United States v. Cortez

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-4784
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
PAULINO CASTRO CORTEZ,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Durham. N. Carlton Tilley, Jr.,
District Judge. (1:06-cr-00475-NCT-2)
Submitted: September 25, 2008 Decided: November 5, 2008
Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and KING, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Wayne Buchanan Eads, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Anna
Mills Wagoner, United States Attorney, David P. Folmar, Jr.,
Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Paulino Castro Cortez was found guilty for possessing
with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine. The
jury found him not guilty, however, for possessing a firearm in
furtherance of a drug trafficking crime under 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (West Supp. 2008). He was sentenced to 151
months of imprisonment. On appeal, Cortez alleges the district
court erred by giving him a two-level enhancement under U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1(b)(1) (2007), for possessing
a dangerous weapon (here a pistol), in light of the jury’s verdict
on the § 924(c) charge. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Cortez concedes on appeal that we review this issue for
plain error, as trial counsel failed to raise this issue below.*
See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725,
731-32 (1993); United States v. Beasley, 495 F.3d 142, 148 (4th
Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1471 (2008). Without the two-
level enhancement, Cortez’s advisory sentencing range would have
been 121-151 months.
Cortez’s argument fails as a matter of law. In United
States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997), the Supreme Court held that
“a jury’s verdict of acquittal does not prevent the sentencing
court from considering conduct underlying the acquitted charge, so
*
Trial counsel initially filed written objections to the
enhancement but he and Cortez abandoned the argument at the
sentencing hearing. (JA 274-75).
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long as that conduct has been proved by a preponderance of the
evidence.” Id. at 157; see United States v. Hunter, 19 F.3d 895,
897 (4th Cir. 1994) (upholding firearm enhancement where defendant
was acquitted of § 924(c) firearm charge). Accordingly, we affirm
Cortez’s sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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