United States v. Dakota Brown

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4823
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DAKOTA BROWN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. Patrick Michael Duffy, Senior
District Judge. (2:10-cr-01203-PMD-1)
Submitted: February 21, 2012 Decided: February 29, 2012
Before SHEDD and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
J. Robert Haley, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Charleston,
South Carolina, for Appellant. William N. Nettles, United
States Attorney, Matthew J. Modica, Assistant United States
Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Following a jury trial, Dakota Brown was convicted of
possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006). The district court sentenced him to
108 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Brown argues that the
district court improperly limited his cross-examination of a law
enforcement witness and that the Government failed to produce
sufficient evidence to support his conviction. We affirm.
We review the district court’s evidentiary rulings for
abuse of discretion. United States v. Blake, 571 F.3d 331, 350
(4th Cir. 2009). “A district court abuses its discretion when
it acts arbitrarily or irrationally, . . . relies on erroneous
factual or legal premises, or commits an error of law.” United
States v. Delfino, 510 F.3d 468, 470 (4th Cir. 2007). We
consider “the evidence in a light most favorable to its
proponent, maximizing its probative value and minimizing its
prejudicial effect.” United States v. Cole, 631 F.3d 146, 153
(4th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“District courts . . . retain wide latitude . . . to
impose reasonable limits on . . . cross-examination based on
concerns about[] . . . prejudice, confusion of the issues, . . .
or interrogation that is . . . only marginally relevant.”
United States v. Ayala, 601 F.3d 256, 273 (4th Cir.) (internal
quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 262 (2010).
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Here, the district court declined to permit Brown’s counsel to
cross-examine the primary Government witness — a law enforcement
officer — regarding a reprimand he had received for conduct that
was wholly unrelated to the charge for which Brown was on trial.
Cross-examination about the reprimand would have been, at best,
only marginally relevant to an assessment of the officer’s
credibility. Coupled with the possibility for confusion and
prejudice, we are not persuaded that the district court abused
its discretion in prohibiting cross-examination on such a
collateral matter.
Turning to the sufficiency of the evidence, we review
a district court’s denial of a Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 motion de
novo. United States v. Penniegraft, 641 F.3d 566, 571 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 564 (2011). We must affirm
“[i]f there is substantial evidence to support the verdict,
after viewing all of the evidence and the inferences therefrom
in the light most favorable to the Government.” United
States v. Murphy, 35 F.3d 143, 148 (4th Cir. 1994). “In
assessing the evidence, the jury’s resolution of all evidentiary
conflicts and credibility determinations must be given
deference.” United States v. Bonner, 648 F.3d 209, 213
(4th Cir. 2011).
Brown argues that the only evidence he possessed a
firearm was the testimony of a law enforcement witness; he
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accurately observes that there was no forensic evidence linking
him to the gun. However, we have held that the uncorroborated
testimony of a single witness may be sufficient evidence of
guilt. United States v. Wilson, 115 F.3d 1185, 1189-90
(4th Cir. 1997). As the verdict here rests on substantial
evidence, we cannot accept Brown’s invitation to disturb it by
substituting the jury’s credibility determinations with our own.
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the
district court. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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