United States v. Joseph Bassett

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4611
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JOSEPH BASSETT,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. William D. Quarles, Jr., District
Judge. (1:11-cr-00512-WDQ-1)
Submitted: March 27, 2013 Decided: April 4, 2013
Before NIEMEYER, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Julie L.B. Johnson, OFFICE
OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Greenbelt, Maryland, for
Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Antonio
J. Reynolds, Assistant United States Attorney, Greenbelt,
Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Joseph Bassett pled guilty to possession of a firearm
by a convicted felon and was sentenced as an armed career
criminal to the mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years
prescribed by 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(e) (West 2000 & Supp. 2012).
Bassett appeals his sentence, arguing that imposition of the
fifteen-year sentence was error because mandatory minimum
sentences conflict with the mandate in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
(2006) to impose a sentence “sufficient but not greater than
necessary.” He further contends that a fifteen-year sentence is
greater than necessary in his case to achieve the sentencing
goals of § 3553(a). We affirm.
The Sentencing Reform Act, of which § 3553(a) is part,
dictates that a defendant should be sentenced in accordance with
its provisions to achieve the purposes of § 3553(a)(2) “[e]xcept
as otherwise specifically provided.” 18 U.S.C. § 3551(a)
(2006). Courts have generally held that statutorily-mandated
minimum sentences are “otherwise specifically provided” and thus
do not conflict with § 3553(a)’s “sufficient but not greater
than necessary” clause. See United States v. Sutton, 625 F.3d
526, 529 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Kellum, 356 F.3d 285,
289 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[T]he [statutory] mandatory minimum
sentences [the defendant] was exposed to . . . clearly fit
within the ‘except as otherwise specifically provided’ exclusion
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of § 3551(a).”). “Courts have uniformly rejected the claim that
§ 3553(a)’s ‘no greater than necessary’ language authorizes a
district court to sentence below the statutory minimum.” United
States v. Cirilo-Muñoz, 582 F.3d 54, 55 (1st Cir. 2009) (per
curiam) (collecting cases); see also United States v. Franklin,
499 F.3d 578, 585 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[Section] 3553(a) factors
do not apply to congressionally mandated sentences”); United
States v. Roberson, 474 F.3d 432, 436 (7th Cir. 2007)
(acknowledging tension between § 3553(a) and statutorily-
mandated sentences, but holding that § 3553(a) is a “very
general statute [that] cannot be understood to authorize courts
to sentence below minimums specifically prescribed by
Congress.”). In United States v. Robinson, 404 F.3d 850 (4th
Cir. 2005), we held that, even after United States v. Booker,
543 U.S. 220 (2005), except in limited circumstances not present
here, “a district court still may not depart below a statutory
minimum.” Id. at 862. Bassett’s reliance on United States v.
Raby, 575 F.3d 376 (4th Cir. 2009), is misplaced, as that case
provides no guidance on sentencing below a mandatory minimum.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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