United States v. Iaquinta

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 03-7645
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
ALBERT F. IAQUINTA,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, Senior
District Judge. (CA-98-764-5)
Submitted: May 7, 2004 Decided: June 15, 2004
Before WIDENER, TRAXLER, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James B. Craven, III, Durham, North Carolina, for Appellant. Frank
D. Whitney, United States Attorney, R. A. Renfer, Jr., Assistant
United States Attorney, Michelle T. Fuseyamore, Special Assistant
United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Albert F. Iaquinta appeals from the district court’s
order determining that he still meets the criteria for civil
commitment under 18 U.S.C. § 4246 (2000). We affirm.
Iaquinta was charged in the District of New Jersey in
1994 with threatening to kill President Clinton, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 871(a) (2000). He was never tried. Rather, due to his
“psychotic and disruptive” behavior after being charged, the
District of New Jersey ordered a psychological evaluation under 18
U.S.C. § 4246(b) to determine if Iaquinta should be civilly
committed for being a danger to others or their property. Iaquinta
was eventually transferred to FCI-Butner, North Carolina. On
October 2, 1998, FCI-Butner filed a Certificate of Mental Disease
or Defect and Dangerousness and recommended that Iaquinta be
committed to the custody of the Attorney General under § 4246. On
February 16, 1999, the Eastern District of North Carolina agreed
and ordered Iaquinta committed to the custody of the Attorney
General for suffering from a mental defect that makes him a danger
to others or their property.
On February 2, 2000, and again on July 7, 2001, motions
were filed to determine if Iaquinta still met the criteria for
commitment under § 4246. On both motions, the district court
determined that he did. On November 18, 2002, a third motion was
filed to determine if his commitment was still warranted, the
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denial of which is the subject of this appeal. After holding
hearings on this motion, the district court ordered that Iaquinta’s
commitment to the custody of the Attorney General under § 4246 be
continued because he still met the requirements for such
commitment.
Under § 4246, if, after a hearing, a district court
determines a person is suffering from a mental disease or defect
that would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another
person or serious damage to property of another, the court may
commit the person to the custody of the Attorney General. Once
committed, an individual may periodically move for a hearing under
18 U.S.C. § 4247(h) (2000) to determine whether the committed
person should be discharged from commitment under § 4246. To
obtain release from commitment, the district court must find that
the committed person has recovered from his mental disease or
defect to such an extent that his release would no longer pose a
substantial risk of harm to others. See 18 U.S.C. § 4246(e). This
court will overturn a district court’s finding that a substantial
risk of harm exists only if the finding is clearly erroneous.
United States v. Cox, 964 F.2d 1431, 1433 (4th Cir. 1992). A
finding is clearly erroneous when “the reviewing court is left with
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.” Faulconer v. Commissioner, 748 F.2d 890, 895 (4th Cir.
1984).
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We have thoroughly reviewed the materials submitted by
the parties in this matter and conclude that the district court’s
determination that Iaquinta still meets the requirements for
commitment under § 4246 was not clearly erroneous. We therefore
affirm the order of the district court continuing Iaquinta’s
commitment under § 4246. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid in the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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