United States v. Marco Huerta-Loya

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4321
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MARCO HUERTA-LOYA,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Newport News. Arenda Wright Allen,
District Judge. (4:11-cr-00070-AWA-TEM-1)
Submitted: October 24, 2012 Decided: November 6, 2012
Before KING and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Fernando Groene, FERNANDO GROENE, PC, Williamsburg, Virginia,
for Appellant. Neil H. MacBride, United States Attorney, Andrew
L. Creighton, Special Assistant United States Attorney, Newport
News, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
After pleading guilty to falsely claiming to be a
United States citizen, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 911 (2006),
Marco Huerta-Loya was convicted following a jury trial of
aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1028A(a)(1), (c) (2006), and sentenced to twenty-four months
and one day in prison. On appeal, Huerta-Loya challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting his aggravated identity
theft conviction. For the following reasons, we affirm.
A defendant challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence “bears a heavy burden,” as reversal of a conviction is
limited to “cases where the prosecution’s failure is clear.”
United States v. Foster, 507 F.3d 233, 244-45 (4th Cir. 2007).
Generally, we will “sustain a guilty verdict that, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, is
supported by substantial evidence.” United States v. Osborne,
514 F.3d 377, 385 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Further, we will “not review the credibility of the
witnesses and assume that the jury resolved all contradictions
in the testimony in favor of the government.” Foster, 507 F.3d
at 244-45.
To establish a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1),
the Government must prove a defendant (1) unlawfully and
knowingly transferred, possessed, or used, (2) another person’s
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means of identification, (3) during and in relation to a
qualifying predicate felony offense, in this case, Huerta-Loya’s
false claim of United States citizenship. United States v.
Abdelshafi, 592 F.3d 602, 607 (4th Cir. 2010). “For purposes of
18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1), a means of identification is . . . any
name or number that may be used, alone or in conjunction with
any other information, to identify a specific individual.” Id.
at 607 n.3 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United
States v. Mitchell, 518 F.3d 230, 233-34 (4th Cir. 2008)
(explaining differences between unique and non-unique
identifiers).
A conviction for aggravated identity theft requires
proof that the defendant knew that the means of identification
at issue actually belonged to a real person. Flores-Figueroa v.
United States, 556 U.S. 646, 657 (2009). Huerta-Loya argues
that the evidence at trial failed to prove that he possessed
such knowledge because nothing indicated that he had the
opportunity or means to learn that the documents he possessed,
an authentic Social Security card and Texas birth certificate,
belonged to a real person. We disagree.
The Government’s agent testified that Huerta-Loya
spoke and understood English well and, in response to the
agent’s questioning, repeatedly indicated that he knew the
documents he possessed belonged to a real person. Although
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Huerta-Loya suggests that neither he nor the agent correctly
understood one another due to a language barrier, we must assume
that the jury resolved any evidentiary contradictions in the
Government’s favor. Foster, 507 F.3d at 244-45.
Moreover, evidence regarding the way in which Huerta-
Loya obtained and used the documents in question suggested that
he knew they were genuine. For example, Huerta-Loya paid
substantially more for the birth certificate and the Social
Security card, which the seller represented to be “very good
papers,” than he did for a Texas photo-identification card he
knew to be fraudulent. Such information supports a reasonable
inference that Huerta-Loya was aware that the more expensive
documents were genuine. United States v. Gomez-Castro, 605 F.3d
1245, 1249 (11th Cir. 2010). The fact that Huerta-Loya paid the
going rate for such genuine documents in the area where he
purchased them strengthens such an inference. Likewise, the
documents in question, which were printed in a distinctive
manner that is very difficult and expensive to reproduce,
appeared authentic even to the untrained eye, further supporting
the conclusion that Huerta-Loya knew they were real. United
States v. Miranda-Lopez, 532 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 2008).
Additionally, Huerta-Loya admitted that he had
successfully used the Social Security card to obtain employment,
again suggesting his knowledge that it was genuine. United
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States v. Holmes, 595 F.3d 1255, 1258 (11th Cir. 2010); Gomez-
Castro, 605 F.3d at 1249. Construing as we must the relevant
contradictory testimony in favor of the Government, the fact
that Huerta-Loya falsely claimed United States citizenship even
after the Government’s agent had seized the Social Security card
and the birth certificate also supports a reasonable finding
that he was confident in the documents’ authenticity. Cf.
United States v. Clark, 668 F.3d 568, 574 (8th Cir. 2012)
(suspect’s response to investigation relevant to show
knowledge). Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence was
sufficient to prove that Huerta-Loya knew the means of
identification he possessed belonged to a real person.
Huerta-Loya also contends that the evidence failed to
establish that he possessed the documents in question “in
relation to” his false claim of United States citizenship. In
United States v. Mobley, 618 F.3d 539 (6th Cir. 2010), the Sixth
Circuit relied upon Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993),
to read the “in relation to” language of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1)
broadly, finding that it only required proof that the “means of
identification” facilitated or had the potential to facilitate
the predicate felony offense. Mobley, 618 F.3d at 548-50.
Considering the use of analogous statutory language in 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1) (2006), we have interpreted “in relation to” in an
equally broad fashion, finding specifically that a firearm is
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carried in relation to a drug trafficking offense if it has the
effect of protecting or emboldening the defendant in the
commission of his crime. United States v. Lipford, 203 F.3d
259, 266 (4th Cir. 2000). Our review of the record leads us to
conclude that the evidence established the “in relation to”
element.
First, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the Government, the documents had already been
recovered by the Government’s agent at the time Huerta-Loya made
his false claim of citizenship, thus permitting the conclusion
that they emboldened Huerta-Loya’s violation of 18 U.S.C. § 911by serving as an immediate means of corroborating his deceptive
statements. Further, the evidence established that Huerta-Loya,
who was at work aboard a fishing vessel when initially detained,
kept the birth certificate and the Social Security card close at
hand and readily available. On these facts, we conclude that a
reasonable juror could have found that Huerta-Loya did so
because the documents would be helpful should he find himself in
the exact predicament he in fact faced, the necessity that he
quickly dispel suspicions regarding his citizenship during
unexpected investigations by immigration officials. Cf. United
States v. Mitchell, 104 F.3d 649, 654 (4th Cir. 1997) (firearm
is not carried “in relation to” a drug crime when its presence
is the product of accident or coincidence).
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Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
The written judgment, however, erroneously reflects that Huerta-
Loya was found guilty by a jury of both Counts one and two. We
remand to the district court for correction of the judgment,
pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 36, to reflect that Huerta-Loya
pled guilty to Count one and was found guilty by a jury on Count
two. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED
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