United States v. Williams

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4288
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MICHAEL WILLIAMS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen,
Jr., District Judge. (1:99-cr-00017-WO-1)
Submitted: September 22, 2010 Decided: October 18, 2010
Before WILKINSON and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
J. Clark Fischer, RANDOLPH & FISCHER, Winston-Salem, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Terry Michael Meinecke, Assistant
United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Following a hearing, the district court revoked
Michael Williams’ supervised release and sentenced him to
twenty-one months in prison. Williams now appeals. His
attorney has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738 (1967), raising two issues but stating that there are
no meritorious issues for appeal. Williams was advised of his
right to file a pro se brief, but did not file such a brief. We
affirm.
At the revocation hearing, Williams admitted violating
a condition of release by using controlled substances on several
occasions. There were no objections to the probation officer’s
determination that Williams, who was in criminal history
category VI, had committed a Grade B release violation and that
his advisory Guidelines range was twenty-one to twenty-seven
months in prison. The court heard from counsel and from
Williams, who explained his reasons for relapsing into drug
abuse.
We review the district court’s decision to revoke
supervised release for abuse of discretion. United States v.
Pregent, 190 F.3d 279, 282 (4th Cir. 1999); United States v.
Armstrong, 187 F.3d 392, 394 (4th Cir. 1999). In light of
Williams’ admission at the hearing, we conclude that revocation
of release was not an abuse of discretion.
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In the Anders brief, counsel argues that the sentence
is excessive and that the district court did not properly
consider Williams’ explanation of his relapse into substance
abuse. We will affirm a sentence imposed following revocation
of supervised release if it is within the applicable statutory
maximum and is not plainly unreasonable. United States v.
Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 439-40 (4th Cir 2006). Here, our review
of the record reveals that the sentence falls within the
statutory maximum of five years. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583(e)(3)
(West 2000 & Supp. 2010). Further, the sentence is procedurally
reasonable: in sentencing Williams, the district court
considered both the Chapter 7 policy statements and the 18
U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2010) factors that it is
permitted to consider. See Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438-40.
Finally, the sentence is substantively reasonable, for the court
adequately explained its reasons for imposing the sentence. See
id. at 440. In this regard, and contrary to Williams’
contention, the court clearly took Williams’ statement at
sentencing into consideration. The court expressed its
appreciation for Williams’ candor and stated that such candor
and Williams’ support system were the reasons it was not
imposing a longer sentence.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
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appeal. We therefore affirm. This court requires that counsel
inform his client, in writing, of his right to petition the
Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If the
client requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes
that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move
in this court for leave to withdraw from representation.
Counsel’s motion must state that a copy of the motion was served
on his client. We dispense with oral argument because the facts
and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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