Michael Williams v. G. Branker

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-6329
MICHAEL ANTWON WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
G.J. BRANKER, Warden; ROBERT C. LEWIS, Director of Prisons,
Defendants – Appellees,
and
MICHAEL A. MUNNS, Deputy Warden; R. WELLMAN, Assoc. Warden
of Operation,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III,
District Judge. (5:09-ct-03139-D)
Argued: December 7, 2011 Decided: January 20, 2012
Before WILKINSON and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and Richard M.
GERGEL, United States District Judge for the District of South
Carolina, sitting by designation.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Duncan wrote the
opinion, in which Judge Wilkinson and Judge Gergel joined.
ARGUED: James Phillip Griffin, Jr., NORTH CAROLINA PRISONER
LEGAL SERVICES, INC., Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Elizabeth F. Parsons, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Ann Ferrari,
NORTH CAROLINA PRISONER LEGAL SERVICES, INC., Raleigh, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Roy Cooper, Attorney General, Raleigh,
North Carolina, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2
DUNCAN, Circuit Judge:
Appellant Michael Williams, an inmate at Central Prison in
Raleigh, North Carolina, sought declaratory and injunctive
relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that prison officials
violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to effectively
treat his mental illness and imposing upon him conditions of
confinement that exacerbated it. Appellees are G.J. Branker,
warden of Central Prison, and Robert C. Lewis, director of
prisons for the North Carolina Department of Prisons. Williams
sued appellees in their official capacities. The district court
granted appellees’ motion for judgment on the pleadings and
dismissed Williams’s suit. For the reasons that follow, we
affirm.
I.
A.
The following facts are taken from Williams’ Third Amended
Complaint. For purposes of our review, we assume them to be
true. See McVey v. Stacey, 157 F.3d 271, 274 (4th Cir. 1998).
In 1993, at the age of 16, Williams began serving a 20-year
prison sentence in facilities run by the North Carolina
Department of Corrections (“DOC”). Throughout his
incarceration, Williams has suffered from severe mental illness
and was diagnosed with, among other disorders, psychotic
3
disorder, schizophrenia, borderline personality disorder, and
intermittent explosive disorder. Williams’s mental illness has
manifested itself through, inter alia, behavioral outbursts as
well as “thoughts of suicide [and the] ingesting or inserting
[of] foreign bodies[] and severe self lacerations.” J.A. 7.
“He has [had] numerous stays in an inpatient psychiatric setting
due to his extensive history of ingesting or inserting foreign
bodies, and severe self lacerations that have required emergency
medical attention.” Id.As a result of his mental illness and its manifestations,
at the time of his complaint in 2010, Williams had spent
approximately 10 years of his incarceration in “segregated
confinement.” J.A. 8. Williams described his segregated
confinement as follows:
[A] small cell whose dimensions are approximately
twelve feet by six feet. The floor, walls, and
ceiling of the cell are concrete. There is a narrow
window that looks out only on the hallway outside the
cell. There is a slot through which food trays and
other materials may be passed, and through which
[Williams] must extend his hands to be cuffed before
the steel door is opened.
Id. Beyond the spartan nature of his confinement, Williams was
also subject to several lifestyle restrictions. For example,
Williams was only “allowed to leave his cell for one hour on
five days of each week”; was “kept indoors constantly” and has
not had “outdoor recreation [for] several years”; was allowed
4
minimal contact with other inmates; could not participate in
religious, work, rehabilitative, or other activities; and was
not allowed “access to a television, and ha[d] very limited
access to reading materials.” J.A. 8-9. In addition to these
restrictions, Williams was subject to additional punishment at
times, including being placed in “restraints in a concrete cell
alone for four hour periods[,] caus[ing] pain and mental
distress.” J.A. 9.
B.
Williams brought suit against appellees under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, claiming that “[i]nstead of [receiving] effective
treatment for his mental illness” he was “being punished with
atypical and significant hardships over and above those imposed
under his sentence.” J.A. 8. Williams alleged that these
hardships were a result of policies created and implemented by
appellees and were in violation of his right under the Eighth
Amendment to be provided with adequate medical care and humane
conditions of confinement. Specifically, Williams alleged that
“[t]he social isolation, arbitrary punishments, lack of exercise
and other conditions of the confinement imposed on him by
policies created and maintained by [appellees] have caused [him]
serious and unnecessary pain and suffering.” J.A. 10.
As Williams described it, his mental illness caused him to
act out, which in turn led to additional restrictions. He
5
alleges the existence of a pernicious circle. As these
restrictions mounted, they aggravated his mental illness,
causing him to misbehave further. Williams was “told he will be
allowed additional privileges when he is able to remain
infraction free for long periods of time, yet the effect of [the
restrictions] effectively prevents him from remaining infraction
free.” Id. Williams has alleged that this cycle was
exacerbated by the fact that “[c]orrectional staff are not
trained in the identification and management of the mentally
ill. They assume that Plaintiff is willfully disobedient or
disruptive, when in fact his behavior is at times beyond his
control.” Id. As to the appellees, Williams further alleged:
As trained and experienced corrections professionals,
[appellees] are aware of the dangers and risks to
[Williams] caused by their policies of long term
confinement and the cruel and unusual conditions
imposed upon him. Regardless of this knowledge,
[appellees] have acted with deliberate indifference to
his right to be free from unnecessary suffering and
mental and physical harm.
Id.Williams sought a declaration that his treatment violated
the Eighth Amendment and an injunction barring DOC officials and
employees from treating Williams in a similar fashion in the
future.
Appellees filed an answer with various exhibits attached,
and moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule
6
of Civil Procedure 12(c). 1 The district court granted appellees’
motion, concluding that “although [Williams’s] conditions of
confinement are unpleasant, they do not deprive Williams of
basic human needs.” J.A. 182. In its opinion, the district
court relied on some of the exhibits to appellees’ answer,
including portions of the DOC Policy and Procedure Manual and
select reports from Williams’s inmate file regarding his mental
health status. In doing so, however, the district court did not
indicate that it was converting appellees’ motion for judgment
on the pleadings to a motion for summary judgment.
II.
On appeal, Williams argues that the district erred both
procedurally and substantively in granting appellees’ motion for
judgment on the pleadings. Williams argues that the district
court erred procedurally in considering exhibits to the
appellees’ answer, thereby constructively converting appellees’
Rule 12(c) motion into a Rule 56 summary judgment motion without
giving Williams notice or a reasonable opportunity to respond.
Williams asserts that the district court’s conclusion was
substantively flawed in that his complaint contained factual
1
Rule 12(c) states: “After the pleadings are closed--but
early enough not to delay trial--a party may move for judgment
on the pleadings.”
7
allegations sufficient to state a claim for Eighth Amendment
violations on its face.
A.
We first consider Williams’s argument that by relying on
attachments to the appellees’ answer, the district court
improperly converted appellees’ motion for judgment on the
pleadings to a motion for summary judgment without giving notice
to Williams. We review a district court’s actions in converting
a Rule 12 motion into a motion for summary judgment for abuse of
discretion. See Baker v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 171
F.3d 939, 943 n.* (4th Cir. 1999).
Matters outside of the pleadings are generally not
considered in ruling on a Rule 12 motion. Am. Chiropractic
Ass’n v. Trigon Healthcare, Inc., 367 F.3d 212, 234 (4th Cir.
2004). Matters--such as exhibits--are outside the pleadings if
a complaint’s factual allegations are not expressly linked to
and dependent upon such matters. See id. A court may convert a
Rule 12 motion into a summary judgment proceeding in order to
consider matters outside of the pleadings. Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(d); Bosiger v. U.S. Airways, 510 F.3d 442, 450 (4th Cir.
2007). In doing so, however, the court must assure that the
parties are on notice of the changed status of the motion.
Davis v. Zahradnick, 600 F.2d 458, 460 (4th Cir. 1979).
Nevertheless, it is widely accepted that if the plaintiff’s
8
allegations, taken as true, do not state a claim for relief, any
error caused by such a conversion without notice is harmless.
See, e.g., Renchenski v. Williams, 622 F.3d 315, 341 (3d Cir.
2010); Colbert v. Potter, 471 F.3d 158, 168 (D.C. Cir. 2006);
United States v. Stevens, No. 95-6739, 1995 WL 559524, at *1
(4th Cir. September 21, 1995) (unpublished).
Here, the district court considered both the DOC Policy and
Procedure Manual and select reports from Williams’s inmate file
regarding his mental health status. Although Williams’s
allegations are arguably dependent on and linked to the DOC’s
policies and procedures, we are troubled by the district court’s
reliance on reports from Williams’s inmate file handpicked by
the defendants, because the complaint is not dependent on such
reports. Nonetheless, in reviewing the district court’s order
to dismiss, we will consider only the allegations set forth in
Williams’s complaint. Accordingly, any error by the district
court will be rendered harmless.
B.
We now consider whether Williams has pleaded sufficient
facts on which to state a violation of the Eighth Amendment. We
conclude that he has not.
We review a grant of a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on
the pleadings de novo, applying the same standard of review we
apply to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, Burbach Broad. Co.
9
of Del. v. Elkins Radio Corp., 278 F.3d 401, 405-06 (4th Cir.
2002). Specifically, we look to whether the factual allegations
in the complaint “raise a right to relief above the speculative
level and . . . state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Robinson v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 551 F.3d 218, 222
(4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). “In
conducting this review, we take the facts in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, but we need not accept the legal
conclusions drawn from the facts, and we need not accept as true
unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.”
Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Although the text of the Eighth Amendment is limited to
cruel and unusual punishments, the Amendment may also “be
applied to some deprivations that were not specifically part of
the sentence but were suffered during imprisonment.” Wilson v.
Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991). In this way, “[t]he Amendment
. . . imposes duties on [prison] officials, who must provide
humane conditions of confinement; prison officials must ensure
that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and
medical care.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994).
The Supreme Court has prescribed a two-part inquiry to
determine whether prison officials’ conduct violated their duty
under the Eighth Amendment to provide humane conditions of
10
confinement. 2 The first part of the inquiry asks whether the
conditions of confinement inflict harm that is, objectively,
sufficiently serious to deprive a prisoner of minimal civilized
necessities. Id. at 834. The second part of inquiry asks
whether prison officials subjectively acted with “deliberate
indifference to inmate health or safety,” meaning that they
actually knew of and disregarded the inhumane nature of the
confinement. Id. at 837 (internal quotation marks omitted). We
consider each prong in turn.
1.
We must first determine whether Williams’s conditions of
confinement objectively deprived him of minimal civilized
necessities such as adequate food, clothing, shelter, medical
care, or physical safety. See In re Long Term Admin.
Segregation of Inmates Designated as Five Percenters (Five
2
Williams’s complaint contains allegations that may be
interpreted both as claims of inadequate medical care based upon
the lack of effective treatment for his mental illness and
inhumane conditions of confinement based on his isolation and
restrictions. For the purposes of our analysis, however, this
is a distinction without a difference. See Wilson, 501 U.S. at
303 (“[W]e see no significant distinction between claims
alleging inadequate medical care and those alleging inadequate
‘conditions of confinement.’ Indeed, the medical care a
prisoner receives is just as much a ‘condition’ of his
confinement as the food he is fed, the clothes he is issued, the
temperature he is subjected to in his cell.”). Accordingly, we
review the sufficiency of all of his allegations under the same
rubric.
11
Percenters), 174 F.3d 464, 472 (4th Cir. 1999). This analysis
is informed by our recognition that “[o]nly extreme deprivations
are adequate to satisfy the objective component of an Eighth
Amendment claim regarding conditions of confinement.” Rish v.
Johnson, 131 F.3d 1092, 1096 (4th Cir. 1997).
Williams’s first claim of extreme deprivation is that he
was denied effective treatment for his mental illness. For an
allegation of inadequate medical care to support an Eighth
Amendment claim there must be “neglect of ‘serious’ medical
needs.” Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996)
(quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1992)); see also
Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9 (“[S]ociety does not expect that prisoners
will have unqualified access to health care.”). Assuming,
without deciding, that Williams’s mental illness created a
serious medical need, we conclude that his allegations regarding
his medical treatment do not rise to the level of neglect. For
instance, Williams does not allege that his illness was ignored
or that he was denied treatment, either altogether or even to a
considerable extent. To the contrary, his complaint alleges
that he has had “numerous stays in an inpatient psychiatric
setting.” J.A. 7. Williams points to no authority for the
proposition that the Eighth Amendment entitles him to
“effective” treatment, or that DOC is a guarantor of mental
health. Cf. Jackson v. Meachum, 699 F.2d 578, 583 (1st Cir.
12
1983) (noting that to “make the Eighth Amendment a guarantor of
a prison inmate’s prior mental health . . . would go measurably
beyond what today would generally be deemed ‘cruel and
unusual’”). Accordingly, we cannot hold that the lack of
effective mental health treatment deprives Williams of a basic
human need.
Williams next claims that the conditions of his confinement
amount to an extreme deprivation because the isolation and
behavioral restrictions to which he is subject “aggravate” his
mental illness and thus “cause him present and ongoing injury to
his mental health.” Appellant’s Br. 11, 13. The conditions of
which Williams complains, however, are no different from those
we found not actionable in Five Percenters, amid a claim that
those conditions harmed plaintiffs’ mental health. In that
case, plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that they were “confined
to their cells for twenty-three hours per day without radio or
television, that they receive[d] only five hours of exercise per
week, and that they [could] not participate in prison work,
school, or study programs.” 174 F.3d at 471. We observed that
negative effects of such restrictions on mental health “are
unfortunate concomitants of incarceration; they do not, however,
typically constitute the ‘extreme deprivations . . . required to
make out a conditions-of-confinement claim.’ ” Id. at 472(quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8-9).
13
The fact that the conditions to which Williams was
subjected aggravated his mental illness is an unfortunate but
inevitable result of his incarceration. This is particularly so
given the twin responsibilities of prison officials to limit the
opportunities for Williams to harm both himself and others.
Accordingly, we cannot conclude that such aggravation amounts to
the denial of a minimal civilized necessity, especially when the
conditions alleged to have caused that aggravation clearly meet
or exceed minimal standards. Because Williams’s allegations do
not show an extreme deprivation resulting in the denial of a
minimal necessity of life, his claim must fail.
2.
Even if Williams alleged facts in his complaint sufficient
to show an extreme deprivation resulting in the denial of a
minimal necessity of life, however, he would still have to show
that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to the
deprivation and the substantial risk of harm resulting from it.
See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836. This is a subjective standard:
Williams must show an actual awareness of the danger, not merely
that officials should have been aware of it. See Brown v.
Harris, 240 F.3d 383, 389 (4th Cir. 2001). Furthermore,
“general knowledge of facts creating a substantial risk of harm
is not enough. The prison official must also draw the inference
between those general facts and the specific risk of harm
14
confronting the inmate.” Johnson v. Quinones, 145 F.3d 164, 168
(4th Cir. 1998).
In an attempt to establish deliberate indifference,
Williams alleges, in conclusory fashion, that “[a]s trained and
experienced corrections professionals, [appellees] are aware of
the dangers and risks to [Williams] caused by their policies of
long term confinement and the cruel and unusual conditions
imposed upon him.” J.A. 10. Appellees’ training and
experience, however, can, at most, support an allegation that
they should have known of the risk to Williams’s mental health
posed by the lack of effective treatment and conditions of
confinement. Williams alleges no facts suggesting that
appellees had actual knowledge of the risks to him. This
omission is fatal to his claim. As we have held, “[t]he prison
official ‘must both be aware of facts from which the inference
could be drawn that a substantial risk of harm exists, and he
must also draw the inference.’ ” Johnson, 145 F.3d at 168(quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). 3
3
Williams seeks to rely on Farmer to support his allegation
of actual awareness. In that case, the Supreme Court considered
whether an Eighth Amendment violation occurred when a
transsexual prisoner was allegedly beaten and raped by fellow
inmates when he was placed in the general prison population.
511 U.S. at 833-34. Williams asserts that in Farmer, prison
officials were “aware of the heightened risk to plaintiff’s
safety posed by the conditions on the unit based on his
transsexuality.” Appellant’s Br. 16. Williams goes on to argue
(Continued)
15
Finally, even if prison officials were aware of the harm
Williams was suffering, his allegations are insufficient to show
that officials were indifferent to that harm. Where the safety
of the inmate, other inmates, or prison staff are at issue, the
subjective component of the Eighth Amendment inquiry also takes
into consideration “threat[s] to . . . safety . . . as
reasonably perceived by the responsible officials on the basis
of the facts known to them, and any efforts made to temper the
severity of a forceful response.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S.
312, 321. Cf. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979)
(“Prison administrators . . . should be accorded wide-ranging
deference in the adoption and execution of policies and
practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal
order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.”).
that prison officials here were likewise aware of his mental
illness, and therefore of the “heightened risk to him posed by
the conditions of long-term segregated confinement.”
Appellant’s Br. 16. This analogy does not aid Williams,
however, because the Supreme Court in Farmer never decided
whether the plaintiff in that case satisfied the subjective part
of the test; it merely opined that the district court had used
an incorrect standard in evaluating his claim and remanded for
reconsideration. 511 U.S. at 848-49. In other words, Farmer
does not stand for the proposition that that a prison official’s
knowledge of a characteristic that could create a risk of harm
to an inmate provides that official with actual knowledge of a
specific risk of harm to that inmate. Instead, as stated in
Johnson, a prisoner must allege that prison officials actually
drew the inference between the characteristic and a specific
risk of harm.
16
In his complaint, Williams acknowledges a history of self
abuse and behavioral outbursts, and that he has been diagnosed
with a number of potentially violent conditions--such as
“psychotic disorder” and “intermittent explosive disorder”--that
put him and others, including inmates and staff, at risk of
harm. J.A. 7. Specifically, his complaint alleges that he has
“a psychiatric history of self injury and reports of thoughts
about suicide. He has numerous stays in an inpatient
psychiatric setting due to his extensive history of ingesting or
inserting foreign bodies, and severe self lacerations that have
required emergency medical attention.” Id. Against this
background, the conditions of Williams’s confinement appear
designed to limit his ability and opportunity to inflict harm on
himself or others, rather than intended to exacerbate his
medical condition. 4 As such, appellees’ institution of these
conditions cannot be said to be a result of deliberate
indifference on their part.
4
Indeed, had prison officials loosened the restrictions on
Williams, and Williams then took his own life, those prison
officials could face liability for their deliberate indifference
to Williams’s suicide risk. See, e.g., Brown, 240 F.3d at 390-
91; Clouthier v. Cnty. of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1244-45
(9th Cir. 2010); Perez v. Oakland Cnty., 466 F.3d 416, 424-25
(6th Cir. 2006).
17
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
court is
AFFIRMED.
18