Tann v. Ludwikoski

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-1380
MICHAEL EUGENE TANN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
LUDWIKOSKI; GEORGE MATEJA,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Benson Everett Legg, District Judge.
(1:10-cv-00612-BEL)
Submitted: August 2, 2010 Decided: August 18, 2010
Before DUNCAN, AGEE, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael Eugene Tann, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Michael Eugene Tann appeals the district court’s order
summarily dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) complaint for
failure to state a claim. In his complaint, Tann, a student at
Baltimore County Community College, alleged that his professor,
David Ludwikoski, treated him differently than white students
regarding certain classroom and course policies. Specifically,
Tann alleged that Ludwikoski maintained strict classroom
policies and required students to sign a contract acknowledging
these policies, but exceptions were made for white students
regarding late class and homework assignments, while Tann was
not given similar accommodations. In addition, Tann stated that
Ludwikoski gave a white student points for an incorrect answer,
but refused to give Tann points for the same answer. Finally,
Tann stated that George Mateja, the Assistant Dean for the
College’s Science Department, discriminated against him by
reinforcing and upholding Ludwikoski’s allegedly discriminatory
decisions.
The district court found that neither Ludwikoski nor
Mateja were state actors and their conduct was not fairly
attributable to the State. It accordingly dismissed the
complaint on this ground without requiring a responsive pleading
from the defendants. We vacate the district court’s order and
remand the case to the district court for further proceedings.
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In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the
plaintiff must allege that defendant violated “a right secured
by the Constitution and laws of the United States,” and that the
deprivation of that right “was committed by a person acting
under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49
(1988). There is no distinction between state action and action
under color of state law. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S.
922, 930 (1982); United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7
(1966). One acts under color of state law when he has exercised
power “possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only
because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state
law.” United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941).
“[S]tate employment is generally sufficient to render the
defendant a state actor.” Lugar, 457 U.S. at 936 n.18; see
West, 487 U.S. at 50.
We conclude that Ludwikoski and Mateja, as employees
of a state public educational institution created by state law,
are state actors. We also conclude that the district court’s
application of the Jackson ∗ test to determine whether Ludwikoski
and Mateja acted under color of state law was inappropriate in
the context of a public college setting. See Chalfant v.
Wilmington Inst., 574 F.2d 739, 745 (3d Cir. 1978) (“We have
∗
Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974).
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expressly rejected the application of the Jackson test, which
was enunciated within the context of a private enterprise
electric utility, to the analysis of state action in a public
library, a university, or any other public educational
institution.”).
Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s order and
remand the case to the district court for further proceedings.
We deny Tann’s motion for appointment of counsel. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
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