Triton Marine Fuels Ltd. v. Green Pacific A/S

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-1958
BRIDGE OIL, LTD.,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
and
TRITON MARINE FUELS LTD., S.A.,
Plaintiff,
and
CRESCENT TOWING AND SALVAGE COMPANY, INC.; COOPER/T. SMITH
MOORING; CANTON PORT SERVICES LLC; ISS MARINE SERVICES,
INC., d/b/a Inchcape Shipping Services; BUNKER HOLDINGS,
LTD.,
Intervenors/Plaintiffs,
v.
GREEN PACIFIC A/S,
Defendant – Appellant,
and
M/V PACIFIC CHUKOTKA, apparel, freights, etc., IMO No.
8800224; EMERALD REEFER LINES, LTD.; EMERALD REEFER LINES,
LLC; INTERTRANSPORT CO., LLC; INTERTRANSPORT, LTD.,
Defendants,
and
THE MASTER OF THE M/V PACIFIC CHUKOTKA,
Garnishee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, District Judge.
(1:06-cv-03346-JFM)
Submitted: October 16, 2008 Decided: November 24, 2008
Before WILLIAMS, Chief Judge, SHEDD, Circuit Judge, and Martin
K. REIDINGER, United States District Judge for the Western
District of North Carolina, sitting by designation.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
David Warren Skeen, WRIGHT, CONSTABLE & SKEEN, L.L.P.,
Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Robert Brooke Hopkins,
OBER, KALER, GRIMES & SHRIVER, P.C., Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
This appeal arises from a multi-party consolidated action
involving suits by various companies seeking recovery for the
provision of marine oil fuel and other marine services. One of
those companies, Bridge Oil, Ltd., asserted (inter alia) an
unjust enrichment claim against Green Pacific A/S, alleging that
it supplied fuel to Green Pacific’s vessel, the M/V PACIFIC
KAMCHATKA, which was then chartered to a third party. The fuel,
for which Bridge Oil was never paid, allegedly enabled the
PACIFIC KAMCHATKA to continue operating and earning money for
Green Pacific. To secure its claim, Bridge Oil attached another
Green Pacific vessel, the M/V PACIFIC CHUKOTKA, while it was
docked in Baltimore, Maryland. Green Pacific moved for summary
judgment on the unjust enrichment claim, and it also moved to
enjoin Bridge Oil from proceeding with litigation that Bridge
Oil had instituted in Nigeria against the PACIFIC KAMCHATKA. In
response, Bridge Oil moved for voluntary dismissal pursuant to
Rule 41(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The
district court granted the motion, and Green Pacific now
appeals. Finding no error, we affirm.
Rule 41(a) governs voluntary dismissals of federal actions.
Under Rule 41(a)(1), a plaintiff may voluntarily dismiss an
action without a court order by filing (1) a notice of dismissal
before the opposing party has filed an answer or summary
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judgment motion or (2) a stipulation of dismissal signed by all
parties that have appeared. Pertinent to this case, Rule
41(a)(2) provides that in any other circumstance, “an action may
be dismissed at the plaintiff’s request only by court order, on
terms that the court considers proper.” “The primary force of
[Rule] 41(a)(2) is to empower district courts to exercise
discretion over voluntary dismissals,” GO Computer, Inc. v.
Microsoft Corp., 508 F.3d 170, 177 (4th Cir. 2007), and we
review a district court’s decision to grant a Rule 41(a)(2)
motion accordingly, see Ellett Bros., Inc. v. U.S. Fidelity &
Guar. Co., 275 F.3d 384, 388 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting that abuse
of discretion standard of review applies).
Although the decision is discretionary, the “purpose of
Rule 41(a)(2) is freely to allow voluntary dismissals unless the
parties will be unfairly prejudiced,” Davis v. USX Corp., 819
F.2d 1270, 1273 (4th Cir. 1987); thus, a district court should
grant a Rule 41(a)(2) motion “absent plain legal prejudice to
the defendant,” Ellett Bros., 275 F.3d at 388. A defendant
cannot establish prejudice sufficient to defeat a Rule 41(a)(2)
motion merely by showing that it has filed a summary judgment
motion, Andes v. Versant Corp., 788 F.2d 1033, 1036 n.4 (4th
Cir. 1986), or that it faces the prospect of a subsequent
lawsuit, Ellett Bros., 275 F.3d at 388-89.
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In reaching its decision, the district court concluded that
Green Pacific would not be sufficiently prejudiced by Bridge
Oil’s voluntary dismissal of the unjust enrichment claim for two
reasons. First, the court noted that although some discovery
had taken place, it was minimal and would have occurred in the
multi-party litigation even without the presence of Bridge Oil’s
unjust enrichment claim. Second, the court noted that Green
Pacific’s summary judgment motion against Bridge Oil was also
directed against a similar claim by another party and,
therefore, would have been filed in any event. As the court
explained: “Green Pacific has not expended considerable
additional effort in defending Bridge Oil’s action, and as a
result, the dismissal of Bridge Oil’s suit would not
substantially prejudice Green Pacific.” Triton Marine Fuels
Ltd., S.A. v. M/V PACIFIC CHUKOTKA, 2007 Westlaw 2579625, *2 (D.
Md. 2007). For support, the court relied particularly on our
opinion in Fidelity Bank PLC v. Northern Fox Shipping N.V., 242
Fed. Appx. 84 (4th Cir. 2007), in which we affirmed an order
granting voluntary dismissal under similar circumstances.
Apart from its conclusion that Green Pacific would not be
substantially prejudiced, the district court also found that
Bridge Oil had adequately explained its basis for seeking
voluntary dismissal of the unjust enrichment claim. As the
court explained:
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I am satisfied with Bridge Oil’s proffered
justification - that dismissal of this action would
leave resolution of the outstanding claims to a court
in Nigeria where the PACIFIC KAMCHATKA has been
arrested. Because Bridge Oil has commenced the
Nigerian action against the PACIFIC KAMCHATKA, the
ship that it actually supplied, it makes sense to
dismiss its claim here.
Triton Marine Fuels, at *2.
On appeal, Green Pacific argues that the district court
abused its discretion by permitting Bridge Oil to voluntarily
dismiss its unjust enrichment claim. However, we disagree and
hold that the court did not abuse its discretion in granting
Bridge Oil’s Rule 41(a)(2) motion. In our view, the court
carefully considered the motion under the appropriate legal
standards, and its conclusion that Green Pacific would not be
sufficiently prejudiced as a result of the dismissal is
supported by the facts of the case. See generally Westberry v.
Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257, 261 (4th Cir. 1999) (stating
that a district court abuses its discretion if its decision “is
guided by erroneous legal principles” or “rests upon a clearly
erroneous factual finding”).
Accordingly, we affirm the voluntary dismissal order. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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