United States v. Dallas Williams

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4787
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DALLAS WILLIAMS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Catherine C. Blake, District Judge.
(1:10-cr-00546-CCB-1)
Submitted: May 21, 2013 Decided: June 6, 2013
Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, LaKeytria W. Felder,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greenbelt, Maryland, for
Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Debra L.
Dwyer, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Dallas Williams pled guilty, pursuant to a conditional
plea agreement, to being a convicted felon in possession of a
firearm and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)
(2006). The district court sentenced Williams as an armed
career criminal to the mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen
years prescribed by 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(e) (West Supp. 2012).
Williams appeals the denial of his Motion for a Franks 1 Hearing
and to Suppress Evidence. 2 In addition, Williams appeals his
sentence, arguing that mandatory minimum sentences conflict with
the mandate in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) to impose a sentence
“sufficient but not greater than necessary.” We affirm.
We consider first Williams’ contention that the
district court erred in denying his motion for a Franks hearing.
Williams claims that the district court erred by denying his
Franks suppression motion because Baltimore Police Department
Officer Clemmie O. Anderson III made deliberately false
statements in his affidavit supporting Williams’ arrest warrant
and that these false statements were material to the probable
cause determination. The affidavit described the police pursuit
1
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
2
Under his plea agreement, Williams preserved his right to
appeal the order denying his Franks suppression motion.
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of a 2001 Acura through the streets of Baltimore. At one point
during the chase, the Acura drove directly towards the police
vehicle, and each of the officers in the cruiser identified the
driver, through the windshield, as Williams. The Acura
eventually turned onto Schroeder Street in a school zone, and
the officers followed. Anderson’s affidavit stated that the
driver parked and escaped on foot and that the officers returned
to the abandoned Acura where they found various papers bearing
Williams’ name.
Based on the application, the state of Maryland
charged Williams with several traffic and eluding charges, and
an arrest warrant was issued. Williams was arrested on January
24, 2010, pursuant to the arrest warrant, and was found in
possession of a firearm and ammunition. A federal grand jury
subsequently charged Williams with possession of a firearm and
ammunition by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1).
Williams moved for a Franks hearing and to suppress
the tangible and derivative evidence, claiming that the arrest
warrant was based on Anderson’s knowing and false statements.
The district court conducted a motions hearing at which both
officers, the principal of the elementary school, and Williams’
probation and parole agent testified. After hearing the
testimony and the parties’ arguments, the court found that
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Williams failed to make the necessary showing for a Franks
hearing. 3 Accordingly, the district court denied the motion.
The purpose of a Franks hearing is to determine
whether, but for the inclusion of intentional or reckless
misstatements by the affiant, an affidavit would not support a
finding of probable cause. United States v. Clenney, 631 F.3d
658, 663 (4th Cir. 2011). A defendant challenging the validity
of a warrant is entitled to a hearing if he makes a preliminary
showing that: “(1) the warrant affidavit contain[s] a
‘deliberate falsehood’ or statement made with ‘reckless
disregard for the truth’ and (2) without the allegedly false
statement, the warrant affidavit is not sufficient to support a
finding of probable cause.” United States v. Fisher, 711 F.3d
460, 468 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56);
Clenney, 631 F.3d at 663 (applying Franks to arrest warrants).
Williams argues that he made this showing and that the
district court erred in denying his motion for a Franks hearing.
We review de novo the legal determinations underlying a district
court’s denial of a Franks hearing, while its factual findings
3
The court remarked, “Of course, as a practical matter, we
sort of just had a Franks hearing because [defense counsel]
called witnesses and [the prosecutor] called witnesses. So I’m
not sure how much further we could get with anything called a
Franks hearing.” (Joint Appendix at 207).
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are reviewed for clear error. United States v. Allen, 631 F.3d
164, 171 (4th Cir. 2011).
Williams claims that Anderson falsely identified
Williams as the driver of the Acura the police were pursuing
because, “given the nature of the pursuit, the officers would
not have had a clear view” inside the car. (Appellant’s Br. at
23). However, as the district court found, Williams presented
no evidence that the driver would not have been visible through
the windshield. Furthermore, the district court found credible
both officers’ testimony that they recognized Williams as he
drove towards them, and we defer to the district court’s
credibility determination. See United States v. Abu Ali, 528
F.3d 210, 232 (4th Cir. 2008) (according appellate deference to
district court’s determinations concerning credibility of
witnesses during pretrial hearing on suppression motion).
Moreover, we conclude that Williams otherwise failed
to show by a preponderance of the evidence that Anderson
knowingly made false statements in his affidavit material to the
probable cause determination. Admittedly, Anderson declared
that Williams drove into a school zone during school dismissal
when, in fact, school had already been dismissed. However,
evidence presented at the motions hearing showed that children
were permitted in the school yard after dismissal and that there
were no school zone signs with lights that would have alerted
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the officer that dismissal had ended. Therefore, we conclude
that the district court did not clearly err by finding that
Anderson’s statement was not inaccurate. Moreover, even if
Anderson’s statement was deliberately untruthful, we agree with
the district court that it was not material to a determination
of probable cause to support the charges in the arrest warrant
for numerous traffic violations and eluding police.
We also agree with the district court that Anderson’s
statement that Williams abandoned the car on Schroeder Street
and fled is not facially false. The officers briefly lost sight
of the car when it turned onto Schroeder Street. When they
turned the corner, they saw the car was parked, and Williams was
gone. Although Williams argued that the affidavit was written
as though Anderson witnessed Williams park the car and flee, the
district court did not clearly err by interpreting the statement
as reflecting the officer’s inference that Williams had parked
the vehicle and fled rather than as the officer’s actual
eyewitness account. Furthermore, assuming arguendo that the
discrepancies between the officers’ testimony regarding (1) the
number of times Anderson had previously addressed Williams
individually, (2) whether Anderson had previously suspected
Williams of drug activity, and (3) whether the door to the
abandoned vehicle was open or closed demonstrated that Anderson
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made false statements in his affidavit, these statements simply
were not material to a finding of probable cause.
We therefore conclude that the district court properly
determined that Williams failed to make the strong showing
necessary to warrant a Franks hearing and, hence, properly
denied Williams’ Motion for a Franks Hearing and to Suppress
Evidence.
Turning to Williams’ challenge to his sentence, the
Sentencing Reform Act, of which § 3553(a) is a part, dictates
that a defendant should be sentenced in accordance with its
provisions to achieve the purposes of § 3553(a)(2) “[e]xcept as
otherwise specifically provided.” 18 U.S.C. § 3551(a) (2006).
Courts have generally held that statutorily mandated minimum
sentences are “otherwise specifically provided” and thus do not
conflict with § 3553(a)’s “sufficient but not greater than
necessary” clause. United States v. Sutton, 625 F.3d 526, 529
(8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Kellum, 356 F.3d 285, 289 (3d
Cir. 2004) (“[T]he [statutory] mandatory minimum sentences [the
defendant] was exposed to . . . clearly fit within the ‘except
as otherwise specifically provided’ exclusion of § 3551(a).”).
“Courts have uniformly rejected the claim that § 3553(a)’s ‘no
greater than necessary’ language authorizes a district court to
sentence below the statutory minimum.” United States v. Cirilo-
Muñoz, 582 F.3d 54, 55 (1st Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (collecting
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cases); see also United States v. Franklin, 499 F.3d 578, 585
(6th Cir. 2007) (“[Section] 3553(a) factors do not apply to
congressionally mandated sentences.”); United States v.
Roberson, 474 F.3d 432, 436 (7th Cir. 2007) (acknowledging
tension between § 3553(a) and statutorily mandated sentences,
but holding that § 3553(a) is a “very general statute [that]
cannot be understood to authorize courts to sentence below
minimums specifically prescribed by Congress”). In United
States v. Robinson, 404 F.3d 850 (4th Cir. 2005), we held that,
even after United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), except
in limited circumstances not present here, “a district court
still may not depart below a statutory minimum.” 404 F.3d at
862. Williams’ reliance on United States v. Raby, 575 F.3d 376(4th Cir. 2009), is misplaced, as that case provides no guidance
on sentencing below a mandatory minimum.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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