John Wooton v. CL, LLC

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-1786
JOHN D. WOOTON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
CL, LLC, a Florida Limited Liability Company; TERRENCE
COYLE, Individually and as Manager/Member of CL, LLC, a
Florida Limited Liability Company; JAY ROBERT LUNDBLAD;
PETER CHICOURIS; ANDERSON MIDGETT; STOCKTON MIDGETT; MIDGETT
REALTY, INCORPORATED,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Elizabeth City. Louise W.
Flanagan, District Judge. (2:09-cv-00034-FL)
Argued: December 4, 2012 Decided: January 10, 2013
Before GREGORY, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Wynn wrote the opinion,
in which Judge Gregory and Judge Agee joined.
ARGUED: David Hart Nelson, DAVID HART NELSON, ESQUIRE,
Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant. Jeffrey Douglass
McKinney, BAILEY & DIXON, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellees. ON BRIEF: Robert H. Merritt, Jr., BAILEY & DIXON,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2
WYNN, Circuit Judge:
This appeal concerns procedural issues that arose after
Plaintiff John D. Wooton brought an action seeking damages
related to his investment in a condominium project. In that
action, Wooten sued companies and individuals connected with the
project alleging fraudulent inducement of contract, negligent
misrepresentation, gross negligence, conversion, civil
conspiracy, violation of North Carolina’s Unfair and Deceptive
Trade Practices Act, violation of the North Carolina Securities
Act, violation of the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act,
and breach of contract. The district court barred Wooton from
amending the pleadings and extending discovery, ultimately
dismissing Wooton’s suit. Wooton challenges these decisions on
appeal. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.
I.
In the underlying action, Wooton contended that he invested
$400,000 in a condominium project that was never built, and that
his investment was not returned. Wooton sought damages from
Defendants—Anderson and Stockton Midgett (the “Midgetts”), their
company Midgett Realty, Inc., and Peter Chicouris—alleging that
3
they misrepresented and concealed material facts to induce
Wooton to invest in the project. 1
After the Midgetts and Chicouris filed motions to dismiss,
Wooton moved to amend his Complaint, seeking to add “only four
sentences: two providing more detail regarding [his] negligent
misrepresentation claim against all defendants and two providing
more detail on the gross negligent misrepresentation claim.”
Wooton v. CL, LLC, No. 2:09-CV-34-FL, at 4 (Sept. 27, 2010)
(“Order I”). 2
The district court found that even with Wooton’s
amendments, the Complaint failed to survive the Midgetts’ and
Chicouris’s motions to dismiss because the Complaint contained
“conclusory allegations and mere rephrasing[s] of the cause[s]
of action;” failed to allege any contact with the Midgetts and
Chicouris prior to Wooton’s investment in the project such that
it was impossible for them to have induced Wooton to invest; and
failed to show that they owed Wooton duties of care. Order I at
7. Accordingly, the district court denied Wooton’s first Motion
to Amend the Complaint and dismissed his claims against the
Midgetts and Chicouris. Midgett Realty then moved for judgment
1
Wooton also brought claims against the project’s owner,
CL, LLC, and CL, LLC partners Terrence Coyle and Jay Lundblad,
none of whom are involved in this appeal.
2
Order I is found at J.A. 326-43.
4
on the pleadings or dismissal, contending that Wooton’s claims
against it were premised on the actions of the Midgetts and thus
failed as a matter of law after the district court had dismissed
the claims against the Midgetts.
On October 25, 2010, nearly a month after the district
court issued Order I, Wooton moved for leave to alter judgment
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) and to amend his
Complaint under Rule 15(a), attaching a Proposed Second Amended
Complaint containing significant alterations. Then, on December
16, 2010, Wooton moved for an additional sixty days of extended
time to complete discovery and file dispositive motions.
On December 29, 2010, the district court granted Midgett
Realty’s Motion to Dismiss and denied Wooton’s various motions.
Wooton v. CL, LLC, No. 2:09-CV-34-FL (Dec. 29, 2010) (“Order
II”). 3 The district court entered final judgment on July 12,
2011, adopting in full Orders I and II.
II.
On appeal, Wooton contends that the district court erred in
denying his second Motion to Amend the Complaint. This Court
reviews a district court’s denial of a motion to amend for abuse
3
Order II is found at J.A. 559-68.
5
of discretion. Nourison Rug Corp. v. Parvizian, 535 F.3d 295,
298 (4th Cir. 2008).
Although district courts should freely give leave to amend
pleadings “when justice so requires,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a),
“after the deadlines provided by a scheduling order have passed,
the good cause standard [of Rule 16] must be satisfied to
justify leave to amend the pleadings,” Nourison Rug, 535 F.3d at
298. Here, the district court determined that Wooton’s second
Motion to Amend the Complaint was not timely under the
scheduling order and that Wooton failed to show good cause for
filing late. Order II at 6.
Wooton devotes much of his argument on appeal to the
additional facts contained in his Proposed Second Amended
Complaint instead of the facts that allegedly prevented him from
presenting his averments in the Proposed Second Amended
Complaint before the scheduling order had expired. Indeed,
Wooton did not even address the untimeliness of his motion
before the district court. Wooton has showed no abuse of
discretion on the part of the district court, and we therefore
affirm the decision to deny Wooton’s second Motion to Amend the
Complaint.
Wooton also contends that the district court erred in
denying as moot his Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment as to
Order I, which dismissed Wooton’s claims against the Midgetts
6
and Chicouris based on the insufficiency of the pleadings.
Because Wooton’s motion to alter or amend was premised entirely
on the additional facts alleged in his Proposed Second Amended
Complaint, he can prevail on this argument only if the district
court should have allowed him to amend the pleadings. Having
already determined that the district court did not err in
denying Wooton’s second Motion to Amend the Complaint, we
conclude the district court did not err in also denying Wooton’s
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment.
Wooton next argues that the district court abused its
discretion in denying his motion to extend the timeline for
discovery. This Court gives district courts “‘wide latitude in
controlling discovery’” and will not disturb discovery orders
“‘absent a showing of clear abuse of discretion.’” Rowland v.
Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 340 F.3d 187, 195 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting
Ardrey v. United Parcel Serv., 798 F.2d 679, 682 (4th Cir.
1986)).
Here, the district court determined that Wooton had “failed
to diligently use the additional time allowed [by an earlier
extension of discovery] to complete the necessary discovery.”
Order II at 9. The reasons Wooton offers for needing additional
discovery—such as to review discovery materials and take
additional depositions—are insufficient to show that the
district court abused its discretion in refusing to grant his
7
motion. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of
Wooton’s Motion to Extend Discovery Deadlines.
Finally, Wooton argues that the district court erred in
dismissing his claims. Because this argument is premised on the
acceptance of the facts included in Wooton’s Proposed Second
Amended Complaint, which the district court did not abuse its
discretion in rejecting, 4 we affirm the dismissal of Wooton’s
Complaint.
III.
For the reasons discussed above, we affirm the district
court’s denial of Wooton’s motions to amend his Complaint, alter
judgment, and extend discovery. Further, we affirm the district
court’s dismissal of Wooton’s Complaint.
AFFIRMED
4
We decline to consider whether, as Wooton argues, this
Court should adopt the Seventh Circuit’s rule for accepting an
unsubstantiated version of the facts on appeal to review a
motion to dismiss. See Reynolds v. CB Sports Bar, Inc., 623 F.3d
1143, 1146-47 (7th Cir. 2010).
8