United States v. Joyner

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-4592
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
ANTHONY DWIGHT JOYNER,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Henry Coke Morgan, Jr., Senior
District Judge. (CR-04-22)
Submitted: January 31, 2006 Decided: February 24, 2006
Before WILKINSON, WILLIAMS, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished per
curiam opinion.
Frank W. Dunham, Jr., Federal Public Defender, Riley H. Ross, III,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Kurt J. Mayer, Frances H. Pratt,
Research and Writing Attorneys, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellant.
Paul J. McNulty, United States Attorney, Michael J. Elston,
William D. Muhr, Assistant United States Attorneys, Norfolk,
Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Anthony Dwight Joyner pled guilty to possession of 161.7
grams of cocaine base (crack) with intent to distribute (Count
One), and possession of 2316 grams of marijuana with intent to
distribute (Count Two), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2000).
He was sentenced to concurrent terms of 221 months imprisonment on
each count. Joyner appeals his sentence, arguing that the district
court clearly erred in finding that he had not accepted
responsibility for his criminal conduct, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Manual § 3E1.1 (2004), and erred by imposing a sentence in excess
of the five-year statutory maximum for Count Two. We affirm the
sentence on Count One, but we vacate the sentence on Count Two and
remand for imposition of a sixty-month sentence on Count Two.
Joyner was arrested in October 2003 after police
conducting surveillance observed him make a suspected drug sale.
Before he was apprehended, Joyner led the police on a high-speed
chase, then fled his car, leaving his girlfriend, Tonya Glossin,
behind. Glossin cooperated with police, surrendered a handgun that
was in her purse, and consented to a search of the apartment she
shared with Joyner. From the apartment, the officers recovered
161.7 grams of crack, 2316 grams of marijuana, $7000 in currency,
and evidence of drug trafficking. Immediately after his arrest,
Joyner admitted that the drugs in Glossin’s apartment were his.
However, in a second interview the next day, he told police that he
- 2 -
lived at another apartment he rented and knew Glossin only as a
friend. He refused to discuss the drugs or money in Glossin’s
apartment. Following his guilty plea, Joyner was interviewed by
the probation officer. Joyner denied having access to the gun,
although he said he knew Glossin owned it. Glossin had told police
that the gun was hers, but that Joyner had access to it. Joyner
admitted that the drugs seized from Glossin’s apartment were his,
but refused to say whether the $7000 was his.
To calculate Joyner’s base offense level, the probation
officer converted the $7000 found in the apartment to another 1764
grams of marijuana. The total drug amount attributed to him was
3238.06 kilograms of marijuana equivalent, resulting in a
recommended base offense level of 34 under USSG § 2D1.1. The
probation officer recommended a two-level enhancement for
possession of a firearm, USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1), to which Joyner
objected, and a two-level adjustment for reckless endangerment
during flight, USSG § 3C1.2.
At the sentencing hearing in May 2005, the district court
sustained Joyner’s objection to the firearm enhancement. Despite
this ruling, the court later expressed skepticism about Joyner’s
statement regarding the firearm. The court determined that Joyner
had not met his burden of affirmatively establishing that he had
accepted responsibility, noting that there were “several instances
where the Court believes he gave improper information to the
- 3 -
police, and his conduct is not consistent with accepting
responsibility.” The court’s elimination of the two-level weapon
enhancement reduced Joyner’s offense level to 36 and reduced the
advisory guideline range to 235-293 months. The court decided
against a downward departure to offset the discrepacy between
sentences for crack and cocaine offenses, as Joyner requested.
However, the court departed downward under USSG § 5K2.23, p.s.
(Discharged Terms of Imprisonment), and sentenced Joyner to a term
of 221 months imprisonment on each count, to run concurrently.
A sentencing court must calculate the appropriate
guideline range and consider the range in conjunction with other
relevant factors under the guidelines and 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a)
(West 2000 & Supp. 2005), before imposing a sentence. United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); United States v. Hughes, 401
F.3d 540, 546 (4th Cir. 2005). The sentence must be “within the
statutorily prescribed range and . . . reasonable.” Hughes, 401
F.3d at 546-47 (citations omitted). If the court imposes a
sentence outside the guideline range, it must state its reasons for
doing so. Id. at 546. The district court’s determination that a
defendant has failed to demonstrate acceptance of responsibility is
a factual finding reviewed for clear error. United States v. Ruhe,
191 F.3d 376, 388 (4th Cir. 1999).
Application Note 1(a) to § 3E1.1 provides that the
sentencing court should consider whether the defendant has
- 4 -
truthfully admitted “the conduct comprising the offense(s) of
conviction, and truthfully admitt[ed] or not falsely den[ied] any
additional relevant conduct for which the defendant is accountable
under § 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct).” Application Note 1(a) also
advises that a defendant need not “volunteer, or affirmatively
admit, relevant conduct beyond the offense of conviction in order
to obtain reduction,” and “may remain silent in respect to relevant
conduct beyond the offense of conviction without affecting his
ability to obtain a reduction . . . .” But “a defendant who
falsely denies, or frivolously contests, relevant conduct that the
court determines to be true has acted in a manner inconsistent with
acceptance of responsibility.” Id.
Joyner argues that he did not deny that the $7000 was his
or that it was part of his drug activity because “he signed a
statement of facts that acknowledged the money was a component of
his intent to distribute.”* Joyner points out that he pled guilty
to both counts of the indictment and, in his first post-arrest
statement, acknowledged that the drugs in Glossin’s apartment were
his. Joyner further contends that, because he was not charged with
possession of drug proceeds or money laundering, the $7000 was
*
The Statement of Facts stated that the police recovered crack
and marijuana from Glossin’s apartment, as well as “$7,000 in U.S.
currency, packaging material, scales, and various items used to
cook cocaine into crack.” The Statement of Facts also stated that
Joyner’s intent to distribute would be proved in part by the
presence of the money and other items.
- 5 -
“only relevant conduct to the offenses charged rather than conduct
actually comprising those offenses.” However, the $7000 was
treated as drug proceeds and used to calculate Joyner’s base
offense level. It was thus relevant conduct that was part of the
offenses of conviction, not additional relevant conduct that went
beyond the offenses of conviction. Consequently, Joyner could not
refuse to acknowledge his ownership of the money and yet claim that
he had truthfully admitted all the conduct that comprised the
offense of conviction under § 3E1.1. Moreover, despite his initial
admission that the drugs in the apartment were his, Joyner sought
to distance himself from both the drugs and the money in a second
interview with police, and later refused to discuss either one. We
conclude that the district court did not clearly err in finding
that Joyner had failed to demonstrate acceptance of responsibility.
Although Joyner did not object in the district court to
the 221-month sentence imposed on Count Two, we agree with the
parties that the sentence exceeds the five-year statutory maximum
provided in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D) for offenses involving less
than fifty kilograms of marijuana. The sentence thus constitutes
plain error, and warrants the exercise of our discretion to correct
it. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-37 (1993)
(unpreserved error may be corrected only if error occurred, that
was plain, and that affects substantial rights, and if failure to
correct error would seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or
- 6 -
public reputation of judicial proceedings); United States v.
Mackins, 315 F.3d 399, 406 (4th Cir. 2003) (same).
We therefore affirm the sentence imposed by the district
court on Count One. We vacate the sentence on Count Two and remand
for the limited purpose of permitting the district court to impose
a sentence of sixty months on Count Two. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would not
aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED
- 7 -