diminished
capacity defense. See Goins v. State (“Goins I”), No. 2010–UP–
339, 2010 WL 10080077, at *1 (S.C. Ct. App. June 29, 2010). The
District Court for the District of South Carolina agreed. See
Goins v. Warden, Perry Corr. Inst. (“Goins II”), No. 5:12–cv–
00267-JMC, 2013 WL 652995 (D.S.C. February 21, 2013). We
granted a Certificate of Appealability (“COA”) “on the issue of
whether [Appellant] received ineffective assistance of counsel
based on his claim that his trial attorney failed to adequately
investigate or present evidence regarding [his] mental health
issues.”
3
We conclude that Appellant’s challenge is, at bottom,
a challenge to a state court’s interpretation and application of
its own law, the federal ramifications of which have not been
preserved for our review. Consequently, we affirm the judgment
of the district court.
I.
On May 30, 2000, Appellant was incarcerated in a
maximum-security cell within the Cherokee County Detention
Center in Cherokee County, South Carolina, where he was awaiting
trial on several counts of breaking and entering. Appellant had
spent the day engaging in a variety of disciplinary infractions,
including flooding his toilet, dismantling a mop, and blocking
the view into his cell. He was naked, as his uniform had been
confiscated, save for a pair of underwear that he was wearing on
his head, he says, to “keep [his] head warm.” J.A. 176. 1 In
response to Appellant’s escalating infractions, two correctional
officers, Officers Blackwell and Wisher, asked cellblock control
to open his cell door. Once the door was opened, Appellant
rushed out, wielding a pillow and a filed metal rod. In the
ensuing melee, Appellant stabbed Officer Blackwell several
1
Citations to the “J.A.” refer to the Joint Appendix filed
by the parties in this appeal.
4
times. Officer Wisher and a second inmate, Trustee Ellis, were
stabbed when they attempted to intervene.
As a result of this incident, Appellant was indicted
in the Cherokee County Court of General Sessions for three
counts of ABWIK. On July 23, 2001, a jury convicted Appellant
on one count of ABWIK, for the attack on Officer Blackwell, and
two counts of the lesser included offense of assault and battery
of a high and aggravated nature (“ABHAN”), for the attacks on
Officer Wisher and Trustee Ellis. Based on his criminal
history, which included a prior ABWIK conviction, the state
court sentenced Appellant to a mandatory term of life
imprisonment without parole on the ABWIK count, see S.C. Code
Ann. § 17-25-45, and to two consecutive terms of ten years
imprisonment on the ABHAN counts. Appellant’s direct appeal, in
which he filed a pro se brief asserting ineffective assistance
of counsel, was unsuccessful.
On March 9, 2004, Appellant filed an application for
post-conviction relief (“PCR”) in state court. In that
application, he argued that his trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to investigate or present at trial evidence
concerning his history of mental health problems. On September
22, 2005, the PCR court conducted an evidentiary hearing on
Appellant’s claims. Both Appellant and his trial counsel
testified, and Appellant submitted various medical records
5
related to his stays at area hospitals (the “mental health
evidence”). Appellant did not present any expert testimony in
support of his claims.
On July 3, 2006, the PCR court entered an order
granting Appellant habeas relief on all three counts of
conviction. The PCR court found, inter alia, that Appellant had
a documented history of diagnoses for mood disorder, bipolar
disorder, polysubstance related disorder, and antisocial
personality disorder. In the PCR court’s view,
[I]f a jury had been exposed to evidence of
the Applicant’s prior episode of
decomposition where he stripped off his
clothes and engaged in aberrant behavior, 2
there is a reasonable probability sufficient
to undermine confidence in the outcome of
this trial, that the jury would have
interpreted the Applicant’s conduct on May
30, 2000, as impulsive and dangerous, but
insufficient to support a finding of [the
mens rea required for ABWIK]. . . . [and]
returned three convictions on ABHAN, as
opposed to two convictions on ABHAN and one
for AB[W]IK.
2
Appellant’s medical records contain reference to an
incident that occurred in 1997, when Appellant was first
diagnosed with bipolar disorder. See J.A. 384-86.
Specifically, on October 3, 1997, Appellant took off all of his
clothes and climbed a water tower because he believed he was
speaking with God. See id. at 316-17, 384. Immediately
following this incident, Appellant was involuntarily committed
to the Dorothea Dix Hospital in Raleigh, North Carolina. He was
released on October 9, 1997, over two and a half years before he
engaged in the conduct giving rise to the ABWIK conviction at
issue in the instant case.
6
J.A. 495 (internal citations omitted).
On July 30, 2007, the state of South Carolina filed a
petition for a writ of certiorari to the South Carolina Supreme
Court. That court transferred the appeal to the South Carolina
Court of Appeals, which granted the petition for the writ of
certiorari on March 11, 2009. The South Carolina Court of
Appeals reversed the PCR Court’s grant of post-conviction relief
and reinstated the three convictions on June 29, 2010.
In its opinion, the South Carolina Court of Appeals
acknowledged the mental health evidence, but emphasized that
Appellant had not “put forth any evidence that he was either
insane at the time of the assaults or incompetent at the time of
trial.” Goins I, No. 2010–UP–339, 2010 WL 10080077, at *1 (S.C.
App. June 29, 2010). It went on to characterize the PCR court’s
prejudice analysis as “tantamount to a recognition of the
defense of diminished capacity, 3 which we do not recognize in
3
The South Carolina Supreme Court has described the
diminished capacity defense as follows:
The diminished capacity doctrine allows a
defendant to offer evidence of his mental
condition with respect to his capacity to
achieve the mens rea required for the
commission of the offense charged. In
particular, the defense may be invoked to
negate specific intent, where such intent is
an element of the offense charged.
Diminished capacity differs from the
insanity defense in that it may be raised by
(Continued)
7
this state.” Id. at *1 (citations omitted). Consequently, the
South Carolina Court of Appeals concluded, Appellant had failed
to demonstrate that his trial counsel’s failure to introduce
this evidence “undermine[d] confidence in the outcome of the
trial.” Id. (citing Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 42-44
(2009) (per curiam)).
Appellant unsuccessfully sought discretionary review
of the South Carolina Court of Appeals’ decision in the South
Carolina Supreme Court. Thereafter, on January 26, 2012,
Appellant filed a federal habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C
§ 2254 in the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina. In his petition, he again argued that he was
denied effective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel
failed to investigate his mental health disorders and present
the mental health evidence. On February 21, 2013, the district
court dismissed the petition and denied a COA. See Goins II,
No. 5:12–cv–00267-JMC, 2013 WL 652995, at *4 (D.S.C. February
21, 2013). Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on March
18, 2013, and we granted a COA “on the issue of whether
a defendant who has conceded to be legally
sane.
Gill v. State, 552 S.E.2d 26, 32 (S.C. 2001) (internal citations
omitted).
8
[Appellant] received ineffective assistance of counsel based on
his claim that his trial attorney failed to adequately
investigate or present evidence regarding [his] mental health
issues.”
II.
Although we review de novo a district court’s decision
on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus that is based on the
state court record, see Barnes v. Joyner, --- F.3d ----, 2014 WL
1759085, at *6 (4th Cir. May 5, 2014), we review the underlying
state court judgment pursuant to the deferential standards set
forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (“AEDPA”).
The relevant statute permits a federal court to grant
relief to a state petitioner “only on the ground that he is in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); see also Wilson v.
Corcoran, 131 S. Ct. 13, 16 (2010) (per curiam) (“‘[F]ederal
habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.’”
(quoting Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991))). When a
claim has been adjudicated on the merits in a state court
proceeding, habeas relief is permissible under AEDPA only if the
state court’s determination:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary
to, or involved an unreasonable application
of, clearly established Federal law, as
9
determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on
an unreasonable determination of the facts
in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). We must also presume the correctness of
the state court’s factual findings unless rebutted by clear and
convincing evidence, see id. § 2254(e)(1), and we are bound by
“a state court’s interpretation of state law, including one
announced on direct appeal of the challenged conviction,”
Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005) (per curiam)
(citations omitted).
As the Supreme Court of the United States has
repeatedly emphasized, AEDPA imposes a “highly deferential
standard for evaluating state-court rulings” that “demands that
state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.”
Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam)
(internal quotation marks omitted). “The question under AEDPA
is not whether a federal court believes the state court’s
determination was incorrect but whether that determination was
unreasonable —-a substantially higher threshold.” Schriro v.
Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007). Accordingly, “[a] state
court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal
habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on
the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v.
10
Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v.
Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). A state prisoner, in other
words, “‘must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim
being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification
that there was an error well understood and comprehended in
existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded
disagreement’” in order to obtain habeas relief from a federal
court. White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1702 (2014) (quoting
Harrington, 562 U.S. at 786-87).
To establish ineffective assistance under Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), a state habeas petitioner
must demonstrate not only that (1) his counsel’s performance was
deficient and (2) he suffered prejudice as a result, but also
that “the state court’s rejection of [the] claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel was ‘contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of’ Strickland, or it rested ‘on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the State court proceeding.’” Porter v. McCollum,
558 U.S. 30, 39 (2009) (per curiam) (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)). Notably, we need not address whether “counsel’s
performance was deficient before examining the prejudice
suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged
deficiencies.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. If we determine
that the state court “reasonably could have concluded that
11
[Appellant] was not prejudiced by counsel’s actions,” then we
need proceed no further with Appellant’s claim. Premo v. Moore,
131 S. Ct. 733, 745 (2011).
Under Strickland’s prejudice prong, “[t]he defendant
must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.” 466 U.S. at 694. As defined by the
Supreme Court, “[a] reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. “When
a defendant challenges a conviction, the question is whether
there is a reasonable probability that, absent [counsel’s]
errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt
respecting guilt.” Id. at 695. “The likelihood of a different
result must be substantial, not just conceivable.” Harrington,
131 S. Ct. at 792. In determining whether there is a reasonable
probability of a different result, we “consider all the relevant
evidence that the jury would have had before it if [counsel] had
pursued [a] different path.” Wong v. Belmontes, 558 U.S. 15, 19
(2009) (per curiam) (emphasis omitted). This includes evidence
that was adduced at trial as well as that which was not
presented until post-conviction review. See Porter, 558 U.S. at
41; see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696.
12
III.
In this appeal, Appellant argues that his trial
counsel’s failure to introduce evidence of his mental health
issues to negate the mens rea required for his ABWIK conviction
amounted to ineffective assistance under Strickland. We
conclude that the South Carolina Court of Appeals neither
unreasonably applied clearly established federal law nor made an
unreasonable determination of the facts in dismissing this claim
for lack of merit. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
A.
We turn first to Appellant’s argument that the South
Carolina Court of Appeals “unreasonably applied the law to
conclude that the [mental health evidence] constituted a
prohibited ‘diminished capacity’ defense under state law.”
Appellant’s Br. 25. In order to prevail on this theory,
Appellant must demonstrate that the South Carolina Court of
Appeals’ adjudication of his claim “resulted in a decision that
. . . involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). A state court
decision is an “unreasonable application of” clearly established
federal law when the state court “identifies the correct
governing legal rule from [the Supreme] Court’s cases but
13
unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state
prisoner’s case.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407 (2000).
Here, the South Carolina Court of Appeals correctly
identified Strickland and its progeny as the “clearly
established Federal law” governing Appellant’s ineffective
assistance claim. See Goins I, No. 2010–UP–339, 2010 WL
10080077, at *1 (S.C. App. June 29, 2010) (citing Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697 (1984))). It went on to rely on
two state court decisions, Gill v. State, 552 S.E.2d 26 (S.C.
2001), 4 and State v. Santiago, 634 S.E.2d 23 (S.C. Ct. App.
2006), 5 to conclude that the PCR court’s finding of prejudice
4
Gill is the seminal case in South Carolina on diminished
capacity. In that case, the trial court permitted the defendant
to call an expert witness, who testified that the defendant had
borderline mental capacity and an antisocial personality. Gill,
522 S.E.2d at 32. The expert opined that, as a result of these
conditions, the defendant “could not formulate malice
aforethought, an essential element of murder.” Id. The
defendant asked for a diminished capacity instruction at the
close of trial, and the judge refused. See id. The South
Carolina Supreme Court affirmed, holding, “[t]he trial judge did
not err by refusing to charge diminished capacity because it is
not recognized in South Carolina.” Id.
5
In Santiago, the trial court refused a defendant’s request
to have an expert witness testify during trial “that because of
[the defendant’s] Asperger’s disorder he did not have the
requisite mental state to commit murder nor the ability to
provide a voluntary confession.” 634 S.E.2d at 161-62. The
South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed, observing,
“[e]ssentially, defense counsel argued that [the defendant] was
culpable of a lesser offense because of his diminished capacity.
However, the diminished capacity defense is not recognized in
South Carolina.” Id. at 162.
14
under Strickland was “tantamount to a recognition of the defense
of diminished capacity, which we do not recognize in this
state.” Goins I, 2010 WL 10080077, at *1. Having found that
the evidence presented to the PCR court was thus inadmissible
for Appellant’s intended purpose as a matter of state
evidentiary law, the South Carolina Court of Appeals determined
Appellant could not have been prejudiced within the meaning of
Strickland by its absence. See id.Appellant contends the South Carolina Court of
Appeals’ decision erroneously “conflated the affirmative defense
of diminished capacity with more traditional defensive efforts
to introduce evidence to undermine the prosecution’s burden” of
proving intent. Appellant’s Br. 27. He points to a plethora of
cases from state courts, district courts, and other circuit
courts of appeals in support of his theory that South Carolina
has apparently settled on an “incorrect definition of diminished
capacity.” Id. at 33. What other courts may think of South
Carolina law, however, is of no moment -- “[i]t is beyond the
mandate of federal habeas courts [] to correct the
interpretation by state courts of a state’s own laws.”
Richardson v. Branker, 668 F.3d 128, 141 (4th Cir. 2012)
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also Wilson v. Corcoran, 131 S. Ct. 13, 16 (2010) (per curiam)
(“‘[F]ederal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of
15
state law’” (quoting Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67
(1991))). 6 Consequently, in analyzing Appellant’s ineffective
assistance claim, we are bound by the South Carolina Court of
Appeals’ interpretation of South Carolina’s evidentiary rules.
See Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005) (per curiam)
(“[A] state court’s interpretation of state law, including one
announced on direct appeal of the challenged conviction, binds a
federal court sitting in habeas corpus.”).
In light of the foregoing principles, we will not
disturb the South Carolina Court of Appeals’ conclusion that
Appellant was not prejudiced within the meaning of Strickland
when his trial counsel failed to make an attempt to introduce
inadmissible evidence. As the Fifth Circuit recently observed,
“the failure to make a meritless attempt at introducing evidence
could not have prejudiced [the petitioner] because the evidence
ultimately would not have been introduced.” Garza v. Stephens,
738 F.3d 669, 677 (5th Cir. 2013); see also Hoots v. Allsbrook,
6
We must reject Appellant’s attempt to give a
constitutional dimension to this argument through invocation of
the Due Process Clause. Although we do not doubt a habeas
petitioner’s ability to challenge a state evidentiary scheme as
violative of his due process rights, see, e.g., Clark v.
Arizona, 548 U.S. 735 (2006), any such challenge falls well
outside of the COA in this case, see United States v. Nicholson,
475 F.3d 241, 244 (4th Cir. 2007) (observing that a petitioner’s
“appeal is limited” to the specific issue or issues identified
in the COA); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c).
16
785 F.2d 1214, 1222 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that trial
counsel’s “decision not to attempt to introduce inadmissible
evidence . . . did not constitute ineffective assistance of
counsel”). Indeed, even taking Appellant’s arguments at face
value, his failure to make a specific proffer to the PCR court
as to what an expert witness would have testified regarding the
mental health evidence, had trial counsel properly investigated
and sought to present such testimony, reduces any claim of
prejudice to mere speculation and is fatal to his claim. See
Beaver v. Thompson, 93 F.3d 1186, 1195 (4th Cir. 1996) (“[A]n
allegation of inadequate investigation does not warrant habeas
relief absent a proffer of what favorable evidence or testimony
would have been produced.”); Bassette v. Thompson, 915 F.2d 932,
940-41 (4th Cir. 1990) (appellant’s failure to “advise us of
what an adequate investigation would have revealed or what these
witnesses might have said, if they had been called to testify”
was fatal to his ineffective assistance of counsel claim).
Consequently, we hold that the South Carolina Court of
Appeals’ decision rejecting Appellant’s ineffective assistance
claim was not an unreasonable application of clearly established
federal law.
B.
We need only briefly consider Appellant’s second and
final argument, i.e., that the South Carolina Court of Appeals
17
“unreasonabl[y] appli[ed] . . . the historical facts” when it
“assum[ed] that [Appellant] would not have been allowed to
introduce his mental health-related evidence to negate mens
rea.” Appellant’s Br. 37. Although Appellant appears to
present this theory in terms of a factual challenge under 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), it is little more than a reimagining of his
first argument under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). In any event,
inasmuch as Appellant has wholly failed to demonstrate that any
of the South Carolina Court of Appeals’ “factual
determination[s]” as to the admissibility of the mental health
evidence were “objectively unreasonable in light of the record
before the court,” Merzbacher v. Shearin, 706 F.3d 356, 364 (4th
Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted), we readily
conclude he is not entitled to habeas relief under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(2).
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
district court is
AFFIRMED.
18