United States v. Jackson

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 99-4600
JESSIE J. JACKSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 99-4601
DAVID M. CRUDUP,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at New Bern.
Terrence W. Boyle, Chief District Judge.
(CR-98-14)
Submitted: July 31, 2000
Decided: September 18, 2000
Before WILKINS, NIEMEYER, and KING, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________________________________________
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
_________________________________________________________________
COUNSEL
Thomas P. McNamara, HAFER, MCNAMARA, CALDWELL, CUT-
LER & CURTNER, P.A., Raleigh, North Carolina; David W. Long,
POYNER & SPRUILL, L.L.P., Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appel-
lants. Janice McKenzie Cole, United States Attorney, Anne M. Hayes,
Assistant United States Attorney, David J. Cortes, Assistant United
States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
_________________________________________________________________
OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Jesse J. Jackson and David M. Crudup were convicted by a jury on
a single count of conspiracy to defraud the United States by aiding
and assisting the preparation of false income tax returns, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994), and multiple counts of aiding and assisting
the preparation and filing of false income tax returns, in violation of
26 U.S.C. § 7206(2) (1994). Jackson was sentenced to a 41-month
sentence on the single count and concurrent 36-month sentences on
the multiple counts. Crudup was sentenced to 37 months on the single
count and concurrent 36-month sentences on the remaining counts.
On appeal, Jackson and Crudup first allege that the district court
erred in refusing to give a First Amendment jury instruction. This
Court reviews a district court's failure to give a jury instruction for
abuse of discretion. See United States v. Ruhe , 191 F.3d 376, 384 (4th
Cir. 1999). Jackson and Crudup would have been entitled to an
instruction on a First Amendment defense if there were evidence suf-
ficient for a reasonable jury to find in their favor on that account. See
United States v. Fleschner, 98 F.3d 155, 158 (4th Cir. 1996). A First
Amendment defense is warranted if there is evidence that the speak-
er's purpose or words are mere abstract teaching of the propriety of
opposition to the income tax law. See id. We find no abuse of discre-
tion. See Fleschner, 98 F.3d at 158.
Jackson and Crudup next argue that the court abused its discretion
in giving the jury a willful blindness instruction. A willful blindness
2
instruction allows a "jury to impute the element of knowledge to [a]
defendant if the evidence indicates that he purposely closed his eyes
to avoid knowing what was taking place around him." United States
v. Schnabel, 939 F.2d 197, 203 (4th Cir. 1991). A willful blindness
instruction is proper when the evidence presented supports an infer-
ence of deliberate ignorance on the part of a defendant. See United
States v. Abbas, 74 F.3d 506, 513 (4th Cir. 1996). A district Court
must ensure, however, that a jury is not permitted to infer a defen-
dant's guilty knowledge based upon a showing of mere careless disre-
gard or mistake. See United States v. Guay , 108 F.3d 545, 551 (4th
Cir. 1997); United States v. Mancuso, 42 F.3d 836, 846 (4th Cir.
1994). We find that under the facts of this case, such instruction was
warranted.
Last, Jackson and Crudup argue that the district court erred in
increasing both their base offense levels by two levels pursuant to
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual 2T1.4(B)(1) for committing the
offenses as a pattern or scheme from which they derived a substantial
portion of their income or from being in the business of preparing tax
returns. We also find no error in such application.
Accordingly, we affirm Jackson's and Crudup's convictions and
sentences. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
3