United States v. Meggison

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-4211
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
LAWRENCE ELIE MEGGISON, a/k/a Larry Edwards,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Catherine C. Blake, District Judge. (CR-
02-332-CCB)
Submitted: August 17, 2005 Decided: October 11, 2005
Before WILLIAMS, TRAXLER, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael D. Montemarano, MICHAEL D. MONTEMARANO, P.A., Elkridge,
Maryland, for Appellant. Thomas M. DiBiagio, United States
Attorney, Angela R. White, Assistant United States Attorney,
Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
A jury convicted Lawrence Meggison on one count of
possession with intent to distribute heroin, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2000). The district court sentenced Meggison
as a career offender to 210 months in prison. Meggison now
appeals. His attorney has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), raising two issues. Meggison also
has filed a pro se supplemental brief, and counsel has filed a
supplemental brief. We affirm.
I
A Maryland state trooper stopped Meggison because
Meggison was driving without a seat belt. Meggison gave the
trooper a license that proved to be suspended. When the trooper
told Meggison that he was going to arrest him for driving under a
suspended license, Meggison was uncooperative. He moved toward the
passenger side of his vehicle, grabbed a jacket from the passenger
seat, and fled. Meggison was apprehended approximately thirty
minutes later. The jacket, which the state trooper identified at
trial as the one that Meggison had grabbed when he fled, contained
1509 packets of heroin in its various pockets.
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II
Counsel contends that the traffic stop was unwarranted
and that the evidence seized as a result of that stop therefore was
inadmissible. Under Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996),
officers may stop a vehicle based on a minor traffic infraction,
even if the true motivation for the stop was the belief, not rising
to probable cause, that the vehicle’s occupants were engaged in
illegal drug activity. Id. at 812-13. Here, the state trooper
testified that Meggison was not wearing a seat belt while driving--
an offense for which a driver may be stopped and issued a traffic
citation. Md. Code Ann. (Transp.) § 22-412.3(b) (Lexis 2002). We
conclude that the stop in this case was reasonable. Our review of
the record further discloses no irregularity in officers’ actions
after the stop that resulted in the discovery of the heroin, and we
conclude that there was no Fourth Amendment violation.
III
Meggison raises three claims in his pro se brief. None
of the claims has merit. First, ineffective assistance of trial
counsel does not conclusively appear on the face of the record.
Therefore, Meggison should raise this claim, if at all, in a motion
filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000). See United States v.
Richardson, 195 F.3d 192, 198 (4th Cir. 1999). Second, the
prosecutor did not express a personal belief in the credibility of
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any witness. Nor did the prosecutor suggest that the testimony of
a witness was corroborated by evidence that the prosecutor knew of
but the jury did not. Thus, there was no improper vouching or
bolstering of any witness. See United States v. Sanchez, 118 F.3d
192, 198 (4th Cir. 1997).
Finally, our review of the record discloses that there
was sufficient evidence to convict Meggison. See Glasser v. United
States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942). Witness credibility is within the
sole province of the jurors, who will resolve any discrepancies in
testimony when making credibility determinations. See United
States v. Saunders, 886 F.2d 56, 60 (4th Cir. 1989). We note that
the trooper testified that the jacket that Meggison fled with was
the same jacket that Meggison had with him when officers found him
hiding in a camper. The jacket contained 1509 packets of heroin--
an amount and packaging method that are consistent with drug
distribution.
IV
Counsel contends that Meggison’s sentence as a career
offender, see U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1 (2004),
violated United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), and
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
Because the issue is raised for the first time on appeal, review is
for plain error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States v.
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Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). Meggison’s reliance on Blakely is
misplaced. In both Blakely and Booker, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed its holding in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 522
U.S. 224, 244 (1998), that the fact of a prior conviction need not
be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Booker, 125 S. Ct.
at 756; Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2536. Here, it is clear from the
face of the judicial record that Meggison had the requisite number
of prior qualifying felony convictions for the career offender
enhancement.*
V
We accordingly affirm the conviction and the sentence.
In accordance with Anders, we have examined the entire record and
have found no other meritorious issues for appeal. This court
requires that counsel inform his client, in writing, of his right
to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If the client requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, counsel
may then move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on the client. We dispense with oral argument because
*
Additionally, our review of the record discloses “no
nonspeculative basis for concluding that the treatment of the
guidelines as mandatory ‘affect[ed] the district court’s selection
of the sentence imposed.’” See United States v. White, 405 F.3d
208, 223 (4th Cir. 2005).
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the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process. The motions to remand and to file a
supplemental brief are denied.
AFFIRMED
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