Carter v. Sixteenth Judicial

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 96-6826
DELL L. CARTER,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
SIXTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT PROSECUTOR'S
OFFICE; TOMMY POPE; WILLY THOMPSON; MICHELLE
DAY,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia. Dennis W. Shedd, District Judge.
(CA-96-736-3-19BC)
Submitted: December 12, 1996 Decided: December 19, 1996
Before MURNAGHAN, NIEMEYER, and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges.
Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Dell L. Carter, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Appellant, a pretrial detainee in a county facility in South
Carolina, filed an untimely notice of appeal from the dismissal
without prejudice of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) complaint. We
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The time periods for filing
notices of appeal are governed by Fed. R. App. P. 4. These periods
are "mandatory and jurisdictional." Browder v. Director, Dep't of
Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978) (quoting United States v.
Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 229 (1960)). Parties to civil actions have
thirty days within which to file in the district court notices of
appeal from judgments or final orders. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1). The
only exceptions to the appeal period are when the district court
extends the time to appeal under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) or reopens
the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6).
The district court entered its order on April 15, 1996; Appel-
lant's notice of appeal was filed on May 21, 1996. Appellant's
failure to note a timely appeal or obtain either an extension or a
reopening of the appeal period leaves this court without jurisdic-
tion to consider the merits of Appellant's appeal. We therefore
dismiss the appeal.
To the extent we would consider the appeal timely under
Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988), the district court's dis-
missal without prejudice is not appealable at this time, given the
fact that Appellant could save his complaint through amendment.
Domino Sugar Corp. v. Sugar Workers' Local Union 392, 10 F.3d 1064,
1066-67 (4th Cir. 1993). This court may exercise jurisdiction only
2
over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994), and certain interlocu-
tory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1994); Fed. R. Civ.
P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541(1949). The order here appealed is neither a final order nor an
appealable interlocutory order. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in
the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
DISMISSED
3