United States v. Charles Justesen

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 99-4209
CHARLES DUWAYNE JUSTESEN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Durham.
James A. Beaty, Jr., District Judge.
(CR-98-238)
Submitted: August 31, 1999
Decided: October 12, 1999
Before ERVIN* and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS,
Senior Circuit Judge.
_________________________________________________________________
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
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COUNSEL
Louis C. Allen, III, Federal Public Defender, William S. Trivette,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Walter C. Holton, Jr., United States Attorney, L. Patrick
_________________________________________________________________
*Judge Ervin participated in the consideration of this case but died
prior to the time the decision was filed. The decision is filed by a quorum
of the panel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(d).
Auld, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina,
for Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
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OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Charles Duwayne Justesen was convicted by a jury on a charge of
taking in excess of $1000 belonging to the United States, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1994). The charge in question arose from
Justesen's commingling of funds from the Hayti Contract Postal Sta-
tion, which he managed, with funds for the maintenance and expenses
of Heritage Square Shopping Center, where the Postal Station was
located. On appeal, Justesen challenges the district court's refusal to
define "property of the United States" as used in § 641 for the jury
and the exclusion of certain evidence.
Justesen's proposed jury instructions defining the phrase "property
of the United States" were two pages long and contained many differ-
ent "if-then" scenarios for the jury to consider. The trial court rejected
these instructions and informed the jury that it had to find "that the
money described in the indictment belonged to the United States."
(emphasis added).
We find that Justesen's proposed instructions were confusing and
did not accurately state the law. Moreover, the court was not required
to further elaborate on the meaning of "property of" or "belonged to,"
as the phrases have a commonly understood meaning. See United
States v. Hall, 93 F.3d 126, 131 (4th Cir. 1996) ("An appellate court
only burdens the conduct of a trial when it requires the elaboration of
statutory elements which are already self-explanatory."). Because
Justesen has cited no authority requiring a definition of "property of
the United States" under § 641 and because the words are used in
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their everyday meaning, we hold that no further instruction was
required. See United States v. Maisel, 12 F.3d 423, 425 (4th Cir.
1993) (declining to define "serious interference" under § 641).
With regard to Justesen's claim that evidence was improperly
excluded, we have carefully reviewed the record, the briefs, and the
district court's decision on Justesen's motion for a new trial, which
raised the same arguments. We find no reversible error, and accord-
ingly, we reject this claim based on the reasoning of the district court.
(See J.A. at 429-37).
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Justesen's conviction. We dis-
pense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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