EQT Gathering Equity, LLC v. Fountain Place, LLC

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-1730
EQT GATHERING EQUITY, LLC, a Delaware limited liability
company; EQT PRODUCTION COMPANY, a Pennsylvania
corporation,
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
and
EQUITABLE GATHERING EQUITY, LLC, a Delaware limited
liability company; 70 EQUITABLE PRODUCTION COMPANY, a
Pennsylvania corporation,
Plaintiffs,
v.
FOUNTAIN PLACE, LLC,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Charleston. John T. Copenhaver,
Jr., District Judge. (2:09-cv-00069)
Argued: January 30, 2013 Decided: May 21, 2013
Before DAVIS, DIAZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: George Lawson Partain, Logan, West Virginia, for
Appellant. David K. Hendrickson, HENDRICKSON & LONG, PLLC,
Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Stephen E.
Hastings, HENDRICKSON & LONG, PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia,
for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2
PER CURIAM:
The parties to this appeal are two property owners,
each of whom own certain rights to a tract of land located in
Logan County, West Virginia (the “Subject Property”). Appellant
Fountain Place, LLC (“Fountain Place”) owns the surface rights
to the Subject Property. Appellees EQT Gathering Equity, LLC
and EQT Production Company (collectively, “EQT”) own the oil and
gas rights to the Subject Property.
This controversy requires that we determine which of
the two property owners must bear the cost of relocating and
burying two pipelines on the Subject Property. In answering
this question, we apply the analysis set forth by the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia in Quintain Development, LLC
v. Columbia Natural Resources, Inc., 210 W. Va. 128, 556 S.E.2d
95 (2001). We first conclude that EQT, as the owner of the oil
and gas rights, was obligated to relocate its pipelines so as
not to interfere with the exercise of the rights held by the
surface rights owner, Fountain Place. We also conclude,
however, that because the parties have not identified a
provision in the instruments controlling how the costs of
relocating the pipelines in the present dispute are to be
apportioned, and the surface rights owner sought to benefit from
the change in the status quo by moving dirt to facilitate the
exercise of its surface rights, Fountain Place, as the surface
3
rights owner, bears the cost of relocating the two pipelines.
Therefore, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
I.
The long and winding history of this case has been
explored in great detail by the district court and does not
warrant further extended discussion here. Accordingly, our
recitation of the facts will be limited to only the most
relevant matters.
Prior to 1944, Island Creek Coal Company (“Island
Creek”) was the owner in fee of various tracts of land in Logan
County, West Virginia, some of which are now at the center of
this dispute. 1
Over the years, Island Creek, through various
instruments, leased certain property rights to other developers.
Two such instruments are relevant to this appeal.
A.
1944 Lease
The first instrument relevant here is a 1944 Agreement
of Lease (the “1944 Lease”). In the 1944 Lease, Island Creek
leased to Columbian Carbon Company and its successors and
1
At oral argument, Appellant indicated Island Creek is
still in existence but has not been joined in this lawsuit.
Oral Argument at 16:55, EQT Gathering Equity, LLC v. Fountain
Place, LLC, (No. 12-1730), available at http://www.ca4.uscourts.
gov/OAaudiotop.htm.
4
assigns, the oil and gas rights to the Subject Property. The
1944 Lease also provided easement rights to the lessee to
develop oil and gas operations on the Subject Property. In
1968, Columbian Carbon Company dissolved. By way of a series of
transfers and corporate name changes, EQT ultimately acquired
Columbian Carbon Company’s rights as lessee to the 1944 Lease.
Therefore, EQT obtained the oil and gas rights as well as the
corresponding easement rights to the Subject Property. The 1944
Lease contains three provisions germane to our discussion here.
The first provision (the “Burying Provision”) places
certain limitations and obligations on the lessee. The Burying
Provision is found in paragraph 8 of the 1944 Lease, and reads:
[Lessee] shall not drill any well within two
hundred (200) feet of any of the principal buildings
upon the leased premises. All pipe lines except those
used to conduct gas and water for drilling engines
shall be buried below plow depth in cultivated land
and at a safe depth when crossing under railroads,
highways and haulroads. In laying pipe lines [Lessee]
shall protect growing crops and fences and if any
injury shall be done thereto [Lessee] shall pay for
the same as well as any injury or damage caused by any
other acts of [Lessee] on the leased premises.
J.A. 68–69. 2
The second provision (the “Subordination Provision”),
found in paragraph 13, indicates that the lessee receives oil
2
Citations to the “J.A.” refer to the Joint Appendix filed
by the parties in this appeal.
5
and gas rights “subject and subordinate to the business of
mining and shipping coal . . . .” J.A. 73.
The third provision (the “Cost Allocation Provision”),
found in paragraph 18, provides for the allocation of certain
costs among Island Creek and the lessee. Paragraph 18 begins by
establishing shared ownership of the oil and gas produced on the
Subject Property among Island Creek and the lessee. Paragraph
18 then provides for cost allocation, stating, in relevant part:
ISLAND CREEK shall, with respect to its sixty-two
(62%) per cent. undivided interest therein, pay to
[Lessee] sixty-two (62%) per cent. of the total cost
of prospecting, drilling and operating for oil and gas
on the leased premises under the provisions of this
lease . . . and transporting the same on the leased
premises including . . . the construction, installing,
operating and maintaining on the leased premises of
such pipe lines . . . as [Lessee] may deem necessary
for such purposes. Included in the total cost shall
be an arbitrary charge of six and five-tenths (6.5%)
per cent thereof . . . .
Such total cost shall include the cost of
performing the obligations of [Lessee] contained in
Paragraphs 7, 8, 10, 11, 12 and 15 hereof.
J.A. 77–78.
B.
1965 Deed
The second instrument of relevance here is a 1965 Deed
in which Island Creek conveyed to Georgia-Pacific Corporation
and its successors and assigns, the surface rights to the
Subject Property (the “1965 Deed”). Following a series of
6
conveyances by Georgia-Pacific Corporation and its successors,
on February 8, 2001, the rights under the 1965 Deed were sold to
Fountain Place. 3 The 1965 Deed states, in part, that the
conveyance is subject to “[t]he right, title and interest of
[EQT’s predecessor in interest] . . . under agreements of lease
dated April 13, 1944,” that is, the 1944 Lease. J.A. 98.
C.
The Pipelines
Pursuant to the 1944 Lease, EQT operates two pipelines
on the Subject Property –– both of which, at various points, run
across surfaces owned by Fountain Place. The two pipelines are
identified by the following designations: DC-4 and BR-866/1875.
1.
DC-4 Pipeline
By March 1998, Fountain Place’s predecessor had
deposited an unknown amount of fill dirt over a portion of the
DC-4 pipeline. By November 21, 2001, Fountain Place had also
3
We need not reiterate the chains of title for the 1944
Lease and 1965 Deed, which were exhaustively covered by the
district court. For our purposes, we need only recognize two
relevant facts. First, EQT and Fountain Place possess the
rights granted in the 1944 Lease (oil and gas rights) and 1965
Deed (surface rights), respectively. Second, although the
parties do not identify precisely when the entity now known as
EQT first acquired the oil and gas rights under the 1944 Lease,
it is clear EQT acquired such rights prior to Fountain Place’s
acquisition of the 1965 Deed on February 8, 2001.
7
deposited an additional unknown amount of fill dirt over the DC-
4 pipeline. In total, approximately “30 feet” of fill dirt
buried the relevant portion of the DC-4 pipeline. J.A. 518.
Following years of negotiation between EQT and Fountain Place
over the dirt covering the DC-4 pipeline, EQT unilaterally moved
the pipeline to a safer location. The relocation cost EQT
$158,141.80.
2.
BR-866/1875 Pipeline
In 2008, Fountain Place desired to install a cellular
phone transmission tower on the Subject Property. Fountain
Place discovered the BR-866/1875 pipeline ran across the surface
of the Subject Property at certain locations –– locations
Fountain Place intended to use as pathways to transport
materials and equipment for the construction of the cell tower
(hereinafter referred to as the “Pathway”). As a result,
Fountain Place excavated underneath the BR-866/1875 pipeline.
The parties dispute whether the excavation was completed at
EQT’s direction, or was carried out on Fountain Place’s own
volition. Nonetheless, it is clear the excavation was
precipitated by Fountain Place’s desire to traverse the Pathway.
According to EQT, the excavation rendered the BR-866/1875
8
pipeline unsafe, and EQT estimated the cost for burying the BR-
866/1875 pipeline at the Pathway location to be $45,000.00. 4
D.
Procedural History
On January 26, 2009, EQT filed the present action
against Fountain Place in the Southern District of West
Virginia. EQT’s complaint alleged six causes of action. EQT
sought a declaratory judgment holding Fountain Place liable for
the cost incurred by EQT for relocating the DC-4 pipeline, an
injunction enjoining Fountain Place from further excavating
under the BR-866/1875 pipeline, and a declaratory judgment
holding Fountain Place liable for the prospective cost of
burying the BR-866/1875 pipeline. The complaint also stated
tort causes of action for negligence, trespass, and intentional
conduct.
In response, Fountain Place filed its answer and a
counterclaim against EQT. Fountain Place denied EQT’s
allegations concerning the DC-4 pipeline, sought an injunction
compelling EQT to bury the BR-866/1875 pipeline under Fountain
4
In their Response Brief on appeal, EQT indicated the BR-
866/1875 pipeline has since been either relocated or buried at
the disputed locations. But EQT did not indicate when this
activity occurred or the actual cost.
9
Place’s Pathway, and sought a declaration that EQT was solely
responsible for the burial costs.
The parties then filed cross motions for summary
judgment with regard to the injunctive and declaratory claims
surrounding the BR-866/1875 pipeline.
On March 5, 2010, given that there was no indication
Fountain Place would further excavate under the pipeline, the
district court dismissed, as moot, the parties’ requests for
injunctive relief. The district court granted EQT summary
judgment on its claim for declaratory relief with respect to the
BR-866/1875 pipeline. The district court based its ruling on
the principles set forth by the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia in Quintain Development, LLC v. Columbia Natural
Resources, Inc., 210 W. Va. 128, 556 S.E.2d 95 (2001). The
district court concluded that because Fountain Place upset the
status quo surrounding the BR-866/1875 pipeline, Fountain Place
was responsible for paying for the cost of the pipeline’s
relocation.
On December 14, 2010, Fountain Place filed a motion
for summary judgment on EQT’s remaining causes of action. EQT
responded by filing its own motion for summary judgment on its
claim for declaratory relief with respect to the DC-4 pipeline.
On March 3, 2011, the district court denied the
parties’ cross motions for summary judgment.
10
On November 15, 2011, the case proceeded to trial to
resolve questions of fact over when, and by whom, fill dirt was
deposited on top of the DC-4 pipeline. The jury returned a
verdict indicating Fountain Place and its predecessor were
responsible for depositing dirt on top of the DC-4 pipeline.
Following the jury trial, Fountain Place filed a
motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In its motion, Fountain
Place argued the facts found by the jury indicated that EQT’s
declaratory action with respect to the DC-4 pipeline and various
tort causes of action were barred by West Virginia’s applicable
statute of limitations.
On March 15, 2012, the district court entered a
Memorandum Opinion and Order on Fountain Place’s motion for
judgment as a matter of law and entered an order of judgment.
In its Memorandum Opinion and Order, the district court
dismissed EQT’s tort claims as time-barred, pursuant to West
Virginia’s two-year statute of limitations for tortious damage
to property. See W. Va. Code § 55-2-12(a). But the district
court also concluded EQT’s declaratory judgment cause of action
with respect to the DC-4 pipeline was not time-barred, because
it was subject to West Virginia’s 10-year statute of limitations
for actions to recover on a contract. See W. Va. Code § 55-2-6.
Applying the principles found in Quintain, the district court
11
then upheld the jury verdict in favor of EQT with respect to
EQT’s request for a declaration that Fountain Place be held
responsible for the cost of relocating the DC-4 pipeline.
The district court’s judgment order incorporated two
of the district court’s prior decisions: (1) the March 5, 2010
Memorandum Opinion and Order granting summary judgment in favor
of EQT on EQT’s claim for declaratory judgment with respect to
the BR-866/1875 pipeline; and (2) the March 15, 2012 Memorandum
Opinion and Order denying judgment as a matter of law in favor
of Fountain Place on EQT’s claim for declaratory judgment with
respect to the DC-4 pipeline.
Fountain Place then filed a motion to amend the
court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order pursuant to Rule 59(e) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fountain Place’s motion
challenged, inter alia, the district court’s application of
Quintain and West Virginia’s 10-year statute of limitations to
EQT’s declaratory causes of action, in what was essentially a
motion for reconsideration. Subsequently, the district court
denied Fountain Place’s motion to amend.
To summarize, the district court concluded:
• Injunctive relief was unnecessary because the safety and
structural integrity of the BR-866/1875 pipeline were no
longer in jeopardy;
12
• Fountain Place was responsible for paying the cost of
relocating the DC-4 and BR-866/1875 pipelines pursuant to
the Supreme Court of Appeals’ decision in Quintain;
• EQT’s declaratory cause of action with respect to the DC-4
pipeline, requiring Fountain Place to pay for the cost of
relocation, was subject to West Virginia’s 10-year statute
of limitations for actions to recover on a contract, W. Va.
Code § 55-2-6, and thus not time-barred;
• EQT’s tort causes of action were subject to West Virginia’s
two-year statute of limitations for tortious damage to
property, W. Va. Code § 55-2-12(a), and thus time-barred.
Fountain Place then timely filed the present appeal,
largely reiterating the arguments made in its Rule 50 motion.
In essence, Fountain Place challenges the district court’s
declarations that Fountain Place must pay for the cost of
relocating the two pipelines.
The district court possessed diversity jurisdiction
over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 5 Additionally, we
5
Fountain Place is a West Virginia limited liability
company with its principal place of business in West Virginia.
The entities collectively referred to as “EQT” consist of a
Delaware limited liability company and a Pennsylvania
corporation with their principal place of business in
Pennsylvania.
13
possess jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291.
II.
We review grants of summary judgment and denials of
judgment as a matter of law de novo. See PBM Prods., LLC v.
Mead Johnson & Co., 639 F.3d 111, 119–20 (4th Cir. 2011).
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we view all
the facts and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. at 119. Summary
judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine dispute of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
“A judgment as a matter of law is proper when, without
weighing the credibility of the evidence, there can be but one
reasonable conclusion as to the proper judgment.” PBM Prods.,
639 F.3d at 120 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Because this case comes before us by way of federal
diversity jurisdiction, “our role is to apply the governing
state law, or, if necessary, predict how the state’s highest
court would rule on an unsettled issue.” Horace Mann Ins. Co.
v. Gen. Star Nat. Ins. Co., 514 F.3d 327, 329 (4th Cir. 2008).
“Accordingly, where there is West Virginia law addressing a
particular question, we will follow it.” Id.
14
III.
In Quintain Development, LLC v. Columbia Natural
Resources, Inc., 210 W. Va. 128, 556 S.E.2d 95 (2001), the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia set forth the
framework for courts to follow in resolving disputes such as the
one presently before the court.
In Quintain, Columbia Natural Resources, Inc. (“CNR”)
owned a natural gas pipeline. The pipeline ran over various
tracts of land pursuant to right-of-way easements granted by the
surface and coal owners of those tracts to CNR’s predecessor in
interest in 1914. Id. at 97–98. In 1995 and 1996, Quintain
Development, LLC (“Quintain”) obtained, by a number of leases,
the surface mining rights to the various tracts. Id. at 98. In
order to exercise its surface mining rights, Quintain brought an
action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against CNR to
compel CNR to relocate its pipeline at CNR’s expense. Id. at
98–99.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia first
considered whether CNR, under its right-of-way easements, was
obligated to relocate its pipeline to accommodate the surface
rights holder. The Supreme Court of Appeals found provisions in
the right–of-way easements clearly indicated that the parties
had intended the easements would not interfere with the mining
of coal, regardless of the mining method employed:
15
The landowners clearly wished to reserve for
themselves the right to remove coal from their
respective properties. CNR’s predecessor in interest
agreed that its pipeline would not interfere with the
removal of coal. Clearly the parties contemplated
that if the pipeline interfered with the removal of
coal, it would be relocated. This fact does not
change simply because the method of mining the coal
may have changed. The action which the parties
contemplated, the possibility of relocating a pipeline
that interfered with the mining of coal, remains the
same. Consequently, . . . under the right-of-way
deeds for the [property at issue], CNR was required to
relocate its pipeline from those properties to the
extent it interfered with the removal of coal there.
Id. at 101.
Finding CNR obligated to relocate its pipeline, the
Supreme Court of Appeals then set about to determine which party
was obligated to pay for the cost of relocating the pipeline.
Id. at 101. In making this determination, the Supreme Court of
Appeals performed a two-part inquiry. First, it turned to the
language of the right-of-way easements to determine whether they
contemplated who should bear the cost for such relocation.
Second, finding the language of the easements silent on the
issue, the Supreme Court of Appeals turned to the principle that
the party benefiting from the change to the status quo should
bear the cost of the change, as espoused in Minard Run Oil Co.
v. Pennzoil Co., 419 Pa. 334, 336, 214 A.2d 234, 235 (1965). It
is this framework that we apply to the present case.
16
A.
Under Quintain, we begin by asking whether the 1944
Lease obligates EQT to relocate its pipeline to accommodate
Fountain Place, the surface rights holder. 556 S.E.2d at 101.
We find that it does.
Two provisions in the 1944 Lease reveal an intent by
the parties to the 1944 Lease for the operator of the oil and
gas pipelines not to interfere with the surface activities on
the Subject Property: (1) the Burying Provision; and (2) the
Subordination Provision. The Burying Provision reveals a clear
intent for the pipelines to be buried and to not interfere with
various surface activities, such as farming, means of
transportation, and the maintenance of fences. The
Subordination Provision also provides that the oil and gas
rights holder receives those rights “subject and subordinate to
the business of mining and shipping coal . . . .” J.A. 73.
From these two provisions, it is a short inferential step to
conclude the oil and gas rights granted to Columbian Carbon
Company, and thus to EQT, were intended not to interfere with
the surface rights of Island Creek and its assigns, that is,
Fountain Place. Accordingly, EQT is obligated to relocate its
pipelines to the extent they interfere with Fountain Place’s
exercise of its surface rights.
17
B.
Under the next step in the Quintain analysis, we must
now determine which party is obligated to pay for the cost of
the pipeline relocation. 556 S.E.2d at 101.
1.
As the Quintain framework dictates, we first turn to
the language of the 1944 Lease. See id.; see also Equitable
Gathering Equity, LLC v. Dynamic Energy, Inc., No. 5:07-cv-
00725, 2009 WL 37186, at *3 (S.D.W. Va. Jan. 7, 2009) (“First,
as in Quintain, the granting instruments in the instant case
state that the coal estate is to be the dominant estate, but are
silent regarding who should bear the cost of relocating the
pipelines.”).
Fountain Place argues that the affirmative command
given the oil and gas rights owner in the Burying Provision
implicitly requires EQT to bear the cost of relocating its
pipelines. See Appellant’s Br. 29 (“[T]he District Court’s
legal conclusion that the [1944 Lease] does not contain a cost
shifting provision . . . is manifestly at odds with the specific
provision in the lease that the Lessee ‘shall’ bury all
pipelines under ‘haulroads.’”). As noted above, the Burying
Provision places an obligation on EQT to bury its pipelines to
the extent they interfere with the exercise of surface rights by
the surface rights owner. The Burying Provision is silent,
18
however, as to how the costs of complying with such obligations
should be apportioned between the oil and gas rights owner and
any subsequent surface rights owner. 6
Accordingly, because the parties have not identified a
provision in the instruments controlling how the costs of
relocating the pipelines in the present dispute are to be
apportioned, we must continue to the next step in the Quintain
analysis.
2.
Given that the parties have not invoked any
controlling provision under the relevant instruments to resolve
this dispute, pursuant to Quintain we must impose the cost of
relocating the DC-4 pipeline and burying the BR-866/1875
pipeline on the party who desired to alter the status quo for
its own benefit. See 556 S.E.2d at 101. Here, the DC-4 and BR-
6
Fountain Place did not argue below in the district court,
in brief on appeal, or at oral argument that the Cost Allocation
Provision applies to the present dispute. See J.A. 398
(“Fountain Place has identified no provision in the [1944 Lease]
or elsewhere in the chain of title that would impose upon
plaintiffs the relocation or burial costs.”). We therefore
consider any such argument waived. See Corti v. Storage Tech.
Corp., 304 F.3d 336, 343 (4th Cir. 2002) (Niemeyer, J.,
concurring) (collecting cases illustrating that “when a party to
a civil action fails to raise a point at trial, that party
waives review of the issue unless there are exceptional or
extraordinary circumstances justifying review”); United States
v. Al-Hamdi, 356 F.3d 564, 571 n.8 (4th Cir. 2004) (“It is a
well settled rule that contentions not raised in the argument
section of the opening brief are abandoned.”).
19
866/1875 pipelines were in existence when Fountain Place
purchased the surface rights under the 1965 Deed in 2001.
Therefore, the initial act of placing the pipelines could not
have altered the status quo as between the parties. The
question then becomes whether subsequent acts, such as the
placement or removal of dirt, altered the status quo for the
benefit of one of the parties. 7
a.
DC-4 Pipeline
With respect to the DC-4 pipeline, the jury found
Fountain Place deposited fill dirt on top of the DC-4 pipeline
as late as November 21, 2001. Fountain Place sought to alter
the status quo for its own benefit –- Fountain Place sought to
change the nature of the Subject Property where the DC-4
pipeline was located in order to conduct its own surface
activities in that area. Although there were incidental
benefits to both EQT and Fountain Place in safely moving the DC-
4 pipeline away from Fountain Place’s surface activities and
7
Upon review, we agree with the district court’s conclusion
that Fountain Place’s evidence that EQT may have first moved the
BR-866/1875 pipeline was too speculative, incomplete, and
contradictory to create a genuine dispute of material fact.
J.A. 395–96 n.14 (“Fountain Place has failed, as a matter of
law, to offer more than a scintilla of evidence that the
disputed pipeline section was moved at any time following its
original placement, whenever that may have occurred.”).
20
alleviating the danger created by Fountain Place, it is Fountain
Place who directly benefitted from the change in the status quo.
Accordingly, the district court correctly concluded that
Fountain Place must bear the cost of the relocation of the DC-4
pipeline.
b.
BR-866/1875 Pipeline
With respect to the BR-866/1875 pipeline, our
conclusion is the same. Even if, as Fountain Place claims, EQT
replaced portions of the BR-866/1875 pipeline in 2001, and again
in 2007, after Fountain Place purchased the surface rights under
the 1965 Deed on February 8, 2001, Fountain Place did not seek
to use the Pathways over which the BR-866/1875 pipeline ran for
the construction of a cell tower until 2008. The pre-2008
status quo was entirely sufficient for EQT. Rather, it was
Fountain Place who sought the change in the status quo by
excavating under the BR-866/1875 pipeline in order to install a
cell tower. Accordingly, the district court correctly concluded
that Fountain Place must bear the cost of the burial of the BR-
866/1875 pipeline.
IV.
In sum, we find that under the 1944 Lease, EQT is
obligated to relocate its pipelines to the extent they interfere
with Fountain Place’s proper exercise of its surface rights
21
under the 1965 Deed. Fountain Place, however, was aware or
should have been aware of the DC-4 and BR-866/1875 pipelines
when it purchased its surface rights in 2001. After its
purchase in 2001, Fountain Place sought to alter the status quo,
and benefit from the change in circumstances. Thus, in
accordance with Quintain Development, LLC v. Columbia Natural
Resources, Inc., 210 W. Va. 128, 556 S.E.2d 95 (2001), Fountain
Place must bear the concomitant costs of relocating the
pipelines. 8
Therefore, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
8
We have considered each of the other issues raised by the
parties in this case on appeal and find them to be without
merit.
22