United States v. William Black

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-5143
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
WILLIAM JOSEPH BLACK,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at New Bern. Louise W. Flanagan,
Chief District Judge. (5:09-cr-00131-FL-1)
Submitted: November 22, 2011 Decided: December 14, 2011
Before NIEMEYER, DAVIS, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Geoffrey W. Hosford, HOSFORD & HOSFORD, P.C., Wilmington, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States
Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant
United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
William Joseph Black was convicted, following a jury
trial, of nine counts of receipt of child pornography, in
violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252(a)(2) (West Supp. 2011), and two
counts of possession of child pornography, in violation of 18
U.S.C.A. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (West Supp. 2011). The district court
sentenced Black to 262 months’ imprisonment and a lifetime term
of supervised release. This appeal timely followed.
Black’s sole appellate contention is that the district
court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial, which was
predicated on the prosecutor’s questioning of a law enforcement
witness regarding Black’s post-Miranda 1 silence. We review a
district court’s refusal to grant a mistrial for an abuse of
discretion. See United States v. Johnson, 587 F.3d 625, 631
(4th Cir. 2009) (providing standard of review), cert. denied,
130 S. Ct. 2128 (2010).
Black argues that, while conducting his direct
examination of State Bureau of Investigation Agent Mike Smith,
the prosecutor engaged in a line of questioning that impinged on
Black’s right to remain silent, in violation of Doyle v. Ohio,
426 U.S. 610 (1976). We agree with the Government that there
was no Doyle violation in this case. The facts of this case are
1
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2
very similar to those in Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 764-65
(1987), in that, like Greer, the district court here sustained
the objection to the improper questioning and thus “did not
permit the inquiry that Doyle forbids.” Greer, 483 U.S. at 764.
We are not persuaded by Black’s attempts to distinguish his case
from Greer.
Concluding that there was no Doyle violation does not
end our inquiry, however. As the Supreme Court explained in
Greer, “[a]lthough the prosecutor’s question did not constitute
a Doyle violation, the fact remains that the prosecutor
attempted to violate the rule of Doyle by asking an improper
question in the presence of the jury.” Id. at 765. An
attempted Doyle violation amounts to a claim of prosecutorial
misconduct, which violates due process if it is so egregious
that it effectively denies the defendant a fair trial. Id.When reviewing such a claim, we must evaluate the challenged
remark “in context.” Id. at 766 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
We readily conclude the prosecutor’s questioning,
while improper, was not so egregious as to render Black’s trial
fundamentally unfair. First, the improper questioning was
limited, and the district court sustained defense counsel’s
prompt objection to it. With the parties’ input, the district
court crafted a curative instruction, ordering the jury to
3
disregard the impermissible line of questioning and any
attempted answers by Smith. This court “generally follow[s] the
presumption that the jury obeyed the limiting instructions of
the district court.” United States v. Williams, 461 F.3d 441,
451 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Further, the Government did not otherwise mention or reference
Black’s post-arrest silence. Finally, the record is replete
with evidence to support the jury’s guilty verdicts.
Accordingly, we hold the district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Black’s motion for a mistrial.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district
court’s judgment. 2 We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
2
Black does not raise any arguments on appeal relevant to
his 262-month sentence.
4