United States v. Russell Jones

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-5307
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RUSSELL JONES, a/k/a Nosebleed, a/k/a Bleed,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. William D. Quarles, Jr., District
Judge. (1:09-cr-00288-WDQ-22)
Submitted: August 15, 2011 Decided: September 7, 2011
Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Joseph J. Gigliotti, Riverdale, Maryland, for Appellant. Traci
L. Robinson, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore,
Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Russell Jones appeals his conviction and 210-month
sentence for one count of conspiracy to distribute and possess
with intent to distribute a controlled substance in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006). Counsel has filed a brief in this court
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
certifying that there are no meritorious issues for appeal but
questioning whether Jones was properly sentenced as a career
offender. We affirm.
We review a sentence for reasonableness under an
abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 51 (2007). This review requires consideration of both the
procedural and substantive reasonableness of a sentence. Id.
First, we must assess whether the district court properly
calculated the Guidelines range, considered the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) (2006) factors, analyzed any arguments presented by
the parties, and sufficiently explained the selected sentence.
Id. at 49-50; see United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 576
(4th Cir. 2010) (“[A]n individualized explanation must accompany
every sentence.”); United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330
(4th Cir. 2009) (same). An extensive explanation is not
required as long as we are satisfied “‘that [the district court]
has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis
for exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking authority.’”
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United States v. Engle, 592 F.3d 495, 500 (4th Cir.) (quoting
Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007)), cert. denied,
131 S. Ct. 165 (2010).
Here, Jones questions on appeal whether the district
court properly sentenced him as a career offender. The pre-
sentence report (PSR) indicated that because Jones has two prior
state felony convictions for possession with intent to
distribute heroin and one felony conviction for assault, he is a
career offender. (Vol. II J.A. 65). Jones states that the
cases were consolidated and sentenced together, and thus are not
separate convictions for the purpose of the career offender
enhancement.
The career offender guideline applies to those cases
in which:
(1) the defendant was at least eighteen years old at
the time the defendant committed the instant offense
of conviction; (2) the instant offense of conviction
is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a
controlled substance offense; and (3) the defendant
has at least two prior felony convictions of either a
crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.
USSG § 4B1.1(a). To qualify, prior sentences must be “counted
separately under the provisions of [USSG] § 4A1.1(a), (b), or
(c).” USSG § 4B1.2(c). “Prior sentences always are counted
separately if the sentences were imposed for offenses that were
separated by an intervening arrest (i.e., the defendant is
arrested for the first offense prior to committing the second
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offense).” USSG § 4A1.2(a)(2) (defining the term “prior
sentence” as used in § 4A1.1).
The PSR indicated that while Jones’s state felony
possession with intent to distribute heroin offenses were
sentenced on the same day, one (State Case No. 203052003) was
committed on August 8, 2003, while the second (State Case No.
103206003) was committed on June 24, 2003. Thus, the offenses
were separate and Jones was properly sentenced as a career
offender.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court
requires that counsel inform Jones, in writing, of the right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If Jones requests that a petition be filed, but counsel
believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel
may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Jones.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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