Ali v. Energy Enterprise Solutions, LLC

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-1700
ASSAM R. ALI,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
ENERGY ENTERPRISE SOLUTIONS, LLC,
Defendant – Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Deborah K. Chasanow, Chief District
Judge. (8:09-cv-01628-DKC)
Submitted: January 10, 2011 Decided: March 3, 2011
Before WILKINSON and KEENAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON,
Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Kathlynne Ramirez, KATHLYNNE RAMIREZ, ESQ., LLC, Gaithersburg,
Maryland; Christopher R. Pudelski, LAW OFFICES OF CHRISTOPHER R.
PUDELSKI, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. John J. Hathway,
David M. Stevens, WHITEFORD, TAYLOR & PRESTON, L.L.P.,
Washington, D.C., for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Assam R. Ali appeals the district court's order
granting Defendant’s summary judgment motion on Ali’s race
discrimination and retaliation claims, brought pursuant to Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (West 2003 & Supp. 2010). Ali asserts that
the district court erred when it granted Defendant summary
judgment because he alleges that he established genuine issues
of material fact regarding his claims. We review the district
court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the facts and
the reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party. See Robinson v. Clipse, 602 F.3d 605,
607 (4th Cir. 2010). For the following reasons, we affirm the
district court’s order.
We conclude that the district court correctly
determined that Ali could not establish a disparate discipline
claim based on Defendant’s revocation of his network privileges
because Ali did not establish that others outside his protected
class were disciplined less severely for similar conduct. See
Cook v. CSX Transp. Co., 988 F.2d 507, 511 (4th Cir. 1993)
(holding that to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory
discipline, the plaintiff must establish that “the prohibited
conduct in which he engaged was comparable in seriousness to
misconduct of employees outside the protected class”).
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We also conclude that the district court correctly
determined that Ali could not establish his disparate treatment
claim based on unequal pay because he could not rebut
Defendant’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the pay
differential. The reason was that two other network team
employees, although they had similar duties and
responsibilities, were paid slightly more because at the time
they joined Defendant’s network team, they possessed greater
educational qualifications or had longer length of service with
Defendant or in information technology, generally. See Wallace
v. Texas Tech Univ., 80 F.3d 1042, 1048-49 (5th Cir. 1996)
(recognizing that evidence of more experience in a particular
position is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for a pay
differential); cf. Stanziale v. Jargowsky, 200 F.3d 101, 108
(3d Cir. 2000) (recognizing that a pay differential based on
educational qualifications is an affirmative defense under the
Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006)).
Last, we conclude that the district court correctly
determined that Ali could not establish his retaliation claim
because he failed to establish that Defendant’s reason for
terminating him (i.e., his refusal to cooperate in finding him a
reassignment) was pretextual. Ali admitted that he refused to
cooperate with Defendant’s request for a revised resume and thus
refused to aid in his placement in a new position. Thus, the
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district court correctly determined that Ali’s refusal to
cooperate with Defendant’s request was a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for Ali’s termination. See, e.g.,
Montes v. Greater Twin Cities Youth Symphonies, 540 F.3d 852,
857-58 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding that employer satisfied burden
of identifying nondiscriminatory reason where plaintiff was
terminated “because he was unwilling to cooperate with board and
staff members”); Barnhart v. Pickrel, Schaeffer & Ebeling Co.,
12 F.3d 1382, 1389 (6th Cir. 1993) (“[S]ummary judgment was
proper because Defendants proffered two legitimate and non-
discriminatory reason[s] for termination--deterioration of work
and failure to cooperate--and [Plaintiff] failed to demonstrate
by a preponderance of evidence that those reasons were
pretext.”). We conclude that the district court correctly
determined that it was up to Ali to present evidence of pretext,
which he simply failed to do.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order
granting Defendant summary judgment on Ali’s discrimination and
retaliation claims. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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