United States v. Leroy Scott, Jr.

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4890
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LEROY SCOTT, JR., a/k/a Roy Scott,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Mark S. Davis, District
Judge. (2:13-cr-00020-MSD-LRL-1)
Submitted: June 30, 2014 Decided: July 8, 2014
Before GREGORY, DUNCAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Mark A. Yurachek, MARK ALLEN YURACHEK & ASSOCIATES, Falls
Church, Virginia, for Appellant. Dana J. Boente, United States
Attorney, Benjamin L. Hatch, Assistant United States Attorney,
Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Leroy Scott, Jr., appeals from his convictions for
conspiracy to tamper with a witness/informant in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1512(k) (2012) (Count 1); conspiracy to retaliate
against a witness/informant in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1513(f)
(2012) (Count 2); tampering with a witness/informant in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(A), (3)(A) & 18 U.S.C. § 2(2012) (Count 3); retaliating against a witness/informant in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1513(a)(1)(B), (a)(2)(A) & 18 U.S.C.
§ 2 (2012) (Count 4); and use of a firearm resulting in death in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), (j) (2012) & 18 U.S.C. § 2(Count 5). He was sentenced to life imprisonment for Counts 1-4
and a consecutive life sentence for Count 5. On appeal, Scott
raises one issue: whether the district court erred by denying
his motion to suppress statements made to investigators. For
the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Scott argues that his statements to investigators were
made in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
When considering a district court’s ruling on a motion to
suppress, we review the district court’s legal conclusions de
novo and its factual findings for clear error. United States v.
McGee, 736 F.3d 263, 269 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S.
Ct. 1572 (2014). If the district court’s determination “of the
evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its
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entirety,” we will affirm those findings, even if we “would have
decided the fact[s] differently.” United States v. Stevenson,
396 F.3d 538, 542 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Where the district court denies the suppression
motion, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to
the Government, United States v. Black, 707 F.3d 531, 534 (4th
Cir. 2013), and defer to the district court’s credibility
findings. United States v. Griffin, 589 F.3d 148, 150 n.1 (4th
Cir. 2009).
We find no reversible error in the district court’s
denial of Scott’s motion to suppress. As noted by the district
court, Scott knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights under
Miranda, and the record reveals that he provided no statements
or evidence to the police prior to signing his Miranda waiver.
Accordingly, we affirm Scott’s convictions. We also deny
Scott’s two motions to file a pro se supplemental brief. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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