Jorge Solano-Moreta v. D. Stephens

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-6487
JORGE J. SOLANO-MORETA,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
D. R. STEPHENS,
Respondent - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle,
District Judge. (5:11-hc-02255-BO)
Submitted: July 25, 2013 Decided: July 29, 2013
Before GREGORY, DAVIS, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Jorge J. Solano-Moreta, Appellant Pro Se. Christina Ann Kelly,
BUREAU OF PRISONS, Butner, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jorge J. Solano-Moreta, a federal prisoner, appeals
the district court’s order entering summary judgment and denying
relief on his 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013)
petition, in which he challenged his loss of twenty-seven days
of good time credit after a prison disciplinary hearing officer
concluded that he had threatened to kill a guard.
Solano-Moreta claims that the disciplinary hearing
officer denied him due process by relying on false incident
reports. But an inmate’s federal due process rights are not
violated by the determination of a disciplinary hearing officer
as long as there is “any evidence in the record that could
support the conclusion reached by the [officer].”
Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455-56 (1985); see
Baker v. Lyles, 904 F.2d 925, 932 (4th Cir. 1990). Because the
district court was precluded from making independent credibility
assessments or reweighing the evidence against Solano-Moreta, it
properly declined Solano-Moreta’s invitation to reevaluate his
disciplinary hearing on the merits under the guise of ensuring
that it rendered him due process. Hill, 472 U.S. at 455.
Solano-Moreta also claims that the disciplinary
hearing denied him due process because it was conducted in his
absence. But an inmate’s right to call witnesses and present
evidence in his own defense at a disciplinary hearing may be
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overcome if it is “unduly hazardous to institutional safety or
correctional goals” to permit him to do so. Brown v. Braxton,
373 F.3d 501, 505 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974)). See also 28 C.F.R. § 541.8(e)(2)
(2013) (permitting inmates to be present at disciplinary
hearings except when institutional security would be compromised
by the inmate’s presence); 28 C.F.R. § 541.17(d) (2010) (same);
Battle v. Barton, 970 F.2d 779, 782-83 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding
that an inmate may be removed from his disciplinary hearing
where the removal is logically related to correctional goals).
Here, Solano-Moreta was removed from the hearing
because he became so disruptive that the hearing officer
believed that his continued presence would be a threat to the
safety of the prison staff. Despite Solano-Moreta’s absence,
the hearing officer reviewed the testimony of each of Solano-
Moreta’s profferred witnesses in the presence of the staff
representative whom Solano-Moreta had requested to assist him.
We agree with the district court that, on the circumstances of
this case, Solano-Moreta’s disciplinary hearing comported with
the Due Process Clause. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566-67. *
*
To the extent that Solano-Moreta asserts that the district
court should have reviewed video footage of the disciplinary
hearing to ascertain whether he actually became so disruptive as
to justify his expulsion, we note that there is no evidence in
(Continued)
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Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
the record that the hearing actually was recorded or that any
such recording supports Solano-Moreta’s allegations.
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