Dewayne Cox v. Bradley Quinn

PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-6943
DEWAYNE JACKSON COX, a/k/a Dwayne Cox,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
OFFICER BRADLEY QUINN; OFFICER JOSHUA PINKERMAN; OFFICER
BENJAMIN BAXLEY,
Defendants – Appellants,
and
CAPTAIN CHAD KELLER; SERGEANT WILLIE SMITH; MAJOR GREG
WINSTON; LIEUTENANT SHELTON; CORRECTIONAL OFFICER MYLES,
a/k/a Miles; OTHER UNKNOWN OFFICERS AND/OR EMPLOYEES OF THE
WESTERN VIRGINIA REGIONAL JAIL; BRANDON JAMAL REDDIX; JUSTIN
MILES,
Defendants.
No. 15-6944
DEWAYNE JACKSON COX, a/k/a Dwayne Cox,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
JUSTIN MILES,
Defendant – Appellant,
and
OFFICER BRADLEY QUINN; OFFICER JOSHUA PINKERMAN; OFFICER
BENJAMIN BAXLEY; CAPTAIN CHAD KELLER; SERGEANT WILLIE SMITH;
MAJOR GREG WINSTON; LIEUTENANT SHELTON; CORRECTIONAL OFFICER
MYLES, a/k/a Miles; OTHER UNKNOWN OFFICERS AND/OR EMPLOYEES
OF THE WESTERN VIRGINIA REGIONAL JAIL; BRANDON JAMAL REDDIX,
Defendants.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Glen E. Conrad, Chief
District Judge. (7:12-cv-00154-GEC)
Argued: May 11, 2016 Decided: July 6, 2016
Before DUNCAN, WYNN, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Harris wrote the opinion,
in which Judge Duncan and Judge Wynn joined.
ARGUED: Jim H. Guynn, Jr., GUYNN & WADDELL, P.C., Salem,
Virginia; Christopher Carey Newton, FRITH ANDERSON & PEAKE,
P.C., Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellants. Melvin Edward
Williams, MEL WILLIAMS PLC, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee. ON
BRIEF: John C. Johnson, FRITH ANDERSON & PEAKE, P.C., Roanoke,
Virginia, for Appellant Justin Miles.
2
PAMELA HARRIS, Circuit Judge:
In 2011, appellee Dewayne Cox was severely beaten by a
fellow inmate while incarcerated at the Western Virginia
Regional Jail. Cox had repeatedly complained to jail
officials — including the appellants, correctional officers
Bradley Quinn, Joshua Pinkerman, Benjamin Baxley, and Justin
Miles — that he was being threatened, harassed, and robbed by
the group of inmates who ultimately orchestrated the beating.
Cox filed suit against Baxley, Quinn, Pinkerman, and Miles,
alleging that they had been deliberately indifferent to a
substantial risk to his safety, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and the Eighth Amendment. The district court denied summary
judgment to the correctional officers, finding that they were
not entitled to qualified immunity on Cox’s claims. We agree,
and we affirm.
I.
A.
Because this is an interlocutory appeal of a denial of
qualified immunity, we consider only “the facts as the district
court viewed them as well as any additional undisputed facts.”
Danser v. Stansberry, 772 F.3d 340, 345 (4th Cir. 2014).
In 2010 and 2011, Dewayne Cox was incarcerated at the
Western Virginia Regional Jail. Cox was housed in “Pod 3A” with
3
about fifty other men, including Terrence Jackson, David Cabell,
Sheron Harris, and Brandon Reddix. Jackson, Cabell, and Harris
formed an informal gang or group in the pod. At some point,
Reddix joined their group as well.
Cox and other inmates found the Jackson-Cabell-Harris group
to be loud, aggressive, intimidating, and threatening. As one
inmate, Gerald Garlic, explained,
They would snatch the T.V. remote from others[’]
hands, and take radio[]s or unplug headphones, and
disrupt board games or card games by pushing them out
of reach or taking p[ie]ces and issuing a challenge to
who-ever they chose to pick on at the time by saying
things like “what ya gonna do pops” “say something”
“I’ll fuck you up” [“]we rule this pod and if y[’]all
don’t like it just say something and we’ll take care
of you” or “say something to the [correctional
officers] we will beat your old toothless stinking ass
to death,” or [“]we are []Bloods and we run shit in
here.”
J.A. 317–18. According to another inmate, Joe Rutherford,
“Harris[,] Cabell and Jackson [were] constantly loud and
intimidating and more or less [were] in a gang all their own.
They were trouble waiting to happen.” J.A. 324.
Cox and at least one other inmate submitted informal
complaints, or “blue slips,” describing the group’s aggressive
and threatening behavior to jail officials, and Cox discussed
his concerns with Captain Chad Keller on March 8, 2011. Cox
informed Keller that Harris was harassing and stealing from him
and requested that either he or Harris be moved to a different
4
pod. According to Cox, Keller responded that he knew Harris was
“an asshole” who “creates problems everywhere he goes.” J.A.
282. But Keller asked Cox if he and Harris could remain in the
pod together if he talked to Harris and “ke[pt] him on a chain.”
Id. Cox agreed.
After Keller talked to Harris about Cox’s complaints,
however, the situation in the pod only got worse for Cox.
Harris called Cox a “snitch” and threatened that he “was going
to get” him. J.A. 283. Then, a few weeks later, Harris and
Cabell instigated a physical altercation with Cox and issued
explicit threats in front of other inmates. As one inmate
described:
[T]here were about six of us playing poker together.
. . . Dewayne [Cox] won a hand. Harris and Cabell
started raising their voices, telling Dewayne he was a
p[ie]ce of shit. Mr. Cabell jerked the sheet we had
covering the table[] off the table and threw cards
everywhere. He reached across the table and knocked
other cards . . . out of Dewayne’s hands and got in
Dewayne[’]s face and said “Do something punk,[] say
anything you old toothless son of a bitch and I’ll
stomp your white ass all over this pod.” Then Cabell
went to the telephone area, still angry, upset, and
threw a blue plastic chair . . . across the floor, and
issued a challenge for the whole pod, for “anybody say
one fucking word about it I will fuck em up” “Go on!
Anybody, please say something so I can beat some ass.”
J.A. 324–25 (affidavit of inmate Rutherford). In addition,
Harris and Cabell stole commissary items from Cox and harassed
him on other occasions. Cox submitted several more blue slips
complaining about these issues and requesting that either he or
5
the inmates who were threatening him be moved to a different
pod. He never received any response.
Appellants Quinn, Baxley, and Pinkerman were certified
correctional officers at the jail, and appellant Miles was an
uncertified officer — essentially, a trainee. On April 11,
2011, Quinn, Baxley, and Miles were on duty in Pod 3A, and
Pinkerman was working nearby. Cox approached Miles that morning
and asked “what they were going to do about what was going on in
the pod . . . with Cabell and Jackson and Harris.” J.A. 218.
He also inquired about the number of blue slips that jail
officials had received about those inmates. Miles stated that
he was aware of blue slips from Cox and one other inmate, and he
asked Cox to step out into the hallway to discuss his concerns
further.
Cox, along with inmate Garlic, went into the hall to talk
further with Miles. They explained that they “were being
harassed” and that Cabell and Harris were stealing from Cox.
J.A. 219. Cox told Miles that he feared for his safety, and
both Cox and Garlic requested that either they or the
problematic inmates be moved out of the pod.
Officers Quinn, Baxley, and Pinkerman eventually joined the
conversation and Cox repeated his concerns to them. Miles
assured Cox and Garlic that they would “take care of it,” and
the other officers agreed. J.A. 221. Cox asked the officers
6
what they planned to do, saying “[s]omebody needs to be moved,
somebody is going to get hurt.” Id. Miles stated that they
would “talk to the guys,” and Cox responded: “Don’t do that
because that will put an X on me and make the situation worse
than what it is.” J.A. 222. Garlic agreed with Cox, expressing
concern that if the officers spoke to the inmates, “they would
only get angry and retaliate against us.” J.A. 319. And both
Cox and Garlic again requested to either be moved from the pod
or to have the other inmates moved. The officers instructed Cox
and Garlic to return to the pod.
After speaking with Cox and Garlic, Miles reached out to
Sergeant Willie Smith for advice. According to Miles, Smith
responded that he was “busy” and that Miles needed to “get [his]
guys to handle it.” J.A. 102. But according to Smith himself,
he told the officers, “[I]f Cox is being threatened in any way
or if anybody is being threatened, remove them out of the pod,
lock the inmates down, lock the whole pod and question all of
the inmates in the pod to find out what was going on.” J.A.
343.
When Cox returned to the pod, he called a friend on the
telephone in the pod’s common area and spoke to her for several
minutes. While Cox was on the telephone, inmates began to
return to the pod from the recreation area. Cox noticed that
Cabell, Jackson, and Harris — who had been at recreation — did
7
not reenter the pod with the others. Then, about five minutes
later, the three men returned to the pod. Right away, Harris
“hollered at” Cox, loudly yelling, “You are a fucking snitch and
we are going to get your ass.” J.A. 225. Cox returned to his
cell, but he continued to hear Harris, as well as Jackson and
Cabell, yelling, “Miles told us what you said, that you told on
us,” that Cox was a “snitch,” and that they were “going to get”
him. J.A. 228. Cox also heard Jackson shout that he was
offering fifty dollars “for somebody to beat [Cox’s] ass.” J.A.
229.
Later that day, Cox left his cell for dinner and approached
Miles, who was serving the inmates’ meal. Cox said:
Mr. Miles, why did you all talk to these guys? Why
did you say anything to these guys? . . . Now they
are threatening me, going to do something to me. . . .
I want out of here, Miles. You all got to do
something.
J.A. 231–32. According to Cox, Miles responded by throwing up
his hands, saying, “What now, Cox?” and then turning around and
walking away. J.A. 232.
Cox sat down with Garlic to eat, and Harris stood up and
yelled, “We are going to get you, snitch, we are going to get
you. We are going to beat your ass before lockdown.” J.A. 232.
Cox returned to his cell without finishing his dinner. He later
came out of his cell and saw Cabell and Jackson walk by. Cabell
8
warned that Cox was “going to get fucked up” before the end of
the day. J.A. 236.
At that point, Brandon Reddix approached Cox and said, “I
want to talk to you, man.” J.A. 237. Cox had not previously
had any problems with Reddix and he started through his own cell
door to talk with Reddix there, but then he realized that Reddix
“was kind of buddy-buddy” with Harris, Cabell, and Jackson. Id.
Cox started to reverse course, but Reddix punched him in the
back of his neck and knocked him across the cell. Reddix
continued to beat Cox on his head, ribs, and back until another
inmate yelled that correctional officers were on the way. Cox
estimates that the assault lasted between 45 and 75 seconds, and
he suffered broken ribs, a loosened tooth, bruising, swelling,
and abrasions.
Miles later discovered Cox bloodied and injured from
Reddix’s attack. Cox reminded Miles, as well as Officer Quinn,
that he had warned them something bad was going to happen to
him.
Miles filed an incident report recommending that Cabell,
Harris, and Jackson be given “Major Violations” for assault.
According to Miles, even though none of those three inmates
actually attacked Cox, “they were a little group in that pod and
they were . . . notorious.” J.A. 147–48. Miles believed that
“they needed to be cited for planning” the attack on Cox. J.A.
9
148. Sergeant Smith concurred with this recommendation in a
separate report.
B.
In 2012, Cox filed suit against Quinn, Baxley, Pinkerman,
and Miles under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 1 Relevant here, Cox alleged
that the correctional officers had violated his Eighth Amendment
right to “protect[ion] from violence at the hands of other
prisoners,” which flows from the Amendment’s prohibition on
“cruel and unusual punishments.” See Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 832–33 (1994); U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
The correctional officers moved for summary judgment. They
argued that they had not violated Cox’s Eighth Amendment rights
because they were not “deliberately indifferent” to a
substantial risk that Cox would be assaulted by a fellow inmate.
See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (element of Eighth Amendment
violation is that defendant prison officials acted with
“‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate health or safety” (citation
omitted)). They also argued that they were entitled to
qualified immunity because reasonable correctional officers in
the same circumstances would not have known that they had
violated Cox’s clearly established rights. See Parrish ex rel.
1
Cox’s original and amended complaints also named other
defendants and included other claims, but those defendants and
claims are not pertinent to this appeal.
10
Lee v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 301 (4th Cir. 2004) (element of
qualified immunity analysis is that the right in question “was
‘clearly established’ at the time of the alleged offense”
(quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001))).
Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Cox, the
district court determined that there was a genuine issue of
material fact in dispute as to whether the correctional officers
had acted with deliberate indifference to a substantial threat
to Cox’s safety. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. The court
further found that the officers were not entitled to qualified
immunity because the duty of jail officials to protect prisoners
from inmate violence was clearly established in April of 2011.
Accordingly, the court denied summary judgment to the
appellants.
Quinn, Baxley, and Pinkerman filed one interlocutory appeal
of the district court’s denial of qualified immunity, and Miles
filed another. We consolidated the two appeals, which we
consider below.
II.
Under the collateral order doctrine, we have jurisdiction
to review a denial of qualified immunity at summary judgment
only “to the extent that the court’s decision turned on an issue
of law.” Danser, 772 F.3d at 344; see Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d
11
225, 234 (4th Cir. 2008) (noting this exception to the rule that
“interlocutory appeals are generally disallowed”). Thus, we may
consider only “the facts as the district court viewed them as
well as any additional undisputed facts,” and our review is
limited to the legal question of whether the court correctly
denied summary judgment on those facts. Danser, 772 F.3d at
345.
We review the district court’s denial of qualified immunity
at summary judgment de novo, viewing the facts in the light most
favorable to Cox, the non-moving party. Id. We may grant
summary judgment to the correctional officers only if “no
material facts are disputed and [they are] entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” See Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531
(4th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quoting Ausherman v. Bank of Am.
Corp., 352 F.3d 896, 899 (4th Cir. 2003)).
A.
At the first step of the qualified immunity inquiry, we
must determine whether, viewing the facts in the light most
favorable to Cox, the correctional officers’ conduct violated a
constitutional right. See Parrish, 372 F.3d at 301. The
correctional officers contend that the undisputed facts show
that they were not, as a matter of law, deliberately indifferent
to a serious risk of harm to Cox, in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. We disagree.
12
1.
The Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to “take
reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.”
Id. at 832 (citation omitted); accord Makdessi v. Fields, 789
F.3d 126, 132 (4th Cir. 2015). And they have a specific
“duty . . . to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of
other prisoners.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833 (alteration in
original) (citation omitted). But a prison official will not be
liable for failing to protect a prisoner from inmate violence
unless two requirements are met. See id. at 834.
“First, the deprivation alleged must be, objectively,
sufficiently serious.” Id. (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted); see Brown v. N.C. Dep’t of Corr., 612 F.3d 720,
723 (4th Cir. 2010) (“[A] prisoner must allege a serious or
significant physical or emotional injury resulting from the
challenged conditions.” (quoting Odom v. S.C. Dep’t of Corr.,
349 F.3d 765, 770 (4th Cir. 2003))). In this case, the parties
do not dispute that Cox’s injuries meet this standard.
Second, and central to this appeal, the defendant prison
officials must have had a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.”
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (citation omitted). “In prison-
conditions cases” like this one, “that state of mind is one of
‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate health or safety.” Id.
(citation omitted). “Deliberate indifference” requires “‘more
13
than mere negligence,’ but ‘less than acts or omissions [done]
for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm
will result.’” Makdessi, 789 F.3d at 133 (alteration in
original) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835). It is a subjective
standard requiring that a prison official “both be aware of
facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial
risk of serious harm exists, and . . . also draw the inference.”
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. And, in addition to subjectively
recognizing that substantial risk, the prison official must also
subjectively be aware that “his actions were ‘inappropriate in
light of that risk.’” Parrish, 372 F.3d at 303 (quoting Rich v.
Bruce, 129 F.3d 336, 340 n.2 (4th Cir. 1997)).
Whether a prison official acted with “deliberate
indifference” is a question of fact that can be proven through
direct or circumstantial evidence. Makdessi, 789 F.3d at 133;
Parrish, 372 F.3d at 303. A plaintiff can make a prima facie
case of deliberate indifference “by showing ‘that a substantial
risk of [serious harm] was longstanding, pervasive, well-
documented, or expressly noted by prison officials in the past,
and the circumstances suggest that the defendant-official being
sued had been exposed to information concerning the risk and
thus must have known about it.’” Parrish, 372 F.3d at 303
(alteration in original) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842). And
a prison official may not avoid liability simply because he was
14
unaware that the inmate was “especially likely to be assaulted
by the specific prisoner who eventually committed the assault.”
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843.
Furthermore, a prison official’s response to a known threat
to inmate safety must be reasonable. See id. at 844 (“[P]rison
officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate
health or safety may be found free from liability if they
responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately
was not averted.” (emphasis added)). Prison officials are
deliberately indifferent if they are aware that “the plaintiff
inmate faces a serious danger to his safety and they could avert
the danger easily yet they fail to do so.” Brown, 612 F.3d at
723 (quoting Case v. Ahitow, 301 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2002)).
And “a factfinder may conclude that the official’s response to a
perceived risk was so patently inadequate as to justify an
inference that the official actually recognized that his
response to the risk was inappropriate under the circumstances.”
Parrish, 372 F.3d at 303.
2.
In light of the facts as we may view them, and drawing
reasonable inferences in Cox’s favor, we find that the district
court correctly held that material issues of fact precluded
summary judgment for the correctional officers on the Eighth
Amendment deliberate indifference claim.
15
First, there is ample evidence suggesting that Quinn,
Pinkerman, Baxley, and Miles were subjectively “aware of facts
from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk
of serious harm exist[ed], and . . . also dr[ew] the inference,”
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837: Cox submitted numerous “blue slips”
complaining that he was being threatened and robbed by Harris,
Cabell, and possibly others; Cox repeatedly informed the
appellants that he feared for his safety and wished either to be
moved from the pod or to have the other inmates moved; and Cox
expressly requested that the correctional officers not discuss
his concerns with Harris and the others because he feared that
would put him at even greater risk. Moreover, Cox renewed his
plea for help to Miles only a short time before the beating
actually occurred. A reasonable jury could thus conclude that
the appellants “had been exposed to information concerning the
risk” to Cox’s safety and therefore “must have known about it.”
See id. at 842 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Furthermore, a reasonable jury could also decide that the
correctional officers knew Cox “face[d] a serious danger to his
safety” and could have “avert[ed] the danger easily” but
“fail[ed] to do so.” See Brown, 612 F.3d at 723 (citation
omitted). Sergeant Smith testified at deposition that he
specifically told the appellants to remove Cox from the pod and
lock it down if Cox feared for his safety. But instead of
16
taking this — or another — reasonable action to protect Cox, the
officers opted to do the very thing Cox warned them would lead
to disaster: They directly confronted the inmates who were
threatening Cox.
The correctional officers contend that the fact that they
took any action at all means that they were not deliberately
indifferent as a matter of law. But the Eighth Amendment
requires more than some action: It requires reasonable action.
See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. Viewing the facts in the light
most favorable to Cox, a jury could conclude that the
appellants’ response to Cox’s concerns — seeking, but
disregarding, Sergeant Smith’s advice, and taking the one action
Cox specifically warned would put him at greater risk — was not
only unreasonable, but “so patently inadequate as to justify an
inference that the official[s] actually recognized that [their]
response to the risk was inappropriate under the circumstances.” 2
See Parrish, 372 F.3d at 303.
The appellants also argue that there is no evidence they
ever drew the inference that Cox faced a substantial risk of
serious harm, see Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, because, they say,
2
And Miles’s relative inexperience does nothing to alter
this analysis; indeed, we are hard-pressed to imagine a more
inappropriate response than throwing up one’s hands and walking
away when informed that an attack on an inmate is imminent.
17
when they addressed Cox’s concerns with the inmates who had
threatened him, the inmates assured the officers there would be
no trouble. But we do not have jurisdiction to consider this
argument because it is based on facts that the district court
did not consider and that remain in dispute. 3 See Danser, 772
F.3d at 345.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of
summary judgment on the constitutional violation prong of the
qualified immunity inquiry.
B.
Even if a correctional officer has violated a prisoner’s
constitutional right, however, he is shielded from liability by
qualified immunity if an objectively reasonable officer could
have believed that his actions were lawful “in light of clearly
established law.” 4 Henry, 652 F.3d at 531. A right is “clearly
3Furthermore, by the correctional officers’ own account,
Harris and Cabell’s response to their inquiry was, “We will stay
to ourselves if they stay to the[m]selves,” J.A. 374 — hardly an
ironclad assurance. A reasonable jury crediting the
correctional officers’ account of this conversation might still
conclude that they were subjectively aware that Cox remained in
danger.
4
Although we need not reach the issue here, we note that
some courts have concluded that it is not necessary to consider
the objective reasonableness prong of the qualified immunity
inquiry at all when summary judgment is denied on deliberate
indifference. See, e.g., Walker v. Benjamin, 293 F.3d 1030,
1037 (7th Cir. 2002); Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120,
142 n.15 (3d Cir. 2001). Prison officials violate the Eighth
18
established” if “[t]he contours of the right” were “sufficiently
clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he
is doing violates that right.” Id. at 534 (alteration in
original) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640
(1987)). In conducting this inquiry, we must define the right
“in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad
general proposition.” Parrish, 372 F.3d at 301 (quoting
Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201). It is not necessary, however, that
“the exact conduct at issue” have been previously held unlawful;
Amendment through deliberate indifference if they are aware of a
substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate, Farmer, 511 U.S.
at 837, yet disregard that risk by taking action that they know
to be inappropriate, Parrish, 372 F.3d at 303. In other words,
for purposes of deliberate indifference, the Eighth Amendment
violation must have been committed knowingly. As we have noted
in the past, “applying an objective qualified immunity standard
in the context of an Eighth Amendment claim that is satisfied
only by a showing of deliberate indifference” — that is, a
knowing violation of the law — presents a “special problem.”
Rish v. Johnson, 131 F.3d 1092, 1098 n.6 (4th Cir. 1997).
Accordingly, some of our sister circuits have concluded that
deliberately indifferent conduct can never be objectively
reasonable for purposes of qualified immunity. See Walker, 293
F.3d at 1037 (holding that deliberate indifference and qualified
immunity inquiries “effectively collapse into one” and that
“[i]f there are genuine issues of fact concerning” a defendant’s
deliberate indifference, the “defendant may not avoid trial on
the grounds of qualified immunity”); Beers-Capitol, 256 F.3d at
142 n.15 (“Conduct that is deliberately indifferent to an
excessive risk to [juvenile detention center] residents cannot
be objectively reasonable conduct.”). But see Estate of Ford v.
Ramirez-Palmer, 301 F.3d 1043, 1049–50 (9th Cir. 2002)
(rejecting approach that “collapses the deliberate indifference
part of the constitutional inquiry into the qualified immunity
inquiry”).
19
“[r]ather, our analysis must take into consideration ‘not only
already specifically adjudicated rights, but those manifestly
included within more general applications of the core
constitutional principle invoked.’” Odom, 349 F.3d at 773
(quoting Amaechi v. West, 237 F.3d 356, 362–63 (4th Cir. 2001)).
The correctional officers contend that the district court
erred in denying them qualified immunity because it was not
clearly established at the time of the assault on Cox that
“interceding and discussing” Cox’s concerns “with the allegedly
threatening prisoners violated Cox’s constitutional rights.”
Appellants’ Br. at 9. They argue that they “received assurances
that there would be no trouble” from the inmates, id. at 12, and
that they had no reason to believe that accepting those
assurances would be unreasonable in light of clearly established
law. But, again, we lack jurisdiction to consider this argument
because it is premised on facts about the officers’ conversation
with the inmates that the district court did not consider and
that remain in dispute. See Danser, 772 F.3d at 345.
On the record as we may view it here, we find that the
district court correctly concluded that the correctional
officers were not entitled to qualified immunity. It has long
been established that jail officials have a duty to protect
inmates from a substantial and known risk of harm, including
harm inflicted by other prisoners. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833.
20
Moreover, by 2011, we had made it clear that “a prison official
acts with deliberate indifference when he ignores repeated
requests from a vulnerable inmate to be separated from a fellow
inmate who has issued violent threats which the aggressor will
likely carry out in the absence of official intervention.”
Odom, 349 F.3d at 773.
Here, Cox repeatedly informed the appellants that he was
being threatened and robbed and that he feared for his safety,
and his concerns were corroborated by other inmates. But the
only action the correctional officers took in response to this
information — despite the instructions of their sergeant — was
to do the one thing Cox specifically warned them would increase
the risk to his safety. And when confronted with Cox’s concerns
again, Miles just threw up his hands and walked away. Under the
law of this Circuit, an objectively reasonable correctional
officer — certified or uncertified — would have known that these
actions were unreasonable, ran afoul of clearly established law,
and violated rights “manifestly included within more general
applications of the core constitutional principle” articulated
in Farmer. See Odom, 349 F.3d at 773 (citation omitted).
Accordingly, the correctional officers are not entitled to
qualified immunity.
21
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s
denial of qualified immunity to the appellants.
AFFIRMED
22