United States v. Williams

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-5029
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ADRIENNE L. WILLIAMS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Peter J. Messitte, Senior District
Judge. (8:09-cr-00071-PJM-1)
Submitted: June 15, 2010 Decided: August 24, 2010
Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael E. Lawlor, Gwendolyn Ruth Waters, LAWLOR & ENGLERT, LLC,
Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United
States Attorney, Hollis Raphael Weisman, Assistant United States
Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Adrienne L. Williams appeals her conviction and seven
month sentence for one count of making false statements in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006) and one count of driving
under the influence of alcohol on lands administered by the
National Park Service in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 4.23(a). For
the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Williams first claims error in the district court’s
order denying her motion for a continuance shortly before her
trial was to begin. Several months before trial, the Government
provided Williams with a report prepared by an expert witness on
DNA tests she conducted in preparation for trial. Williams did
not retain an expert to analyze that report at that time. In
the days before the trial began, the Government provided
Williams with copies of the expert’s notes, worksheets, and
quality assurance documents. In response, Williams requested a
continuance to hire an expert to review the documents. The
district court denied the motion.
We review the denial of a motion for a continuance for
abuse of discretion. United States v. Williams, 445 F.3d 724,
739 (4th Cir. 2006). “[E]ven if such an abuse is found, the
defendant must show that the error specifically prejudiced her
case in order to prevail.” Id. (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Because the disclosure of the notes and
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worksheets was not required, Williams had the expert’s report in
her possession for months without retaining an expert of her
own, and several of the Government’s distant witnesses had
already arrived for trial, we find that the district court did
not abuse its discretion by denying the motion.
Next, Williams claims that the prosecutor engaged in
misconduct by making certain comments during her closing
statement to the jury. First, Williams claims that the
Government’s counsel improperly vouched for the credibility of
the arresting officer’s testimony by saying “[t]here is no
prosecutor who is going to put on the witness stand an officer
who tried to rape someone and vouch for the officer’s
credibility.” Williams claims that in the context of her trial
for making false claims, this statement impermissibly placed the
imprimatur of the Government on the witness’s testimony.
Next, Williams alleges misconduct in the prosecutor’s
statement that “[i]f Williams’s story [of sexual assault] had
been believed, Officer Ritacco would have been investigated in
more detail and prosecuted within the department by internal
affairs.” She argues that the prosecutor used this information
to bolster the veracity of Ritacco’s testimony. Williams also
argues that the prosecutor’s request that the jury “imagine an
accusation of rape against your husband or your boyfriend or
your father, how that would make you feel. Just imagine an
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accusation of rape against you” impermissibly inflamed their
emotions and denied her the right to an impartial jury.
Because Williams did not object to any of these
statements at trial, we review for plain error. See United
States v. Sanchez, 118 F.3d 192, 197 (4th Cir. 1997); United
States v. Adam, 70 F.3d 776, 780 (4th Cir. 1995). Under the
plain error test, United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-37
(1993), a defendant must show that (1) error occurred; (2) the
error was plain; and (3) the error affected his substantial
rights. Id. at 732. Even when these conditions are satisfied,
this court may exercise its discretion to notice the error only
if the error “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or
public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
We review a claim of prosecutorial misconduct “to
determine whether the conduct so infected the trial with
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due
process.” United States v. Scheetz, 293 F.3d 175, 185
(4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The test
for reversible prosecutorial misconduct has two components;
first, the defendant must show that the prosecutor’s remarks or
conduct were improper and, second, the defendant must show that
such remarks or conduct prejudicially affected his substantial
rights so as to deprive him of a fair trial.” Id.4
In evaluating the allegedly improper remarks, we find
that the prosecutor likely engaged in impermissible vouching,
bolstering, and making so-called “golden rule” comments to the
jury by improperly trying to place them in the crime victim’s
shoes. While we find these comments inappropriate, we cannot
say that Williams was so prejudiced by the comments as to affect
her substantial rights or deny her a fair trial. Indeed, the
Government adduced overwhelming evidence that Williams
fabricated her claim that Ritacco attempted to sexually assault
her. Based on our review of the entire record, we decline to
disturb Williams’s convictions on this ground.
We therefore affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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