United States v. Vaughnta Jones

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-5283
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
VAUGHNTA MARKEES JONES,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Rock Hill. Cameron McGowan Currie, District
Judge. (0:06-cr-01169-CMC-1)
Submitted: November 1, 2011 Decided: November 9, 2011
Before KING, SHEDD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Scarlet B. Moore, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellant.
Robert C. Jendron, Jr., OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Vaughnta Markees Jones appeals his 168-month sentence
for possessing a firearm as a convicted felon (“Count Five”) and
possessing a sawed-off shotgun (“Count Seven”), in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006) and 26 U.S.C. §§ 5841, 5861(d), and
5871 (2006), respectively. Jones’ counsel has filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), in which
she states that she could identify no meritorious issues for
appeal, but questions whether Jones’ guilty plea was valid and
whether his sentence is reasonable. Jones has filed a pro se
informal brief, raising several issues relating to his
conviction and sentence. Having reviewed the record, we affirm
the judgment of the district court.
Jones dedicates significant portions of his informal
brief to protesting the merits of the district court’s denial of
his pretrial motion to suppress. However, a valid guilty plea
waives such an alleged antecedent jurisdictional defect.
Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973); United States v.
Willis, 992 F.2d 489, 490 (4th Cir. 1993). Although the record
suggests that the parties contemplated that Jones would be able
to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress, his guilty plea
is not expressly conditioned on his ability to pursue that issue
on appeal. Because “direct review of an adverse ruling on a
pre-trial motion is available only if the defendant expressly
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preserves that right by entering a conditional guilty plea,”
this court can consider Jones’ motion to suppress only in the
context of determining whether Jones’ guilty plea was voluntary.
United States v. Wiggins, 905 F.2d 51, 52 (4th Cir. 1990).
Because Jones did not seek to withdraw his guilty plea
below, this court reviews it for plain error. United States v.
Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 524-27 (4th Cir. 2002). To establish
plain error, Jones must show that “(1) an error was made; (2)
the error is plain; and (3) the error affects substantial
rights.” United States v. Massenburg, 564 F.3d 337, 342–43 (4th
Cir. 2009). “If all three of these conditions are met, an
appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a
forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously affects the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” United States v. Carr, 303 F.3d 539, 543 (4th
Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations
omitted).
Even assuming that Jones would not have entered an
unconditional guilty plea had the district court advised him of
its effect on his ability to appeal the denial of the motion to
suppress, we decline to exercise our discretion to correct the
error, because it is clear that the motion to suppress is
without merit. Carr, 303 F.3d at 543. Jones’ motion challenged
the search of the rental car he was driving, despite the fact
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that he was not an authorized driver under the rental agreement.
It has been long-settled in this circuit that Jones, “as an
unauthorized driver of the rented car, had no legitimate privacy
interest in the car and, therefore, the search of which he
complains cannot have violated his Fourth Amendment rights.”
United States v. Wellons, 32 F.3d 117, 119 (4th Cir. 1994).
Because any error deprived Jones only of the ability to pursue
an argument that is conclusively foreclosed by longstanding
precedent, neither the fairness nor integrity of the proceedings
below was impaired, and we decline to notice the error. Carr,
303 F.3d at 543.
With respect to Jones’ sentence, our review is for
reasonableness, applying an abuse of discretion standard.
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). We first ensure
that the district court committed no significant procedural
error, “such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating)
the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory,
failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence
based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately
explain the chosen sentence.” Id. If no procedural error was
committed, we review the sentence for substantive
reasonableness, taking into account the “totality of the
circumstances.” Id. In this respect, “an appellate court must
defer to the trial court and can reverse a sentence only if it
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is unreasonable, even if the sentence would not have been the
choice of the appellate court.” United States v. Evans, 526
F.3d 155, 160 (4th Cir. 2008) (emphasis in original). A
sentence that falls within a properly calculated Guidelines
range is presumptively reasonable. United States v. Allen, 491
F.3d 178, 193 (4th Cir. 2007).
We have thoroughly reviewed the arguments raised by
Jones in his informal brief pertaining to his sentencing and
determine that they are without merit. See United States v.
Hampton, 628 F.3d 654, 659 (4th Cir. 2010) (stating standard of
review). See also United States v. Hood, 628 F.3d 669, 672-73
(4th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2138 (2011). Nor do
we discern any other error——procedural or substantive——with
respect to the within-Guidelines sentence imposed upon Jones.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.
This court requires that counsel inform Jones, in writing, of
the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Jones requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Jones.
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We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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