United States v. Joy

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-5101
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff − Appellee,
v.
RICO JARUIASE JOY,
Defendant − Appellant.
No. 07-5102
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff − Appellee,
v.
TERRELL KURT MYERS,
Defendant − Appellant.
No. 07-5104
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff − Appellee,
v.
JAMETRIUS LAQUAN JUDGE,
Defendant − Appellant.
No. 07-5105
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff − Appellee,
v.
ABDUL JAMAL BRYANT,
Defendant − Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the District
of South Carolina, at Florence. Terry L. Wooten, District
Judge. (4:06-cr-01317-TLW-6; 4:06-cr-01317-TLW-4; 4:06-cr-
01317-TLW-5; 4:06-cr-01317-TLW-3)
Argued: March 25, 2009 Decided: July 2, 2009
Before WILLIAMS, Chief Judge, WILKINSON, Circuit Judge, and
David A. FABER, Senior United States District Judge for the
Southern District of West Virginia, sitting by designation.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: David Bruce Betts, Columbia, South Carolina, for
Appellants. Rose Mary Sheppard Parham, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee. ON
BRIEF: John Wesley Locklair, III, LOCKLAIR LAW FIRM, LLC,
Surfside Beach, South Carolina, for Appellant Rico Jaruiase Joy;
Kathy Price Elmore, ORR, ELMORE & ERVIN, LLC, Florence, South
Carolina, for Appellant Jametrius Laquan Judge; Henry M.
Anderson, Jr., Florence, South Carolina, for Appellant Abdul
Jamal Bryant. W. Walter Wilkins, United States Attorney,
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Columbia, South Carolina, Carrie A. Fisher, Assistant United
States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Florence,
South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Following the denial of their motions to suppress, Rico
Joy, Abdul Jamal Bryant, Terrell Kurt Myers, and Jametrius
Laquan Judge (collectively “Appellants”) entered conditional
guilty pleas to being felons in possession of firearms and
ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g)(1) (West 2000).
They now collectively appeal the district court’s denial of
those motions, arguing here, as below, that there was no
probable cause to justify their arrest and, accordingly, that
the search incident to their arrest was unconstitutional. *
I.
In 2006, the Horry County Police Department (“HCPD”) began
investigating the drug activities of Lawrence Davis. After
confidential informants purchased drugs from Davis on two
different occasions, the HCPD decided to set up a buy/bust,
planning to arrest Davis after a confidential informant
purchased the drugs. On November 29, 2006, the lead
investigator for the case, Detective Jolliff, and another
*
Appellants also argue that the search was unjustified
under a Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) analysis, which
presents a less onerous standard for the Government to meet than
that for probable cause. Because we affirm the district court’s
finding that there was probable cause to arrest Appellants,
however, we do not address this argument.
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investigator, Detective Mark Cooper, arrived at the home where
the drug buy was supposed to occur. Jolliff and Cooper
monitored the residence from a position behind its garage, and
additional units set up a perimeter. The officers had expected
Davis to arrive alone, but he arrived accompanied by two other
vehicles containing the Appellants. Davis and his driver exited
their vehicle, a red Chevy, and entered the house. The
Appellants also exited their vehicles, a white Ford and a gray
Kia, and spread out to stand at equidistant intervals in the
home’s driveway. They did not talk; the four Appellants simply
stood in their positions for twenty minutes until Davis and his
driver exited the home, at which point all four Appellants
returned to their vehicles.
Detective Jolliff, who was monitoring the drug buy with a
recording device, made the decision to “[t]ry to get all three
cars.” (J.A. at 340.) When the drug buy was complete, Jolliff
told the other officers that “everybody is getting in all three
vehicles.” (J.A. at 341.) Jolliff was unsure which vehicle
contained Davis, but the dispatcher told Jolliff that he needed
to “[c]all it” because the dispatcher did not believe that
Jolliff had enough evidence to prove a conspiracy among all of
the individuals. (J.A. at 341-42.) Although he never
specifically withdrew his order to stop the other two vehicles,
5
Jolliff ultimately instructed the officers that the dealer was
in the red car.
Acting pursuant to that information, the officers initiated
a “takedown” of all three vehicles when they stopped for a red
light. During this takedown, officers approached the vehicles,
ordered the occupants out, patted them down, arrested them, and
searched the vehicles. The officers recovered one gram of crack
cocaine, one stun gun, and a loaded 9mm pistol from Davis and
his driver, who had occupied the red car. The officers likewise
recovered a loaded NEF .32 caliber revolver from Bryant’s
waistband, and a loaded and chambered Glock 9mm pistol from
Myers’s waistband. The officers also seized a loaded and
chambered Ruger .45 caliber pistol from Joy’s waistband. No
weapon was recovered from Judge’s person, but a loaded Ruger .44
caliber pistol was found near the driver’s seat where Judge had
been seated. Bryant and Myers had occupied the white Ford,
while Joy and Judge had been riding in the gray Kia.
On December 19, 2006, a federal grand jury in the District
of South Carolina indicted Bryant, Myers, Joy, and Judge, as
well as Davis and his driver, charging them with, inter alia,
being felons in possession of firearms and ammunition in
violation of 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e). The
Appellants moved to suppress the firearms and ammunition found
at the time of their arrest, arguing that the officers did not
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possess the probable cause necessary to stop their vehicles,
arrest them, and search their persons. After a hearing, the
district court determined that probable cause existed to arrest
the four Appellants and denied their motions to suppress. The
district court later denied a motion to reconsider, prompting
the four Appellants to file conditional guilty pleas, reserving
the right to appeal the district court’s denial of their motions
to suppress. The Appellants were sentenced at a separate
hearing on October 30, 2007, and all four timely appealed. We
possess jurisdiction over their claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1291 (West 2006).
II.
In reviewing the denial of a motion to supress, we review
the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual
findings for clear error. United States v. Blatstein, 482 F.3d
725, 730 (4th Cir. 2007). We view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prevailing party below. United States v.
Perkins, 363 F.3d 317, 320 (4th Cir. 2004).
A.
A warrantless arrest is constitutionally permissible if
there is probable cause for the arresting officer to believe
that a felony is being or has been committed by the arrested
individual. See United States v. McCraw, 920 F.2d 224, 227 (4th
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Cir. 1990). Probable cause to arrest exists if the facts and
circumstances within the arresting officers’ knowledge at the
moment the arrest is made would be sufficient for a prudent man
to believe that the defendants had committed an offense. United
States v. Dorlouis, 107 F.3d 248, 255 (4th Cir. 1997). “While
probable cause requires more than bare suspicion, it requires
less than that evidence necessary to convict.” United States v.
Gray, 137 F.3d 765, 769 (4th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Even “seemingly innocent activity” can provide
the basis for probable cause when considered in the context of
the surrounding circumstances. Taylor v. Waters, 81 F.3d 429,
434 (4th Cir. 1996).
The district court found that Bryant, Myers, Joy, and Judge
“were involved in setting up a perimeter” while Davis and his
driver were inside conducting the drug transaction with the
confidential informant. (J.A. at 241.) In reaching this
conclusion, the district court pointed to undisputed evidence
that the Appellants, though riding in separate vehicles, arrived
together with Davis, a known drug dealer, and his driver. The
Appellants walked to specific locations around the property
where the drug transaction was taking place, did not speak to
each other during their time outside of their vehicles, and
returned to their vehicles and left when Davis and his driver
exited the building. The district court concluded that setting
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up a perimeter signaled involvement with the drug transaction
taking place inside and gave the arresting officers probable
cause to arrest the Appellants.
We agree. Detective Jolliff observed the Appellants arrive
with a known drug dealer at the scene of an arranged buy/bust
and take positions at equidistant invervals around the house
without speaking to one another. Detective Jolliff, an officer
experienced in surveillance and buy/bust operations, testified
that the Appellants’ actions suggested that they were lookouts
for the drug deal, and the district court relied on this
testimony in making its determination. The Appellants offer us
no alternative explanation for their presence at the scene.
Of course, “a police officer may draw inferences based on
his own experience in deciding whether probable cause exists. .
. . [a]n appeals court should give due weight to a trial court’s
finding that the officer was credible and the inference was
reasonable.” Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 700
(1996). Thus, we agree with the district court and find that a
reasonable officer, after witnessing their behavior at a known
drug transaction, would believe that the Appellants were
involved in the transaction and thus had committed an offense.
See United States v. Rivera, 370 F.3d 730, 733 (8th Cir. 2004)
(finding probable cause where suspect’s “actions and behavior,
although perhaps seemingly innocuous to the general public, were
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reasonably suspicious to officers trained to recognize behaviors
consistent with those of a lookout for a drug deal”).
B.
In response to this relatively common-sense conclusion, the
Appellants raise two arguments. First, the Appellants point out
that the dispatcher in this case told the arresting officers
that there was not enough evidence to convict the Appellants for
conspiracy with the drug dealer. Thus, according to the
Appellants, the arresting officers could not have believed that
probable cause existed to stop and arrest them. Second, the
Appellants claim that, even if Detective Jolliff was aware of
facts that would establish probable cause, his knowledge cannot
be imputed to the officers who actually effected the arrests of
the Appellants. We find neither argument persuasive.
i.
With respect to the Appellants’ argument that the
dispatcher’s ruminations somehow preclude a finding of probable
cause, we note that whether one particular individual
subjectively believes probable cause does or does not exist is
irrelevant. “Because probable cause is an objective test, we
examine the facts within the knowledge of arresting officers to
determine whether they provide a probability on which reasonable
and prudent persons would act; we do not examine the subjective
beliefs of the arresting officers to determine whether they
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thought that the facts constituted probable cause.” Gray, 137
F.3d at 769. Here, Appellants had just been observed in what
the district court determined was the establishment and
maintenance of a perimeter to safeguard a drug transaction. The
Appellants arrived and left at the same time as the dealer. We
believe that this knowledge of Appellants’ participation in a
known drug transaction “provide[s] a probability on which
reasonable and prudent persons would act.” Id. Thus,
Appellants’ contention that the dispatcher’s personal beliefs
preclude a finding of probable cause is without merit.
ii.
Likewise, the Appellants’ argument that Detective Jolliff’s
knowledge of their activities cannot be imputed to the officers
who actually initiated the arrests is similarly without merit.
Under the collective knowledge doctrine, the collective
knowledge of the police can be used in two different situations
to establish probable cause even when the arresting officer
himself does not have sufficient personal knowledge to
independently establish probable cause. The first situation
arises when one officer with personal knowledge of facts
sufficient to establish probable cause orders another officer,
who does not have personal knowledge of those facts, to make an
arrest. In that situation, it is clear that “so long as the
officer who orders an arrest . . . has knowledge of facts
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establishing probable cause, it is not necessary for the
officers actually making the arrest . . . to be personally aware
of those facts.” United States v. Laughman, 618 F.2d 1067,
1072-73 (4th Cir. 1980). In the second situation, an officer
without independent knowledge of facts sufficient to establish
probable cause makes an arrest, but the officer has been in
communication with a group of officers that collectively has
knowledge of facts sufficient to establish probable cause.
“[W]hen a group of agents in close communication with one
another determines that it is proper to arrest an individual,
the knowledge of the group that made the decision may be
considered in determining probable cause, not just the knowledge
of the individual officer who physically effected the arrest.”
Laughman, 618 F.2d at 1072 n.3. (quoting United States v. Woods,
544 F.2d 242, 260 (6th Cir. 1976); see also United States v.
Wells, 98 F.3d 808, 810 (4th Cir. 1996) (“[A]lthough the agent
who actually seized the weapon pursuant to the supervising
agent’s instructions had no personal knowledge that [the
defendant had committed a crime], it is sufficient that the
agents collectively had probable cause to believe the weapon was
evidence of a crime at the time of the seizure.”). Both
versions of the collective knowledge doctrine support finding
probable cause in this case.
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First, although Appellants claim that Jolliff only ordered
the stop of one vehicle, the record clearly demonstrates that
Jolliff initially ordered the officers to attempt to stop all
three vehicles. After his command to “[t]ry to get all three
cars,” the dispatcher interfered and told Jolliff that he needed
to pick a vehicle. (J.A. at 340.) At that point, Jolliff did
not retract his previous command, but he clarified that the
dealer was in the red car. Thus, because his initial order to
try and stop all three cars was not withdrawn, Jolliff’s
knowledge may be imputed to the arresting officers.
Moreover, even if Jolliff did retract his initial order to
“try to get all three cars,” the arresting officers need not
individually have personal knowledge of facts sufficient to
establish probable cause. The record indicates that the
arresting officers were in communication with Detective Jolliff
over the course of the buy/bust: the officers heard Jolliff
state that “all three cars [were] involved” in the drug
transaction, and they had personally listened to a radio
transmission that detailed Appellants’ involvement in the drug
transaction. (J.A. at 340.) And, of course, Detective Jolliff
had witnessed Appellants engaged in the formation of a
protective perimeter at the scene of a known drug transaction.
Because the arresting officers were in close communication with
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one another, we consider the collective knowledge of the group,
which is sufficient to establish probable cause.
C.
Because the officers had probable cause to arrest the
Appellants, we next consider the propriety of the searches that
led to discovery of the firearms. Of course, “[o]nce suspects
occupying an automobile have been arrested, officers are
permitted, as a contemporaneous incident to the arrest, to
search their persons.” Dorlouis, 107 F.3d at 255. Because
probable cause existed to arrest the Appellants, the officers
were justified in searching the persons of Bryant, Myers, and
Joy, and the firearms discovered during those searches were
properly admitted into evidence by the district court.
The circumstances surrounding the discovery of Judge’s
firearm are slightly different, however, because that firearm
was discovered in the driver’s seat of the vehicle where Judge
had been seated. Although a vehicle search incident to arrest
is generally unjustified unless “the arrestee is unsecured and
within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the
time of the search . . . circumstances unique to the vehicle
context justify a search incident to a lawful arrest when it is
reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest
might be found in the vehicle.” Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct.
1710, 1719 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
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record is unclear as to whether Judge was secured or within
reaching distance of his vehicle at the time of the firearm’s
discovery, but we find that it was reasonable for the officers
to believe that evidence relevant to Judge’s involvement in the
drug transaction might have been found in the vehicle. As
stated above, the officers knew that Judge had just been present
on the scene of a known drug transaction. The Supreme Court has
specifically acknowledged that drug offenses are the type of
offense for which it may be reasonable to believe that evidence
relating to the crime might be located in the vehicle. Id.Because the officers could have reasonably believed that
evidence relating to Judge’s involvement in the drug transaction
might have been located in the passenger compartment of his
vehicle, the district court properly admitted the firearm into
evidence.
III.
“As its name suggests, probable cause involves
probabilities -- judgment calls that are tethered to context and
rooted in common sense.” United States v. White, 549 F.3d 946,
947 (4th Cir. 2008). We find that, given the information
available to the officers at the time of Appellants’ arrest, the
officers reasonably believed that Appellants had been involved
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in a felony relating to the drug transaction. For the foregoing
reasons, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
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