Shirley Slone v. Comm of Social Security

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-1542
SHIRLEY M. SLONE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Big Stone Gap. James P. Jones,
District Judge. (2:10-cv-00018-JPJ-PMS)
Submitted: September 11, 2012 Decided: September 13, 2012
Before MOTZ, GREGORY, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Joseph E. Wolfe, Norton, Virginia, for Appellant. Nora Koch,
Acting Regional Chief Counsel, Brian O’Donnell, Supervisory
Attorney, Charles J. Kawas, Special Assistant United States
Attorney, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania; Timothy J. Heaphy, United States Attorney, Rick
Mountcastle, Assistant United States Attorney, Roanoke,
Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Shirley M. Slone appeals the district court’s order
adopting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and
upholding the Commissioner of Social Security’s decision to deny
her a period of disability insurance benefits. We have reviewed
the record and affirm.
Our review of the Commissioner’s disability
determination is limited to evaluating whether the findings are
supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct law
was applied. See Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 653 (4th
Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g) (2006)).
“Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). We do not reweigh evidence
or make credibility determinations in evaluating whether a
decision is supported by substantial evidence; “[w]here
conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ,” we
defer to the Commissioner’s decision. Id.
According to Slone, the administrative law judge
(“ALJ”) improperly failed to find that Slone suffered from
severe mental impairments, and improperly failed to base his
residual functional capacity (“RFC”) assessment on the combined
effects of Slone’s physical impairments. Our review of the
record convinces us otherwise. None of Slone’s treating
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physicians opined that she suffered from a severe mental
impairment, and the record amply supports the ALJ’s conclusion
that her mental infirmities did not significantly affect her
ability to perform work-related tasks. The record likewise
supports the ALJ’s RFC assessment.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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