United States v. Jamar Randall

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-5160
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JAMAR SERON RANDALL,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Max O. Cogburn, Jr.,
District Judge. (3:10-cr-00174-MOC-1)
Submitted: August 16, 2012 Decided: September 7, 2012
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
Dismissed in part; affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
Chiege O. Kalu Okwara, LAW OFFICE OF CHIEGE O. KALU OKWARA,
Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Anne M. Tompkins,
United States Attorney, Jenny Grus Sugar, Assistant United
States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jamar Seron Randall seeks to appeal his conviction for
one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2006), and his ninety-two month
sentence. The Government seeks enforcement of the appellate
waiver in Randall’s plea agreement. We dismiss in part and
affirm in part.
Randall first challenges the district court’s denial
of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The district court’s
denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is reviewed for
abuse of discretion. United States v. Ubakanma, 215 F.3d 421,
424 (4th Cir. 2000). “[A] defendant does not have an absolute
right to withdraw a guilty plea, even before sentencing.”
United States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245, 248 (4th Cir. 1991).
Instead, he must show that a “fair and just reason” supports his
request to withdraw his plea. Id. Our review of the record
leads us to conclude that Randall’s plea was knowing and
voluntary, and that the district court correctly denied
Randall’s motion to withdraw the plea. We therefore affirm the
district court’s denial.
Upon review of the plea agreement and the transcript
of the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing, we further conclude that
Randall knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal.
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The remaining issues Randall seeks to raise relating to his
conviction and sentence fall squarely within the compass of his
waiver of appellate rights. Accordingly, we grant the
Government’s request to dismiss and dismiss the appeal in part.
To the extent Randall makes any challenge that falls
outside the scope of his waiver, including as to the
effectiveness of his counsel, we discern no cognizable error. *
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED IN PART;
AFFIRMED IN PART
*
To the extent that Randall asserts that his trial counsel
did not provide effective representation, our review on direct
appeal is limited to the record. Having reviewed the available
record, we find no conclusive support for Randall’s claim. Any
ineffective assistance of counsel argument that Randall wishes
to assert that requires evidence beyond the record must be
raised, if at all, in a post-conviction proceeding pursuant to
28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2012). E.g., United States v.
Baldovinos, 434 F.3d 233, 239 (4th Cir. 2006).
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