United States v. Stevens

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4125
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
AHMAD RASHARD STEVENS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. David C. Norton, Chief District
Judge. (2:05-cr-01095-DCN-1)
Submitted: October 19, 2010 Decided: November 12, 2010
Before WILKINSON, KING, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis H. Lang, CALLISON, TIGHE & ROBINSON, LLC, Columbia, South
Carolina, for Appellant. Sean Kittrell, Assistant United States
Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
In April 2007, the district court sentenced Ahmad
Rashard Stevens to five years of probation following Stevens’
guilty plea to possession with intent to distribute marijuana,
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2006). In June 2009,
Stevens was charged with several violations of his probation,
which he admitted. The district court revoked Stevens’
probation and sentenced him to forty-two months of imprisonment
and Stevens now appeals. His attorney has filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), raising
two issues but stating that there are no meritorious issues for
appeal. Stevens was informed of his right to file a pro se
supplemental brief but did not do so. Finding no error, we
affirm.
In the Anders brief, counsel first questions whether
the district court erred in revoking Stevens’ probation.
Appellate courts review a district court’s decision to revoke
probation for abuse of discretion. See Burns v. United States,
287 U.S. 216, 222 (1932); United States v. Bujak, 347 F.3d 607,
609 (6th Cir. 2003); Gov’t of the V.I. v. Martinez, 239 F.3d
293, 301 (3d Cir. 2001). The district court need only find a
violation of a term of probation by a preponderance of the
evidence. Bujak, 347 F.3d at 609. Here, Stevens admitted that
he violated the terms of his probation. We therefore conclude
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that the district court did not abuse its discretion in revoking
Stevens’ probation.
Counsel next questions whether the sentence imposed
following the revocation of probation was plainly unreasonable.
Upon a finding of a probation violation, the district court may
revoke probation and resentence the defendant to any sentence
within the statutory maximum for the original offense. 18
U.S.C. § 3565(a) (2006); United States v. Schaefer, 120 F.3d
505, 507 (4th Cir. 1997). “[W]e review probation revocation
sentences, like supervised release revocation sentences, to
determine if they are plainly unreasonable.” United States v.
Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007). We first assess the
sentence for unreasonableness, “follow[ing] generally the
procedural and substantive considerations employed in reviewing
original sentences . . . .” United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d
433, 438-39 (4th Cir. 2006). However, “[t]his initial inquiry
takes a more ‘deferential appellate posture concerning issues of
fact and the exercise of discretion’ than reasonableness review
for guidelines sentences.” Moulden, 478 F.3d at 656 (quoting
Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438). Only if we determine that a sentence
is procedurally or substantively unreasonable will we “decide
whether the sentence is plainly unreasonable.” Id.Although a district court must consider the policy
statements in Chapter Seven of the sentencing guidelines along
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with the statutory requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), “‘the
court ultimately has broad discretion to revoke its previous
sentence and impose a term of imprisonment up to the statutory
maximum.’” Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439 (quoting United States v.
Lewis, 424 F.3d 239, 244 (2d Cir. 2005)) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Moulden, 478 F.3d at 656-57. Such a
sentence is substantively reasonable if the district court
stated a proper basis for concluding that the defendant should
receive the sentence imposed. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. “The
court must provide a statement of reasons for the sentence
imposed, as with the typical sentencing procedure, but this
statement ‘need not be as specific as has been required’ for
departing from a traditional guidelines range.” Moulden, 478
F.3d at 657 (quoting Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438). A sentence is
plainly unreasonable if it is clearly or obviously unreasonable.
Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439. We have thoroughly reviewed the record
and conclude that the sentence imposed is both procedurally and
substantively reasonable; it follows, therefore, that the
sentence is not plainly unreasonable.
We have examined the entire record in accordance with
the requirements of Anders and have found no other meritorious
issues for appeal. We therefore affirm the judgment of the
district court. This court requires that counsel inform
Stevens, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court
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of the United States for further review. If Stevens requests
that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a
petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court
for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion
must state that a copy thereof was served on Stevens. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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