United States v. Gerald Walker

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4723
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
GERALD EUGENE WALKER,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles,
District Judge. (1:13-cr-00017-CCE-1)
Submitted: May 29, 2014 Decided: June 5, 2014
Before MOTZ, KING, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, Gregory Davis, Senior
Litigator, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley
Rand, United States Attorney, Kyle D. Pousson, Special Assistant
United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Gerald Eugene Walker pled guilty to possession of
ammunition by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2012),
preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to
suppress. The district court sentenced Walker to 188 months’
imprisonment. Walker appeals.
Construing the facts in the light most favorable to
the Government, United States v. Black, 707 F.3d 531, 534 (4th
Cir. 2013), the evidence before the district court established
the following. On the afternoon of October 17, 2012, Durham,
North Carolina Police Officer Ryan Harris was on patrol with a
civilian “ride-along” passenger. In order to demonstrate for
the passenger how a police officer “runs license plates,” Harris
did so with the license plate on the vehicle in front of him—a
gray Honda. As a result, Harris discovered that the
registration was expired and the car had no insurance. Harris
followed the vehicle for a short time, and then activated his
lights when it turned into a gas station parking lot. As Harris
approached the vehicle, the driver and passenger—Walker—both
emerged from the Honda. Harris ordered both of them to stay in
the car. Walker ignored Harris’ instruction and continued to
walk away from the car. According to Harris, he ordered Walker
and the driver to remain in the vehicle as part of standard
officer safety procedures. Walker continued to walk away from
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Harris, and, as Harris approached him, Walker started to run.
Harris noticed Walker tugging on his belt buckle and then
noticed what appeared to be a gun. Harris ordered Walker to
drop the weapon, but, after Walker kept running away, Harris
fired at Walker, missing him. The chase continued until Walker
turned and shot at Harris, missing him as well. Walker was soon
apprehended nearby by other officers.
Walker was charged in a single-count indictment with
possession of ammunition by a felon. He filed a motion to
suppress, arguing that Harris’ order to return to the vehicle
constituted an unlawful seizure in violation of Walker’s Fourth
Amendment rights. After a hearing, the district court denied
the motion. Walker noted a timely appeal.
We review the district court’s factual findings
regarding the motion to suppress for clear error, and the
court’s legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Burgess,
684 F.3d 445, 452 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 490(2012).
A vehicle stop is permissible if the officer has
probable cause to believe a traffic violation has occurred,
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996), or has a
reasonable suspicion of unlawful conduct, regardless of the
officer’s subjective motivations, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-
22 (1968). Here, it is undisputed that the automobile in which
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Walker was a passenger had expired tags and no insurance. Thus,
he apparently concedes that the initial traffic stop was lawful.
Walker argues, however, that in order for Harris to
detain him in the vehicle, the officer needed a “reasonable
suspicion” that Walker was engaged in criminal activity. We
disagree. A lawful traffic stop justifies detaining the
vehicle’s occupants for the time necessary to request a driver’s
license and vehicle registration, run a computer check, and
issue a citation. United States v. Digiovanni, 650 F.3d 498,
507 (4th Cir. 2011). “Additionally, ‘a police officer may as a
matter of course order the driver of a lawfully stopped car to
exit his vehicle.’ . . . That rule, the justification for which
is officer safety, extends to passengers as well.” United
States v. Vaughan, 700 F.3d 705, 710 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting
Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 410 (1997)). Because Harris
clearly had the authority to order Walker to exit the vehicle,
we find that Harris also possessed the authority to order him to
remain inside the vehicle. See United States v. Williams, 419
F.3d 1029, 1031 (9th Cir. 2005) (“We now hold that a passenger’s
compliance with an officer’s command to get back into the car in
which the passenger had just exited is not an unreasonable
seizure under the Fourth Amendment.”); see also United States v.
Sanders, 510 F.3d 788 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that officer’s
seizure of vehicle passenger, by ordering him, after he left the
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vehicle during a traffic stop, to reenter it, was reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Clark, 337 F.3d
1282, 1288 (11th Cir. 2003) (finding no Fourth Amendment
violation where officer, in order to protect his own safety,
ordered defendant to reenter automobile in which he had been
passenger).
Moreover, as noted by the district court, even though
Harris had the authority to detain Walker, he did not do so
because Walker did not respond to his directions to stop and get
back in the car. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626
(1991) (holding that a fleeing suspect was not “seized,” for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment, until he was physically
apprehended).
Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Walker’s motion
to suppress and affirm his conviction. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
addressed in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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