United States v. Christopher Daniels

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-5099
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CHRISTOPHER CORNELIUS DANIELS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, Senior
District Judge. (5:11-cr-00057-BR-1)
Submitted: June 14, 2012 Decided: June 19, 2012
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part and dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
Randolph M. Lee, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States Attorney,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Christopher Cornelius Daniels appeals the criminal
judgment entered following his guilty plea, pursuant to a
written plea agreement, to conspiracy to distribute and possess
with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine base,
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006). On appeal, counsel
filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738(1967), asserting that there are no meritorious grounds for
appeal but questioning whether the district court properly
sentenced Daniels as a career offender. Daniels has filed a pro
se supplemental brief in which he alleges that counsel provided
ineffective assistance. The Government has filed a motion to
dismiss the appeal based on the appellate waiver provision in
Daniels’ plea agreement. Daniels opposes the motion. We affirm
in part and dismiss in part.
We review a defendant’s waiver of appellate rights de
novo. United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir.
2005). A defendant may waive his right to appeal if “the waiver
was based upon a knowing and intelligent decision.” United
States v. General, 278 F.3d 389, 400 (4th Cir. 2002) (providing
standard) (internal quotation marks omitted); see United
States v. Johnson, 410 F.3d 137, 151 (4th Cir. 2005). We will
enforce a valid waiver so long as “the issue being appealed is
within the scope of the waiver.” Blick, 408 F.3d at 168.
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Our review of the record leads us to conclude that
Daniels’ waiver of appellate rights was knowing and intelligent
and that the sentencing issue raised by counsel falls within the
waiver’s scope. Daniels received a sentence below the advisory
Guidelines range established at the sentencing hearing. Thus,
we grant in part the Government’s motion to dismiss and dismiss
this portion of the appeal.
The waiver provision, however, does not preclude our
review of Daniels’ conviction pursuant to Anders or the
ineffective assistance claims Daniels raises in his pro se
supplemental brief. We conclude that the record does not
conclusively demonstrate that counsel was ineffective. United
States v. Martinez, 136 F.3d 972, 979 (4th Cir. 1998) (providing
standard); see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694
(1984) (providing elements of ineffective assistance claim).
Thus, we decline to consider Daniels’ ineffective assistance
claims on direct appeal.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record and have found no unwaived and potentially meritorious
issues for review. We therefore deny in part the Government’s
motion to dismiss and affirm Daniels’ conviction. This court
requires that counsel inform Daniels, in writing, of his right
to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If Daniels requests that a petition be filed, but
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counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Daniels. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal conclusions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART;
DISMISSED IN PART
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