United States v. Ronnie Rainey

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4611
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RONNIE D. RAINEY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III,
District Judge. (5:10-cr-00199-D-1)
Submitted: April 30, 2012 Decided: May 9, 2012
Before GREGORY, DUNCAN, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
W. H. Paramore, III, W. H. PARAMORE, III, P.C., Jacksonville,
North Carolina, for Appellant. Jennifer P. May-Parker,
Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Ronnie D. Rainey pled guilty to one count of mail
fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (West Supp. 2011), and
was sentenced to 120 months in prison. In accordance with
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), Rainey’s attorney has
filed a brief certifying that there are no meritorious issues
for appeal but questioning whether the Government breached the
terms of Rainey’s plea agreement. Rainey has filed a pro se
supplemental brief raising numerous claims. * We affirm Rainey’s
conviction and sentence.
Because Rainey did not assert in the district court
that the Government had breached the terms of his plea
agreement, his claims on appeal to that effect are reviewed for
plain error. Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 133-34
(2009). To prevail under this standard, Rainey must show that
he was prejudiced by a breach of his plea agreement that “was so
obvious and substantial that failure to notice and correct it
affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the
judicial proceedings.” United States v. McQueen, 108 F.3d 64,
*
In his pro se brief, Rainey alleges multiple instances of
breach of the plea agreement, challenges the validity of his
guilty plea, contests the calculation of his offense level on
multiple grounds, attacks the procedural and substantive
reasonableness of his sentence, and asserts ineffective
assistance of counsel.
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65-66 (4th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks and alteration
omitted). We have carefully examined the record and are unable
to find an obvious breach of Rainey’s plea agreement.
Therefore, this claim entitles him to no relief.
We decline to consider Rainey’s pro se claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel at this time. Generally, such
claims are not cognizable on direct appeal unless the record
conclusively establishes counsel’s “objectively unreasonable
performance” and resulting prejudice. United States v. Benton,
523 F.3d 424, 435 (4th Cir. 2008). Instead, ineffective
assistance claims are most appropriately pursued in a motion
pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2011). See United
States v. Baptiste, 596 F.3d 214, 216 n.1 (4th Cir. 2010).
Here, the record offers no clear indication of counsel’s
deficient performance. We have examined the remainder of
Rainey’s pro se claims and conclude that they lack merit.
Rainey’s challenges to the losses of specific victims are
premature, as the district court has not yet entered its final
order of restitution.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore
affirm Rainey’s conviction and sentence. This court requires
that counsel inform Rainey, in writing, of his right to petition
the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If
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Rainey requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes
that such a petition would be frivolous, counsel may move in
this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s
motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Rainey. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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