United States v. Jamel Leonard

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4202
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JAMEL RAYSHAWN LEONARD,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at New Bern. Louise W. Flanagan,
District Judge. (7:10-cr-00073-FL-1)
Submitted: August 17, 2012 Decided: September 13, 2012
Before DUNCAN, KEENAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Richard C. Speaks, SPEAKS LAW FIRM, PC, Wilmington, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States
Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Yvonne V. Watford-McKinney,
Assistant United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jamel Rayshawn Leonard, who pled guilty without a plea
agreement to one count of possession of a firearm by a felon, in
violation of 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 922(g)(1), 924 (West 2000 & Supp.
2012), appeals the district court’s amended judgment entered
after this court vacated his original 120-month sentence and
remanded to the district court for resentencing, in accordance
with United States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2011) (en
banc). Leonard’s sole argument is that the district court erred
when it granted the Government’s motion for an upward variant
sentence on remand. In particular, Leonard argues that the
upward variant sentence was unwarranted, and, that his 108-month
sentence is unreasonable, because his prior criminal conduct was
adequately considered in his category VI criminal history score,
and he exhibited exemplary post-sentencing conduct and
rehabilitation efforts. Finding no error, we affirm.
We review any criminal sentence, “whether inside, just
outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines range,” for
reasonableness, “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion
standard.” United States v. King, 673 F.3d 274, 283 (4th Cir.
2012), petition for cert. filed, No. 11-10786 (U.S. June 5,
2012); see Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). When
the district court imposes a departure or variant sentence, we
consider “whether the sentencing court acted reasonably both
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with respect to its decision to impose such a sentence and with
respect to the extent of the divergence from the sentencing
range.” United States v. Hernandez-Villanueva, 473 F.3d 118,
123 (4th Cir. 2007). The district court “has flexibility in
fashioning a sentence outside of the Guidelines range,” and need
only “‘set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that it
has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis’”
for its decision. United States v. Diosdado-Star, 630 F.3d 359,
364 (4th Cir.) (quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356
(2007)) (alteration omitted), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2946
(2011).
“The fact that the appellate court might reasonably
have concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is
insufficient to justify reversal of the district court.” Gall,
552 U.S. at 51. “This deference is due in part because the
sentencing judge is in a superior position to find facts and
judge their import and the judge sees and hears the evidence,
makes credibility determinations, has full knowledge of the
facts and gains insights not conveyed by the record.” Diosdado-
Star, 630 F.3d at 366 (internal quotation marks, brackets and
citation omitted); see Rita, 551 U.S. at 357–58 (recognizing
that the district court also “has access to, and greater
familiarity with, the individual case and the individual
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defendant before [the court] than the Commission or the appeals
court”).
Because the district court identified multiple reasons
for its variance, all of which were based on the 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2012) factors and related to the
particular facts of Leonard’s case, we conclude that the variant
sentence is reasonable. See King, 673 F.3d at 284 (concluding
that upward variant sentence was reasonable as it was adequately
supported by reference to the § 3553(a) factors that “the court
determined required the sentence ultimately imposed”); Diosdado-
Star, 630 F.3d at 366-67 (holding that a six-year upward variant
sentence was substantively reasonable because district court
expressly relied on several of the § 3553(a) factors to support
the variance).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s amended
judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the Court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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