Mack v. Chater

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
MAMIE L. MACK,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
No. 96-1154
SHIRLEY S. CHATER, COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of South Carolina, at Charleston.
David C. Norton, District Judge.
(CA-94-1659-2-18AJ)
Submitted: March 25, 1997
Decided: July 17, 1997
Before WIDENER, MURNAGHAN, and WILLIAMS,
Circuit Judges.
_________________________________________________________________
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
_________________________________________________________________
COUNSEL
Mary J. Wiesen-Kosinski, Aiken, South Carolina, for Appellant. Mar-
garet B. Seymour, United States Attorney, John B. Grimball, Assis-
tant United States Attorney, Arthur J. Fried, General Counsel,
Randolph W. Gaines, Acting Principal Deputy General Counsel, A.
George Lowe, Acting Associate General Counsel, Litigation Division,
Frieda Schlemeyer Colfelt, Office of the General Counsel, SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appel-
lee.
_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
_________________________________________________________________
OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Mamie Mack appeals the decision of the district court adopting the
recommendation of the magistrate judge, granting summary judgment
to the Commissioner of Social Security, and upholding the denial of
Mack's application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental
security income. The Commissioner's decision to deny benefits was
based upon the finding that Mack had the residual functional capacity
to perform work-related activities, except for work involving under-
standing and carrying out detailed or complex instructions, and thus
was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act.
Because we find that the Commissioner's decision is supported by
substantial evidence, and that the correct law was applied, we affirm.*
Mack filed her application for social security disability benefits
claiming disability since April 2, 1992, as the result of back problems
and high blood pressure. A hearing was held before an administrative
law judge (ALJ) on June 11, 1993. After a thorough review of the
hearing testimony by Mack and her daughter, and the relevant medi-
cal evidence, the ALJ determined that, although Mack suffers from
mild mental retardation, she was not disabled because, at that time,
Mack's medical condition did not constitute a disability under the
Social Security Act.
_________________________________________________________________
*On December 15, 1994, while this action was pending in the district
court, Mack filed a second application for disability benefits claiming
disability since September 29, 1993. The ALJ entered a decision in favor
of Mack and the government has not appealed. Our decision today is not
intended to disturb this subsequent award of benefits to Mack.
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This court must uphold the Commissioner's decision that a claim-
ant is not disabled so long as the correct law was applied and the deci-
sion is supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C.§ 405(g) (West
Supp. 1996); Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990).
The Supreme Court has defined substantial evidence as "such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). Sub-
stantial evidence "consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence
but may be somewhat less than a preponderance. If there is evidence
to justify a refusal to direct a verdict were the case before a jury, then
there is ``substantial evidence.'" Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d at 1456(quoting Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1966)). This
court will not reweigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that
of the ALJ. Hays, 907 F.2d at 1456.
After considering Mack's claims on appeal and reviewing the
record, we find that the ALJ properly evaluated the evidence before
him, including Mack's subjective complaints, and made appropriate
credibility and factual findings in accordance with relevant regulatory
criteria and Fourth Circuit case law.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order upholding the
Commissioner's denial of Mack's April 2, 1992, application for dis-
ability benefits. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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