United States v. Singleton

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-4243
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JAMES SINGLETON, a/k/a X-5,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J.
Conrad, Jr., Chief District Judge. (3:07-cr-00282-RJC-1)
Submitted: December 23, 2009 Decided: January 11, 2010
Before WILKINSON, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Claire J. Rauscher, Executive Director, Matthew R. Segal,
FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA, INC., Asheville,
North Carolina; Beth Blackwood, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN
NORTH CAROLINA, INC., Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Edward R. Ryan, Acting United States Attorney, Charlotte, North
Carolina; Amy E. Ray, Assistant United States Attorney,
Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
James Singleton entered a conditional guilty plea,
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2), to being a felon in possession of a
firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(e) (2006).
Singleton preserved his right to challenge the district court’s
denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of
an investigative stop by Officer Kirk Bynoe and Officer Charles
Gunter of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina, Police
Department.
On appeal, Singleton contends that the totality of the
circumstances shows that the officers did not have reasonable
suspicion to effectuate a Terry ∗ stop because carrying an
unconcealed firearm in a high crime area is not a crime in North
Carolina and Singleton’s understandably nervous conduct when
finding himself observed by police officers did not indicate
that he was involved in any criminal activity. Singleton also
argues that, even if the officers had reasonable suspicion to
stop him, the investigatory stop was longer than necessary to
determine whether Singleton was engaged in criminal activity.
Finding no error, we affirm.
In reviewing a district court’s ruling on a motion to
suppress, we defer to the district court’s factual findings,
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Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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setting them aside only if clearly erroneous, and review its
legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Perry, 560 F.3d
246, 251 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 177 (2009). When
the district court has denied a motion to suppress, the evidence
must be viewed in the light most favorable to the Government.
United States v. Neely, 564 F.3d 346, 349 (4th Cir. 2009).
Consistent with the Fourth Amendment, a police officer
may conduct a brief investigatory stop, known as a Terry stop,
“when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that
criminal activity is afoot.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119,
123 (2000) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30). Whether there is
reasonable suspicion to justify the stop depends on the totality
of the circumstances, including the information known to the
officer and any reasonable inferences to be drawn at the time of
the stop. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8 (1989).
Reasonable suspicion may exist even if “each individual factor
‘alone is susceptible of innocent explanation.’” United States
v. Black, 525 F.3d 359, 366-67 (4th Cir.) (quoting United States
v. Arivizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002)), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct.
182 (2008). The reasonable suspicion determination is a
“commonsensical proposition,” and deference should be accorded
to police officers’ determinations based on their experience of
what transpires on the streets. United States v. Foreman, 369
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F.3d 776, 782 (4th Cir. 2004); United States v. Lender, 985 F.2d
151, 154 (4th Cir. 1993).
Although Singleton contends that carrying an
unconcealed gun through a high crime area is not a crime in
North Carolina, lawful conduct may give rise to a reasonable
suspicion if the circumstances as a whole indicate that criminal
activity is afoot. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125. Here, Officer
Bynoe testified that the majority of people carrying unconcealed
firearms in this area are security guards or special police and
that Singleton was not wearing a uniform that would identify him
as either. In addition, the officers testified that, upon
noticing the police, Singleton exhibited a “fright or flight”
expression on his face which, in the officers’ experience, meant
he was getting ready to take off running.
Singleton contends that he was understandably nervous
when he found himself observed by police officers, and his
nervousness did not give the officers reasonable suspicion that
he was engaged in criminal activity. However, a defendant’s
unusually nervous behavior is a factor that the police can take
into consideration when making the reasonable suspicion
determination. United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 338 (4th
Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 943 (2009); Foreman, 369
F.3d at 785; United States v. Mayo, 361 F.3d 802, 807-08 (4th
Cir. 2004).
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Moreover, evasive conduct, including walking in the
opposite direction upon noticing police officers, may also be
taken into consideration by the police, even if the conduct
stops short of headlong flight. United States v. Smith, 396
F.3d 579, 584 (4th Cir. 2005); Mayo, 361 F.3d at 807-08; Lender,
985 F.2d at 154. Here, the officers testified that upon
noticing them, Singleton turned 180 degrees and began walking in
the opposite direction. He ignored the first request to stop.
Instead, he continued to walk quickly in the opposite direction,
and stopped only when Officer Gunter issued a second command.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the Government, we conclude the district court did not err in
denying the motion to suppress. Based on the totality of the
circumstances, the officers had a reasonable, articulable
suspicion to justify the Terry stop. Singleton’s presence in a
high crime area carrying an unconcealed firearm, his wearing
very casual clothes indicating he was not a security officer,
and his nervous and evasive conduct when confronted by police
officers, gave the officers reason to suspect Singleton was
involved in criminal activity. Further, the period of detention
was not unreasonable, as it “last[ed] no longer than . . .
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.” Florida v.
Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983). The purpose of the stop was to
verify that Singleton was lawfully carrying a firearm in an area
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plagued by gun offenses, and the ten-minute period of his
detention was no longer than necessary to make that
determination.
Therefore, the Terry stop did not violate Singleton’s
Fourth Amendment rights, and the district court properly denied
Singleton’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result
of the stop. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s
judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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