Anderson v. Caldwell County Sheriff's Office

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-2344
JERRY ANDERSON,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CALDWELL COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE; ALAN C. JONES,
Individually and in his Official Capacity as Sheriff of the
Caldwell County Sheriff's Office; JEFFERY LEE STAFFORD,
Individually and in his Official Capacity as a Deputy
Sheriff of the Caldwell County Sheriff's Office; BRIAN
ANTHONY BENNETT, Individually and in his Official Capacity
as a Deputy Sheriff of the Caldwell County Sheriff's Office;
SHELLY HARTLEY, Individually and in her Official Capacity as
a Deputy Sheriff of the Caldwell County Sheriff's Office;
FIDELITY AND DEPOSIT COMPANY OF MARYLAND; THE OHIO CASUALTY
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants – Appellants,
and
JOHN DOE, representing Other Unidentified Officers of the
Caldwell County Sheriff's Office, Individually and in his
Official Capacity as a Deputy Sheriff of the Caldwell County
Sheriff's Office; JANE DOE, representing Other Unidentified
Officers of the Caldwell County Sheriff's Office,
Individually and in her Official Capacity as a Deputy
Sheriff of the Caldwell County Sheriff's Office; DOE BOND
COMPANY; CHRISTOPHER BRACKETT, Individually and in his
Official Capacity as a Deputy Sheriff of the Caldwell County
Sheriff's Office; TRACY PYLE, Individually and in his
Official Capacity as a Deputy Sheriff of the Caldwell County
Sheriff's Office,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Asheville. Martin K. Reidinger,
District Judge. (1:09-cv-00423-MR-DLH)
Argued: January 29, 2013 Decided: April 24, 2013
Before DAVIS and KEENAN, Circuit Judges, and John A. GIBNEY,
Jr., United States District Judge for the Eastern District of
Virginia, sitting by designation.
Reversed in part, dismissed in part, and remanded by unpublished
per curiam opinion.
James R. Morgan, Jr., WOMBLE CARLYLE SANDRIDGE & RICE, PLLC,
Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellants. Robert Mauldin
Elliot, ELLIOT, PISHKO & MORGAN, PA, Winston-Salem, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2
PER CURIAM:
This case comes before the Court on an interlocutory appeal
of the district court’s denial of a motion for summary judgment
on the ground of qualified immunity. The central issue is
whether law enforcement officers had probable cause to arrest
the plaintiff-appellee for the murder of his wife. The Court
finds that probable cause existed for the arrest, entitling the
arresting officers to qualified immunity on the plaintiff-
appellee’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because those claims
fail, the plaintiff-appellee’s derivative federal claims of
supervisory and local government liability also fail. The Court
also concludes that public officers’ and governmental immunity
shield the defendants-appellants from most of the plaintiff-
appellee’s state law claims, but the Court lacks jurisdiction to
review the statutory bond claim.
I.
A.
Jerry Anderson (“Anderson”) commenced this action by filing
a complaint in which he alleged that the defendants had harmed
him in various ways. Specifically, under § 1983 he asserted a
claim that various Caldwell County Deputy Sheriffs, led by
Captain Jeffery Lee Stafford (“Stafford”), violated his Fourth
Amendment rights. He sued the Caldwell County Sheriff’s Office
(“CCSO”) and Sheriff Alan C. Jones (“Jones”) for failure to
3
train and supervise the deputy sheriffs. He also asserted state
law claims of malicious prosecution, false arrest, and
obstruction of justice. Finally, he sued the CCSO’s liability
insurer and bonding company for any damages caused by the
alleged violations of his rights. 1
The defendants-appellants filed motions for summary
judgment on a number of bases, including qualified immunity,
public officers’ immunity, and governmental immunity. The
district court denied those motions, leading to this
interlocutory appeal. 2
B.
In December 2005, the plaintiff-appellee’s wife, Emily
Anderson (“Emily”) went missing from their farm in Caldwell
County, North Carolina. Nine days later, Stafford and the CCSO
investigative team found her body in the toolbox of her truck,
which had been abandoned in South Carolina. After a lengthy
investigation, Stafford arrested Anderson for his wife’s murder.
1
Anderson sued the sheriff and deputies in both their
individual and official capacities. Suits against public
officers in their official capacities actually raise claims
against the entity for which the officer works. Kentucky v.
Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985). We, therefore, will not
discuss the official capacity claims against the individual
defendants.
2
The district court did grant summary judgment (1) in favor
of Deputy Bennett in his individual capacity for all claims and
(2) in favor of all the defendants as to Anderson’s negligence
claims. These decisions are not relevant to this appeal.
4
A grand jury indicted him about two weeks later for first-degree
murder. Anderson stood trial for nine weeks in mid-2007, but
the jury could not reach a verdict. The judge declared a
mistrial, and ultimately the state dismissed the case without
prejudice.
The following facts led to Anderson’s arrest and
prosecution:
On December 29, 2005, the day Emily disappeared, a worker
on Anderson’s farm heard Emily and Anderson arguing. At 9:30
a.m., not long after the argument, Anderson and Emily drove to a
wooded area of their farm — Anderson drove a front-end loader
and Emily drove her pickup truck. A neighbor heard the front-
end loader driving on Anderson’s farm near the wooded area, and
then heard two shots. Another neighbor also heard two shots.
When the police later found Emily’s body, it had dirt and grass
on it, as well as two gunshot wounds.
One half-hour after driving out to the wooded area,
Anderson returned to the farm buildings in the front-end loader.
He told workers on the farm to clean the loader, paying special
attention to the bucket. A worker told the officers that this
was an unusual request by Anderson. Forensic analysis later
showed bloodstains on the bucket of the front-end loader.
Sometime between 10 a.m. and noon, Anderson had a worker
drive him to the wooded area, where Anderson got out of the
5
vehicle with a large plastic bag. The next day, he told his
employees to search the area for a cell phone.
Although none of the farm workers saw Anderson again until
the late afternoon, he instructed them to tell anyone who asked
that he had been at the farm all day. To bolster this story, he
later changed oil filters on some farm equipment, backdated the
documentation of the repair to December 29, 2005, and told a
worker to lie about the date they had changed the filters.
The CCSO unearthed additional evidence relating to Emily’s
death, most of it pointing to Anderson as the culprit. In
summary, the evidence is as follows:
• Several people indicated that the Andersons were
unhappily married, and that Emily planned to leave
Anderson.
• Anderson had found cards to Emily from a man named
Bill. He also had found indications that someone had
sent her flowers.
• When the deputies told Anderson about Emily’s death,
he showed no emotion and, in fact, laughed and “told
stories.”
• Not long before Emily’s disappearance, Anderson had
applied for and received a new passport, listing his
sister as his emergency contact.
6
• Emily had $4.5 million in life insurance with Anderson
and their company as beneficiaries. Anderson’s first
wife, Teresa Martin, told officers that Anderson had
her get life insurance designating him as the
beneficiary. Martin stated that at some point during
the marriage she woke up disorientated in the trunk of
the car. Anderson said he planned to hide her away
and collect the insurance money, but eventually he let
her out of the trunk.
• Bank of America notified the deputies that there had
been no activity on Emily’s account since December 23,
2005.
• Alltel, the Andersons’ phone company, reported that
Emily’s phone showed no activity after December 28,
2005. The deputies found her phone attached to her
belt. The phone company told the CCSO that the phone
had been in South Carolina since December 29, 2005.
• An Alltel representative told the CCSO that he
believed that Anderson had turned his cell phone off
between the hours of 12:04 p.m. and 4:51 p.m. on
December 29, 2005. Turning the phone off would avoid
cell site registry during that time. In addition,
Anderson had Emily’s calls forwarded to his phone.
7
• Although he told the deputies he owned no guns,
Anderson actually owned several firearms.
• Cadaver dogs had indicated that a corpse had been in
the wooded area of Anderson’s farm.
Based on the foregoing, Stafford and the deputies developed
a theory of the crime. They believed that while in the wooded
area on the morning of December 29, 2005, Anderson had fatally
shot Emily. He then loaded her body into the toolbox on her
truck, and drove her to South Carolina, where he abandoned the
truck in a motel parking lot.
Not all the evidence, however, indicated Anderson’s guilt.
The following evidence surfaced casting some doubt on the
deputies’ theory:
• Anderson passed a polygraph test at the CCSO’s
request.
• A Waffle House cook in South Carolina told Stafford
that he had received a call on the day they discovered
the body. The anonymous caller said that the truck of
the “missing woman from North Carolina” was in the
parking lot of the Quality Inn located next to the
Waffle House. The cook said he believed that the
truck had been parked there for two weeks.
8
• The Waffle House cook said that, during that time, he
thought he had seen the driver’s side door open and a
white male approximately 5’8” to 5’9” with blond hair
and a crew cut standing next to the door. The manager
was not certain, however, that the individual was
standing next to Emily’s truck.
• A pathologist and a medical examiner offered opinions
that Emily had most likely died one to three days
before the discovery of her body on January 7, 2006.
They could not rule out, however, that she had died up
to ten days earlier.
Finally, the deputies received some information, the
significance of which is unclear, because they simply did not
follow up on the leads:
• The CCSO did not question people who had registered at
the Quality Inn during the time Emily’s truck was
there.
• The cleaning crew at the motel found some eyeglasses
in a room after the police found her body. Emily was
missing her eyeglasses when the police discovered her
body.
• Two Waffle House employees said they had seen a woman,
matching Emily’s description, wearing an Old Navy
9
shirt; Emily had been wearing a similar shirt when the
police found Emily’s body. The woman had entered the
Waffle House several times late on the night before
the police found her body. This person had been
accompanied by a white male.
• Motel employees saw a white male and female pull up
beside Emily’s truck in the parking lot.
• A man reported to Stafford’s secretary that he had
seen Emily either on December 28 or 29 at 8:30 a.m. at
a convenience store in Caldwell County with a man with
dark hair in a mullet haircut (short on the sides,
long in the back).
With the foregoing evidence in hand, Stafford appeared
before a magistrate, testified under oath, and secured an arrest
warrant. The magistrate kept no recording or other record of
precisely what Stafford said to obtain the warrant.
II.
As an initial matter, the Court must determine the
propriety and scope of the appeal.
The defendants-appellants appeal the district court’s
denial of summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity,
public officers’ immunity, and governmental immunity.
Ordinarily, courts of appeals will only hear appeals of final
orders, Bailey v. Kennedy, 349 F.3d 731, 738 (4th Cir. 2003),
10
and “[d]enials of summary judgment are not final orders,”
Hensley v. Horne, 297 F.3d 344, 347 (4th Cir. 2002). Certain
immunities, however, present an exception to the general rule.
Bailey, 349 F.3d at 738–39.
Qualified immunity is not only an immunity from liability,
but also immunity from the burdens of facing trial. Brown v.
Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362, 366–67 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing Mitchell
v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)). When a district court
denies a motion based on qualified immunity, the defendant can
appeal immediately, before a full trial on the merits. Winfield
v. Bass, 106 F.3d 525, 528-29 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
Otherwise the protection against the burdens of trial is lost,
regardless of the outcome of the appeal. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at,
526.
Similarly, “under North Carolina law, public officers’
immunity is an immunity from suit.” Bailey, 349 F.3d at 738–39
(citing Summey v. Barker, 544 S.E.2d 262, 264 (N.C. Ct. App.
2001)). So, too, is governmental immunity, which “bars action
against, inter alia, the state, its counties, and its public
officials sued in their official capacity.” Arrington v.
Martinez, 716 S.E.2d 410, 414 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011).
As in all motions for summary judgment, the existence of a
genuine dispute of material issues of fact precludes a district
court from granting summary judgment on the basis of immunity.
11
If the factual conflicts form the basis of the denial of summary
judgment, an appellate court cannot decide the issues, and it
lacks jurisdiction over the case. See Winfield, 106 F.3d at
529. “If, however, resolution of the factual dispute is
immaterial to whether immunity should be afforded, the
underlying legal question about whether immunity is to be
afforded remains and may be appealed . . . .” Jackson v. Long,
102 F.3d 722, 727 (4th Cir. 1996). In the instant case, the
district court found that material issues of fact prevented it
from awarding summary judgment. Based on this ruling by the
trial court, the plaintiff-appellee moves to dismiss the appeal.
The district court did not issue a written opinion.
Rather, the court stated its reasoning in a relatively brief
oral ruling. It believed that material questions of fact
existed as to (1) whether Stafford lied to the magistrate to get
the arrest warrant; (2) whether Stafford obtained the arrest
warrant by omitting substantial exculpatory evidence; (3)
whether Hartley participated with Stafford in getting the
warrant; and (4) whether probable cause would exist when the
court excised the impermissible elements from Stafford’s
presentation to the magistrate.
It goes without saying, of course, that parties frequently
raise factual disputes when litigating motions for summary
judgment. Courts can grant summary judgment to a movant,
12
however, as long as the facts are taken in the light most
favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Scott v.
Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007); Brown, 278 F.3d at 362 n.2.
This rule applies in cases involving immunity, as in any other
summary judgment context. Scott, 550 U.S. at 378; Brown, 278
F.3d at 366 n.2. The obligation of the Court, in such cases, is
to decide whether, as a matter of law, viewing the facts in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, the defendant should
prevail based on immunity. Scott, 550 U.S. at 378. That the
parties differ about the facts does not necessarily preclude
appellate review. Rather, “this [factual conflict] usually
means adopting . . . the plaintiff's version of the facts.” Id.This is precisely the function of the Court in this case.
We do not decide disputed facts, but rather questions of law —
whether the facts taken in the light most favorable to Anderson
establish the defendants-appellants’ entitlement to qualified
immunity, public officers’ immunity, and/or governmental
immunity. The Court has jurisdiction to make such a ruling, and
we deny the plaintiff-appellee’s motion to dismiss the appeal.
III.
The defendants-appellants argue that the officers in their
individual capacities are entitled to qualified immunity on the
federal claims. For the reasons set forth herein, we agree.
13
A.
We review de novo a district court’s denial of an officer’s
claim of entitlement to qualified immunity. See, e.g., Melgar
v. Greene, 593 F.3d 348, 353 (4th Cir. 2010). Government
officials performing discretionary functions are entitled to
qualified immunity from liability for civil damages to the
extent that “their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818
(1982). When ruling on a qualified immunity claim, we must
consider two questions: (1) whether a constitutional or
statutory right would have been violated on the facts alleged by
the plaintiff, and (2) whether the right asserted was clearly
established at the time of the alleged violation. Saucier v.
Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001). 3
The district court erred in denying summary judgment to the
officers on Anderson’s Fourth Amendment claims. Based on our
review of the record, we conclude that probable cause existed at
the time that Stafford sought the arrest warrant and arrested
3
The Court need not consider these issues in any particular
order. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). A
resolution of either question in the defendants’ favor mandates
a judgment in favor of the defendants.
14
Anderson. 4 Thus, Stafford did not violate Anderson’s Fourth
Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable seizure.
Because no constitutional violation occurred, the Court need not
proceed to the second step of the Saucier qualified immunity
analysis.
B.
“The Fourth Amendment prohibits law enforcement officers
from making unreasonable seizures, and seizure of an individual
effected without probable cause is unreasonable.” Brooks v.
City of Winston-Salem, 85 F.3d 178, 183 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing
Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989)). So long as the
officer supports the arrest with probable cause, the police have
not committed a constitutional violation. See S.P. v. City of
Takoma Park, Md., 134 F.3d 260, 274 (4th Cir. 1998).
When a police officer acts pursuant to a warrant, he is
entitled to qualified immunity if he could have reasonably
believed that probable cause existed to support the application.
Porterfield v. Lott, 156 F.3d 563, 570 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1986)). For probable
cause to exist, there need only be sufficient evidence to
4
Regardless of what Stafford actually said to the
magistrate, probable cause still existed for Anderson’s arrest.
Thus, the alleged uncertainty as to what Stafford told the
magistrate does not give rise to a genuine dispute over a
material fact.
15
warrant the belief of a reasonable officer that an offense has
been or is being committed. Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d at 367.
See also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963).
The law does not require that the officer have evidence
sufficient to convict the criminal defendant. Brown, 278 F.3d
at 367. Once a neutral and detached magistrate deems an arrest
reasonable by finding that probable cause exists for the arrest,
the continuing seizure of the criminal defendant is also
reasonable. Brooks, 85 F.3d at 184; Taylor v. Waters, 81 F.3d
at 436.
The Supreme Court defines probable cause as a “commonsense,
nontechnical” concept that deals “with the factual and practical
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent
men, not legal technicians, act.” Ornelas v. United States, 517
U.S. 690, 695 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983)). This Court has
stated that the probable cause standard does not require that
the officer's belief be more likely true than false. United
States v. Humphries, 372 F.3d 653, 660 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing
United States v. Jones, 31 F.3d 1304, 1313 (4th Cir. 1994)).
Thus, a probable cause determination turns on the assessment of
probabilities. Gates, 462 U.S. at 232. “[O]nly the
probability, not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity is
the standard of probable cause.” Id. at 235.
16
A court makes a finding of probable cause based on the
totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time
of the arrest. Brown, 278 F.3d at 367. Yet, an officer “may
not disregard readily available exculpatory evidence of which he
is aware.” Wadkins v. Arnold, 214 F.3d 535, 541 (4th Cir.
2000). “Objective inquiry into the reasonableness of an
officer’s perception of the critical facts leading to an arrest
. . . . must charge him with possession of all the information
reasonably discoverable by an officer acting reasonably under
the circumstances.” Sevigny v. Dicksey, 846 F.2d 953, 957 n.5
(4th Cir. 1988).
Although an officer may not disregard readily available
exculpatory evidence that he knows about, the failure to pursue
potentially exculpatory leads will not negate probable cause.
Wadkins, 214 F.3d at 541 (citing Torchinsky v. Siwinski, 942
F.2d 257, 264 (4th Cir. 1991)). The law does not require
reasonable law enforcement officers to “exhaust every
potentially exculpatory lead or resolve every doubt about a
suspect's guilt before probable cause is established.”
Torchinsky, 942 F.2d at 264 (citing Krause v. Bennett, 887 F.2d
362, 371 (2d Cir. 1989) (“[P]robable cause does not require an
officer to be certain that subsequent prosecution of the
arrestee will be successful.”)).
17
Here, the plaintiff-appellee asks the Court to judge the
CCSO investigation through the lens of hindsight. The
plaintiff-appellee complains that Stafford relied on a great
deal of “questionable” evidence, did not properly evaluate the
credibility of witnesses, and clearly did not tell the
magistrate about “exculpatory” evidence. But even assuming the
plaintiff-appellee is correct in his arguments about the facts,
probable cause still existed.
First, as noted above, the failure to follow up on
potentially exculpatory leads does not control the ruling in
this case. “[T]he failure to pursue a potentially exculpatory
lead is not sufficient to negate probable cause.” Wadkins, 214
F.3d at 541.
Moreover, the fact that no contemporary record exists to
show what Stafford said to the magistrate when seeking the
arrest warrant does not undermine the showing in this record of
the existence of probable cause. While this practice of
providing only oral testimony is of concern to the Court in a
general sense, for the purposes of this analysis, the Court need
not delve into this issue. Based on a review of the facts
available to Stafford, probable cause existed at the time he
sought the arrest warrant and arrested Anderson.
Without repeating the evidence in great detail, the
undisputed evidence showed that the Andersons had a rocky
18
marriage, that Anderson and Emily had gone into a wooded area on
the farm on the morning of December 29, 2005, that the sound of
gunshots emanated from the wooded area, that Anderson drove a
front-end loader to the wooded area, that forensic analysis
showed the presence of blood in the bucket of the front-end
loader, that Anderson was not seen most of the day Emily
disappeared, and that Anderson had instructed his employees to
lie concerning his presence on the day Emily disappeared. In
addition, the undisputed evidence showed that Anderson had a
large insurance policy on Emily’s life, that he had firearms,
that it appeared he had turned his phone off for several hours
on the day Emily disappeared, and that Emily’s phone was in
South Carolina starting on the day she disappeared.
Probable cause existed to believe Anderson killed his wife,
and the arrest of Anderson therefore did not violate the Fourth
Amendment. Moreover, even considering all of the potentially
exculpatory evidence cited by Anderson that was known to
Stafford, alongside the inculpatory evidence set forth above,
there was still probable cause to arrest Anderson. Having
concluded that no constitutional violation occurred, we need not
proceed to the second step of the Saucier qualified immunity
analysis.
19
C.
Because no Fourth Amendment violation occurred, the sheriff
and the CCSO may not be held liable for failure to train or
supervise the Caldwell County deputies. 5 No actionable claim
against supervisors or local governments can exist without a
constitutional violation committed by an employee. City of Los
Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (per curiam);
Giancola v. State of W. Va. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 830 F.2d 547,
550 (4th Cir. 1987). Thus, Anderson’s claims of inadequate
training or supervision cannot proceed. Belcher v. Oliver, 898
F.2d 32, 36 (4th Cir. 1990). Sheriff Jones and the CCSO,
therefore, are not liable under § 1983.
IV.
The defendants-appellants argue that the officers in their
individual capacities are entitled to public officers’ immunity
on Anderson’s state law claims against them. We review the
denial of public officers’ immunity de novo. Bailey, 349 F.3d at
739.
5
Since the CCSO does not enjoy qualified immunity,
ordinarily we would lack jurisdiction to consider its liability
in an interlocutory appeal. But because the CCSO’s liability is
“inextricably intertwined” with the deputies’ liability, the
Court will assume pendent jurisdiction over the CCSO’s appeal.
Altman v. City of High Point, 330 F.3d 194, 207 n.10 (4th Cir.
2003).
20
Under North Carolina law, plaintiffs may hold public
officials who are engaged in the exercise of discretionary,
governmental duties personally liable only for “corrupt or
malicious” actions. Smith v. Hefner, 68 S.E.2d 783, 787 (N.C.
1952); Bailey, 349 F.3d at 742.
Anderson does not argue that the officers undertook their
actions in a corrupt manner. Rather, Anderson argues that the
officers undertook their actions maliciously. “A defendant acts
with malice when he wantonly does that which a man of reasonable
intelligence would know to be contrary to his duty and which he
intends to be prejudicial or injurious to another.” Grad v.
Kaasa, 321 S.E.2d 888, 890 (N.C. 1984). The North Carolina
Supreme Court classifies an act as wanton when “done of a wicked
purpose, or when done needlessly, manifesting a reckless
indifference to the rights of others.” Id. at 890–91.
The Court of Appeals of North Carolina recently held that
if probable cause existed for the issuance of an arrest warrant,
public officer’s immunity shields the defendants from individual
liability. Beeson v. Palombo, 727 S.E.2d 343, 346 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2012).
Not only did probable cause exist for Anderson’s arrest,
but Anderson has not put forth evidence that the officers acted
with reckless indifference to his rights. Additionally, because
probable cause existed, a person of reasonable intelligence
21
would not know that his actions were contrary to his duty.
Further, Anderson has not put forth any evidence that the
officers intended for their acts to be prejudicial to Anderson.
Thus, public officer’s immunity bars the state law claims
against the officers in their individual capacities.
Accordingly, we hold that the district court erred in failing to
enter summary judgment in favor of the officers in their
individual capacities on the plaintiff-appellee’s various state
law claims.
V.
The defendants-appellants argue that the CCSO is entitled
to governmental immunity on the state law claims against it.
“The existence of sovereign immunity is a question of law that
we review de novo.” S.C. Wildlife Fed’n v. Limehouse, 549 F.3d
324, 332 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Under North Carolina law, “the doctrine of governmental, or
sovereign immunity[,] bars action against, inter alia, the
state, its counties, and its public officials sued in their
official capacity.” Arrington, 716 S.E.2d at 414 (N.C. Ct. App.
2011). “Suits against public officials are barred by the
doctrine of governmental immunity where the official is
performing a governmental function, such as providing police
services.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
22
Counties and their officials may waive governmental
immunity by purchasing insurance. Slade v. Vernon, 429 S.E.2d
744, 746 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993), implied overruling on other
grounds recognized in Boyd v. Robeson County, 621 S.E.2d 1 (N.C.
Ct. App. 2005). If a county purchases liability insurance, it
only waives its governmental immunity by the amount of insurance
purchased by the county. Evans v. Housing Auth. of Raleigh, 602
S.E.2d 668, 673 (N.C. 2004). But insurance policies can include
explicit exclusions of coverage for any claim that governmental
immunity would ordinarily cover.
The insurance policies purchased by the CCSO explicitly
exclude coverage for “[a]ny claim, demand, or cause of action
against any Covered Person as to which the Covered Person is
entitled to sovereign immunity or governmental immunity under
North Carolina law.” See J.A. 731, 734, 782, 794; see also J.A.
862, 1115. Thus, the county’s purchase of insurance has not
waived governmental immunity as to the state law claims against
the CCSO, and these claims fail as a matter of law.
VI.
The only remaining cause of action is the statutory bond
claim against the CCSO’s sureties under § 58-76-5 of the North
Carolina General Statutes. Section 58-76-5 provides that
[e]very person injured by the neglect, misconduct, or
misbehavior in office of any . . . sheriff . . . or
other officer, may institute a suit or suits against
23
said officer . . . and [his] sureties upon [the]
respective bonds for the due performance of [his]
duties in office in the name of the State . . . and
every such officer and the sureties on the officer’s
official bond shall be liable to the person injured
for all acts done by said officer by virtue or under
color of that officer's office
Anderson has asserted a claim only against the sheriff’s
sureties. See J.A. 223–24.
The defendants-appellees argue that “the state tort claim[]
against . . . the Sheriff’s sureties . . . [is] based solely on
respondent [sic] superior” and “cannot be supported” because
“the individual officers are entitled to public officer’s
immunity.” Opening Br. 58. But “[b]y expressly providing for
th[e] [statutory bond] cause of action, the General Assembly has
abrogated common law immunity where a public official causes
injury through neglect, misconduct, or misbehavior in the
performance of his official duties or under color of his
office.” Smith v. Jackson County Bd. of Educ., 608 S.E.2d 399,
411-12 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Immunity is
thus immaterial with respect to a claim on a bond under N.C.
Gen.Stat. § 58–76–5.” Id.; see also Slade, 429 S.E.2d at 747.
Whether Anderson’s statutory bond claim fails on other
grounds is beyond this Court’s jurisdiction. 6 “Our exercise of
6
Although the sureties joined in the notice of appeal filed
in this case, they have not filed separate briefs explaining why
we have jurisdiction over their appeal. As we explain in the
(Continued)
24
pendent appellate jurisdiction is proper only when an issue is
(1) inextricably intertwined with the decision of the lower
court to deny . . . immunity or (2) consideration of the
additional issue is necessary to ensure meaningful review of the
. . . immunity question.” Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 658
(4th Cir. 2012). “Claims are ‘inextricably intertwined’ when the
resolution of one claim necessarily resolves the other claim.”
Henry v. Purnell, 501 F.3d 374, 376 (4th Cir. 2007).
Here, our review of the issues of qualified, public
officers’, and governmental immunity does not require any
evaluation of the state statutory bond claim. Accordingly, we
decline to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over that
claim.
VII.
For the reasons stated above, we dismiss the appeal of the
district court’s ruling as to the statutory bond claim, and
reverse the denial of summary judgment on the remaining claims.
The arresting officers are entitled to qualified immunity on the
federal claims; the derivative federal claims of supervisory and
text, we do not have, and in any event, we decline to exercise,
such jurisdiction. The sureties’ apparent reliance on Turner v.
City of Greenville, 677 S.E.2d 480 (N.C. App. 2009), and Altman
v. High Point, 330 F.3d 194 (4th Cir. 2003), is plainly
misplaced, as there was no bond claim in either of those cases.
25
local government liability fail because no actionable claim can
exist without a constitutional violation committed by a
subordinate employee; public officers’ and governmental
liability shield the officers and the CCSO from Anderson’s state
law claims; and the Court lacks jurisdiction to review the
statutory bond claim against the sureties.
REVERSED IN PART,
DISMISSED IN PART,
AND REMANDED
26