United States v. William Chapman

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4956
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
WILLIAM DEAN CHAPMAN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Gerald Bruce Lee, District
Judge. (1:13-cr-00233-GBL-1)
Submitted: June 27, 2014 Decided: July 11, 2014
Before WILKINSON and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON,
Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed in part; dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
April E. Fearnley, FEARNLEY LAW PLLC, Vienna, Virginia, for
Appellant. Dana J. Boente, Acting United States Attorney, Chad
Golder, Assistant United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
William Dean Chapman pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea
agreement to one count of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1343 (2012). Chapman contends that he did not knowingly and
voluntarily waive his right to counsel for the purpose of his
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. He further contends that
the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion
to withdraw the guilty plea. Also, he challenges the court’s
findings under the Sentencing Guidelines. We affirm in part,
and because we will enforce the appeal waiver, dismiss in part.
A defendant may waive his right to counsel so long as
the waiver is knowing and voluntary. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458 (1938). The determination of whether there has been an
intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each
case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding
the case, including the background, education, sophistication,
experience, the conduct of the accused and the stage of the
proceeding. Id. at 464; Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 88 (2004).
In deciding whether the defendant’s waiver of counsel was
sufficient, an appellate court should examine the entire record.
United States v. Singleton, 107 F.3d 1091, 1097 (4th Cir. 1997).
This circuit holds that no particular interrogation of the
defendant is required, so long as the court warns the defendant
of the dangers of self representation so that he makes his
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choice with his eyes open. United States v. King, 582 F.2d 888,
890 (4th Cir. 1978).
We have reviewed the record, and given the stage of
the proceeding, Chapman’s educational background and work
experience, the district court’s familiarity with Chapman’s
motion to withdraw, there being little risk of complex legal
issues and Chapman’s knowledge regarding the legal standard for
a motion to withdraw a plea and the factors that are considered
by the court, we conclude that Chapman’s waiver of his right to
counsel was knowing and voluntary.
We review the denial of a motion to withdraw the
guilty plea for abuse of discretion. United States v. Ubakanma,
215 F.3d 421, 424 (4th Cir. 2000). A defendant bears the burden
of demonstrating to the district court’s satisfaction that a
“fair and just reason” supports the request to withdraw. Fed.
R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B). There are six factors that are
considered when determining whether a defendant should be
permitted to withdraw the plea. See United States v. Moore, 931
F.2d 245, 248 (4th Cir. 1991). The factors are whether:
(1) the defendant has offered credible evidence that his plea
was not knowing or voluntary; (2) the defendant has credibly
asserted his legal innocence; (3) there has been a delay between
the entering of the plea and the filing of the motion; (4) the
defendant has had close assistance of competent counsel; (5) the
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withdrawal will cause prejudice to the government; and (6) the
withdrawal will inconvenience the court and waste judicial
resources. Id. Factors One, Two and Four carry the most weight
when deciding whether there is a fair and just reason to grant
the motion. United States v. Sparks, 67 F.3d 1145, 1154 (4th
Cir. 1995). Moreover, the key in determining whether a motion
to withdraw should be granted is whether the plea hearing was
properly conducted under Rule 11. United States v. Puckett, 61
F.3d 1092, 1099 (4th Cir. 1995).
We have reviewed the record, the plea colloquy and the
district court’s reasons for denying Chapman’s motion. We note
that Chapman’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary, that he
failed to credibly assert his legal innocence, that the delay
was inordinate, that at the time of the plea Chapman was
assisted by counsel, and that granting the motion would have
prejudiced the Government and caused a waste of judicial
resources had the Government chosen to proceed to trial.
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in denying the motion.
Chapman’s challenge to his sentence is foreclosed by
his appeal waiver. Chapman agreed to waive his right to appeal
the conviction and “any sentence within the statutory
maximum[.]” (Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) at 21). Chapman also
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acknowledged during the plea colloquy that he was waiving his
right to appeal whatever sentence was imposed. (J.A. at 48).
We review the validity of an appellate waiver de novo.
United States v. Copeland, 707 F.3d 522, 528 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 134 S. Ct. 126 (2013). We “generally will enforce a
waiver . . . if the record establishes that the waiver is valid
and that the issue being appealed is within the scope of the
waiver.” United States v. Thornsbury, 670 F.3d 532, 537 (4th
Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). A
defendant’s waiver is valid if he agreed to it “knowingly and
intelligently.” United States v. Manigan, 592 F.3d 621, 627
(4th Cir. 2010). “Although the validity of an appeal waiver
often depends on the adequacy of the plea colloquy, the issue
ultimately is evaluated by reference to the totality of the
circumstances,” United States v. Davis, 689 F.3d 349, 355 (4th
Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted), such as “the
experience and conduct of the accused, as well as the accused’s
educational background and familiarity with the terms of the
plea agreement.” Thornsbury, 670 F.3d at 537 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Based on the totality of the circumstances, we
conclude that Chapman knowingly and voluntarily waived his right
to appeal whatever sentence was imposed and at the Government’s
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urging, will enforce the waiver. Thus, we dismiss the appeal
from that part of the judgment imposing sentence.
Accordingly, we affirm in part and dismiss in part.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART;
DISMISSED IN PART
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