Walter Whitaker v. Nash-Rocky Mount Board of Education

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-2060
WALTER LEE WHITAKER,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
NASH-ROCKY MOUNT BOARD OF EDUCATION, d/b/a Nash-Rocky Mount
Public Schools; RICHARD A. MCMAHON, Superintendent; CARINA
BRYANT, Southern Nash Middle School Principal,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle,
District Judge. (5:11-cv-00246-BO)
Submitted: March 23, 2012 Decided: April 6, 2012
Before DAVIS, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Walter Lee Whitaker, Appellant Pro Se. Lewis Wardlaw Lamar,
Jr., THE VALENTINE LAW FIRM, Nashville, North Carolina, for
Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Walter Lee Whitaker appeals the district court’s order
granting the defendants’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss his complaint raising claims under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (West
2003 & Supp. 2011) (“Title VII”), and the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 to 12213 (2006)
(“ADA”). Whitaker challenges the district court’s determination
that his claims are barred by res judicata. At issue is whether
Whitaker’s current claims are the same, for purposes of res
judicata, as those raised in his previous appeal, pursuant to
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-325(n) (2011), to the North Carolina
superior court seeking review of the Nash-Rocky Mount Board of
Education’s (“Board”) decision not to renew Whitaker’s contract
for employment as a probationary public school teacher.
We review de novo a district court’s Rule 12(b)(6)
dismissal, Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir.
2008), and are bound under 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006) to apply the
law of the rendering state to determine the extent to which a
state court judgment should have preclusive effect in a federal
action. See Davenport v. North Carolina Dep’t of Transp., 3
F.3d 89, 92-93 (4th Cir. 1993). In North Carolina, the doctrine
of res judicata will bar a claim when there is (1) a final
judgment on the merits in an earlier suit, (2) both cases
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involve the same cause of action, and (3) the new claim involves
the same parties as the earlier suit, or their privies. State
ex rel. Tucker v. Frinzi, 474 S.E.2d 127, 128 (N.C. 1996).
As we previously discussed in Davenport, North
Carolina utilizes a modified form of the transactional approach
to determine whether claims are the same for res judicata
purposes. See Davenport, 3 F.3d at 93-97. Pursuant to this
approach, North Carolina tempers the broad claim preclusive
effect of a pure transactional methodology with case-specific
considerations based on prudential and equitable concerns. See
id.; Country Club of Johnson County, Inc. v. United States Fid.
& Guar. Co., 563 S.E.2d 269, 275 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002);
Northwestern Fin. Group v. County of Gaston, 430 S.E.2d 689, 694
(N.C. Ct. App. 1993).
In keeping with this approach, North Carolina courts
are reluctant to apply the bar of res judicata where the claim
in question could not have been raised or fully adjudicated in
the initial proceeding. See Davenport, 3 F.3d at 93-97; Country
Club of Johnson County, 563 S.E.2d at 275; Spry v. Winston-
Salem/Forsyth County Bd. of Educ., 412 S.E.2d 687, 689 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1992). Accordingly, under North Carolina law, res judicata
will not bar successive suits or claims, even when based on the
same predicate facts, where the complaining party has not had an
opportunity to litigate, in a single judicial proceeding, all
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claims arising from the transaction or events at issue. See
Davenport, 3 F.3d at 96-97.
Here, we conclude that, based on the limited nature of
the judicial proceeding afforded Whitaker under § 115C-325(n),
North Carolina would not consider the claims raised in
Whitaker’s previous appeal and those asserted in his instant
suit to be the same for purposes of res judicata. First, under
North Carolina law then in force, Whitaker had no right to a
hearing, discovery, or an opportunity to present evidence prior
to the Board’s decision not to renew his contract. Moore v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 649 S.E.2d 410, 415-18 (N.C.
Ct. App. 2007).
Further, under § 115C-325(n), the appeal to the
superior court was limited to the evidence before the school
board * and whether the school board’s actions violated North
Carolina law. Id. at 416-19. Accordingly, even if Whitaker
could have raised his current federal law claims before the
superior court, he would have done so without a right to
discovery, the ability to present relevant evidence, or the
*
On motion, Whitaker was allowed to supplement the record
before the superior court with additional documents. As the
superior court’s opinion indicates, however, this
supplementation was not as of right, and was allowed based on
the court’s finding of just cause and a lack of opposition from
the Board.
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privilege of having his case heard by a jury. Moreover, due to
the procedural incongruities of adjudicating the appeal of a
state agency’s administrative decision alongside newly raised
federal law claims, it is unlikely that the superior court would
or could have allowed Whitaker to join new, federal claims with
his appeal under § 115C-325(n). Davenport, 3 F.3d at 97 n.8.
Therefore, because Whitaker could not have effectively raised or
fully adjudicated his current claims during his previous
challenge to the non-renewal of his contract, we find that,
under North Carolina law, they are not barred by res judicata.
See Davenport, 3 F.3d at 96-97.
Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s order
dismissing Whitaker’s complaint and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
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