United States v. LaWesley Foxx

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4662
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LAWESLEY DONTE FOXX, a/k/a Pappa,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. James R. Spencer, District
Judge. (3:05-cr-00249-JRS-3)
Submitted: February 26, 2013 Decided: February 28, 2013
Before MOTZ, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Mary E. Maguire,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Caroline S. Platt, Appellate
Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Angela Mastandrea-
Miller, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
LaWesley Donte Foxx was sentenced to thirty-six months
in prison following the revocation of his supervised release.
Foxx’s counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that he has reviewed the record and
believes there are no meritorious grounds for appeal. Counsel
nonetheless asserts that Foxx’s sentence is plainly unreasonable
because it is greater than necessary in light of the 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2012) factors the district court
was required to consider. The Government has declined to file a
responsive brief and Foxx has failed to file a pro se
supplemental brief despite receiving notice of his right to do
so. Finding no error, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
This court will affirm a sentence imposed after
revocation of supervised release if it is within the prescribed
statutory range and is not plainly unreasonable. United States
v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 438-40 (4th Cir. 2006). While a
district court must consider the Chapter Seven policy
statements, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual Ch. 7, Pt. B, and
the statutory requirements and factors applicable to revocation
sentences under 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3553(a), 3583(e) (West 2000 &
Supp. 2012), the district court ultimately has broad discretion
to revoke supervised release and impose a term of imprisonment
up to the statutory maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439.
2
A supervised release revocation sentence is
procedurally reasonable if the district court considered the
Chapter 7 advisory policy statements and the § 3553(a) factors
it is permitted to consider in a supervised release revocation
case. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583(e); Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439-40.
And although the district court need not explain the reasons for
imposing a revocation sentence in as much detail as when it
imposes an original sentence, it “still must provide a statement
of reasons for the sentence imposed.” United States v.
Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation
marks omitted). A revocation sentence is substantively
reasonable if the district court stated a proper basis for
concluding the defendant should receive the sentence imposed, up
to the statutory maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. Only if a
sentence is found procedurally or substantively unreasonable
will this court “then decide whether the sentence is plainly
unreasonable[.]” Id. at 439 (emphasis omitted). With these
principles in mind, we have reviewed the record and have
considered counsel’s arguments and discern no sentencing error.
We therefore conclude that Foxx’s thirty-six-month sentence is
not plainly unreasonable.
We have examined the entire record in accordance with
our obligations under Anders and have found no meritorious
issues for appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s
3
judgment. This court requires that counsel inform Foxx, in
writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the
United States for further review. If Foxx requests that a
petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition
would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for
leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel's motion must
state that a copy thereof was served on Foxx. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
4