United States v. Woods

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-1296
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ISAAC LEE WOODS; REGINA BAILEY WOODS; ELLA R. WOODS,
Defendants – Appellants,
and
UNLIMITED FINANCIAL RESOURCES,
Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, Senior
District Judge. (5:07-cv-00187-BR)
Submitted: September 4, 2009 Decided: September 30, 2009
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Isaac Lee Woods, Regina Bailey Woods, Ella R. Woods, Appellants
Pro Se. Sarah Burnette, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Isaac Lee Woods, Regina Bailey Woods and Ella R. Woods
appeal the district court’s order and judgment granting the
United States’ motion for summary judgment, voiding several real
property transfers and denying several of the Woods’ motions.
Finding no error, we affirm.
This court reviews a district court’s grant of summary
judgment de novo, “viewing the facts and the reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party.” Emmett v. Johnson, 532 F.3d 291, 297 (4th
Cir. 2008). Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, the
discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Additionally, “the mere existence of
some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat
an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 3304(b)(1)(A), (B) (2006), the
district court may set aside any transfer of assets made by a
debtor if the debtor makes the transfer with either “actual
intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor” or “without
receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the
transfer . . . if the debtor . . . intended to incur, or
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believed or reasonably should have believed that he would incur,
debts beyond his ability to pay as they became due.” In
examining a debtor’s actual intent, the court may consider
eleven non-exclusive factors set forth in 28 U.S.C.
§ 3304(b)(2), including whether a transfer was made to an
insider, the timing of the transfer, whether “the transfer was
of substantially all the debtor’s assets,” and whether the
consideration for the transfer “was reasonably equivalent to the
value of the asset transferred[.]” Even if the court fails to
find evidence of actual intent to commit fraud, the court may
still set aside the transfers if there is evidence of badges of
fraud.
We have reviewed the record and find summary judgment
was appropriate in this case substantially for the reasons cited
by the district court. See United States v. Woods, No. 5:07-cv-
00187-BR (E.D.N.C. Dec. 10, 2008). We further find the court’s
denial of several of the Woods’ motions was proper.
Accordingly, we affirm. The Woods have several pending motions:
(1) motion to expedite; (2) motion for summary disposition; (3)
motion to reconsider order deferring action on motion for
summary disposition; (4) motion to consolidate; and (5) motion
to reconsider limiting electronic access of the Woods’ appendix.
We deny the motions. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
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materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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