United States v. Eddie Snead

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-5100
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
EDDIE WAYNE SNEAD,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Malcolm J. Howard,
Senior District Judge. (5:09-cr-00281-H-1)
Submitted: October 31, 2012 Decided: November 7, 2012
Before GREGORY, SHEDD, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Dismissed in part; affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
Noah A. Clements, THE CLEMENTS FIRM, Washington, D.C., for
Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney,
Jennifer P. May-Parker, Joshua L. Rogers, Assistant United
States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Eddie Wayne Snead appeals his conviction and 228-month
sentence following his guilty plea pursuant to a plea agreement
to distribution of a quantity of cocaine, in violation of
21 U.S.C.A. § 841(a)(1) (West 2006 & Supp. 2012).
The Government argues that Snead’s appeal of his sentence is
foreclosed by the waiver of appeal rights in his plea agreement
and that the remainder of the appeal is without merit.
We dismiss in part and affirm in part.
A criminal defendant may waive the right to appeal if
that waiver is knowing and intelligent. United States v.
Poindexter, 492 F.3d 263, 270 (4th Cir. 2007). Generally, if
the district court fully questions a defendant regarding the
waiver of his right to appeal during a plea colloquy performed
in accordance with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, the waiver is both valid
and enforceable. United States v. Johnson, 410 F.3d 137, 151
(4th Cir. 2005). Whether a defendant validly waived his right
to appeal is a question of law this court reviews de novo.
United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir. 2005).
Where the Government seeks to enforce an appeal waiver and there
is no claim that it breached its obligations under the plea
agreement, we will enforce the waiver if the record establishes
that (1) the defendant knowingly and intelligently agreed to
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waive the right to appeal; and (2) the issue being appealed is
within the scope of the waiver. Id. at 168 & n.5.
Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we
conclude that Snead knowingly and voluntarily waived the right
to appeal his 228-month sentence. Accordingly, we dismiss the
portion of Snead’s appeal challenging his sentence under United
States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 237, 241-47 (4th Cir. 2011)
(en banc), and Congress’ sentencing policies.
Next, we decline to reach the merits of Snead’s
challenge to the hearing on his motion to suppress evidence
because the claimed error was waived by virtue of his guilty
plea. “When a defendant pleads guilty, he waives all
nonjurisdictional defects in the proceedings conducted prior to
entry of the plea.” United States v. Bundy, 392 F.3d 641, 644
(4th Cir. 2004). A criminal defendant’s guilty plea “represents
a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the
criminal process.” Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267
(1973). “Thus, the defendant who has pled guilty has no
non-jurisdictional ground upon which to attack that judgment
except the inadequacy of the plea or the government’s power to
bring any indictment at all.” United States v. Moussaoui, 591
F.3d 263, 279 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Snead’s valid guilty plea thus waives his
argument challenging the judgment of conviction on the basis of
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a claimed constitutional error at the pre-guilty-plea hearing on
his motion to suppress evidence.
Snead also challenges the district court’s failure to
order a competency hearing sua sponte. A district court is
required to order a competency hearing sua sponte “if there is
reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may presently be
suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally
incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the
nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to
assist properly in his defense.” 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) (2006).
In determining whether there is reasonable cause to order a
competency hearing, a district court “must consider all evidence
before it, including evidence of irrational behavior, the
defendant’s demeanor . . . , and medical opinions concerning the
defendant’s competence.” United States v. Mason, 52 F.3d 1286,
1290 (4th Cir. 1995). To prevail on a claim that the district
court erred in failing to order a competency hearing, the
defendant must establish that the court “ignored facts raising a
bona fide doubt regarding his competency.” Moussaoui, 591 F.3d
at 291 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).
After review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we
conclude that Snead fails to establish that the district court
abused its discretion in failing to order a competency hearing
sua sponte. See United States v. Banks, 482 F.3d 733, 742
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(4th Cir. 2007) (stating the standard of review). Snead’s two
indicators of his alleged need to be evaluated for mental
competence — letters he supposedly wrote to the district court
prior to the sentencing hearing and the nature of his allocution
at that hearing — do not establish a bona fide doubt as to his
competency. Snead fails to identify the letters at issue,
expound on their contents, or explain how the letters in any way
bear on the issue of whether he was suffering at the sentencing
hearing from a mental disease or defect that prevented him from
understanding the nature and consequences of the hearing or in
assisting in his defense. Further, Snead also fails to connect
his allocution with any reasonable basis for believing he lacked
understanding of the sentencing proceeding or lacked the ability
to assist in his defense. Accordingly, the district court did
not abuse its discretion in failing to order a competency
hearing sua sponte.
Snead also argues that he was constructively denied
counsel at the portion of the sentencing hearing dedicated to
his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Constructive denial of
counsel “results from circumstances where the performance of
counsel is so inadequate that, in effect, no assistance of
counsel is provided at all.” Moussaoui, 591 F.3d at 289(internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). After review
of the record, we reject Snead’s argument, premised on United
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States v. Joslin, 434 F.2d 526, 528-31 (D.C. Cir. 1970), that he
was constructively denied counsel because trial counsel failed
to deliver arguments in support of the motion and told the
district court that he recommended against granting it. Unlike
in Joslin, which, in any event, does not bind this court, Snead
did not plausibly assert his innocence of the offense to which
he had pled guilty. Further, Snead in no way suggests that his
trial counsel plausibly could have argued that he had shown a
fair and just reason for withdrawing his guilty plea. Cf.
United States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245, 248 (4th Cir. 1991)
(listing six factors this court is to consider in determining
whether defendant has carried his burden in showing a fair and
just reason to withdraw his guilty plea). Further, Snead’s
suggestion that he was constructively denied counsel because
there may have been a “breakdown of communication” with trial
counsel is wholly unexplained and lacks record support.
Accordingly, Snead’s claim of the constructive denial of counsel
is without merit.
Finally, Snead claims that trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance in connection with the competency hearing
conducted by the magistrate judge. Claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel generally are not cognizable on direct
appeal. United States v. King, 119 F.3d 290, 295 (4th Cir.
1997). Rather, to allow for adequate development of the record,
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a defendant must bring his claims in a 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West
Supp. 2012) motion. Id. An exception exists, however, where
the record conclusively establishes ineffective assistance.
United States v. Baldovinos, 434 F.3d 233, 239 (4th Cir. 2006).
After review of the record, we find no conclusive evidence that
trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance, and we therefore
decline to consider this claim on direct appeal.
In view of the foregoing, we dismiss the appeal in
part and affirm the district court’s judgment in part. We deny
Snead’s motion seeking leave to file a pro se supplemental
brief. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
DISMISSED IN PART;
AFFIRMED IN PART
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