South Carolina Ass'n of School Administrators v. Disabato

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-1540
SOUTH CAROLINA ASSOCIATION OF SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
ROCKY DISABATO, d/b/a Rocky D,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia. Cameron McGowan Currie, District
Judge. (3:10-cv-00271-CMC)
Argued: October 25, 2011 Decided: January 4, 2012
Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and WILKINSON and WYNN, Circuit
Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Wynn wrote the opinion,
in which Chief Judge Traxler and Judge Wilkinson concurred.
ARGUED: John Marshall Reagle, CHILDS & HALLIGAN, P.A., Columbia,
South Carolina, for Appellant. Kevin Alan Hall, HALL & BOWERS,
LLC, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Kenneth
L. Childs, Keith R. Powell, CHILDS & HALLIGAN, P.A., Columbia,
South Carolina, for Appellant. Karl S. Bowers, Jr., M. Todd
Carroll, HALL & BOWERS, LLC, Columbia, South Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
WYNN, Circuit Judge:
With this appeal, the South Carolina Association of School
Administrators (“SCASA”) seeks to reinstate its federal
declaratory judgment action against radio personality Rocky
Disabato. Before the district court, SCASA sought to have South
Carolina’s Freedom of Information Act (“SC FOIA”) declared
unconstitutional as applied to it as a purportedly public
corporation. But in an earlier-filed state case, a state court
judge has already held exactly that. Because the district court
did not abuse its discretion in determining that abstention in
favor of the earlier-filed state suit was appropriate under
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), we affirm the dismissal
of SCASA’s complaint.
I.
SCASA is a non-profit corporation that views itself as “a
leading force for public education in South Carolina . . . .”
J.A. 5. SCASA engages in issue advocacy through, among other
things, “influencing education legislation and policy” and
“ensuring a cadre of effective leaders . . . .” J.A. 5.
In May 2009, SCASA brought a lawsuit against then-South
Carolina Governor Mark Sanford seeking a writ of mandamus
requiring former Governor Sanford to apply to the federal
government for federal funds, including approximately $780
2
million for public education and other public services. In June
2009, the South Carolina Supreme Court entered judgment in favor
of SCASA and issued a writ of mandamus against former Governor
Sanford.
In August 2009, SCASA received a public records request
from Disabato. Purportedly pursuant to the SC FOIA, Disabato
demanded SCASA records discussing the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009 and former Governor Sanford, including
anything with references to SCASA’s lawsuit against former
Governor Sanford. Disabato further demanded telephone records
reflecting all calls made or received by SCASA and its staff—
including staff members’ cell phone records—from January 1, 2009
to July 31, 2009.
SCASA responded to Disabato’s request in writing, asserting
that it was not subject to the SC FOIA because it “is not a
public entity and therefore does not have to comply with the
Freedom of Information procedures.” J.A. 41. Nevertheless,
SCASA advised Disabato that it would “be happy to talk with
[him] about [his] interest and would try and provide [him] with
as much information as possible verbally regarding the stimulus
funding issue and Governor Sanford.” J.A. 41. SCASA received
no further communications from Disabato until it received notice
of a lawsuit Disabato had filed against SCASA on December 7,
2009 in the Charleston County Court of Common Pleas.
3
On February 2, 2010, SCASA, in turn, brought a federal
declaratory judgment action contending that the SC FOIA was
unconstitutional as applied to it as a purportedly public
corporation. 1 Specifically, SCASA alleged that
Relative to non-profit corporations engaged in
political speech and issue advocacy, such as SCASA,
the FOIA’s broad record disclosure requirements chill
the exercise of First Amendment rights, and the FOIA’s
broad record disclosure requirements chill the
exercise of First Amendment rights, and the FOIA’s
open meeting requirements and vague application to any
corporation supported in whole or in part by public
funds constitute prior restraints on freedom of speech
and association.
J.A. 4.
Instead of answering SCASA’s federal complaint, Disabato
moved the federal district court to abstain and dismiss. SCASA
opposed the motion. On April 22, 2010, the district court
granted Disabato’s motion and dismissed the case on the basis of
abstention. SCASA appeals.
1
On February 9, 2010, SCASA notified the State of South
Carolina of its constitutional challenge. Though the State has
not moved to intervene in SCASA’s federal case, the State did
move to intervene in the state suit—albeit first at the
appellate stage—on September 30, 2011. The Supreme Court of
South Carolina granted the motion to intervene on October 14,
2011.
4
II.
We review a district court’s decision to decline
jurisdiction based on abstention principles for abuse of
discretion. Nivens v. Gilchrist, 444 F.3d 237, 240 (4th Cir.
2006). A district court abuses its discretion whenever “its
decision is guided by erroneous legal principles.” Martin v.
Stewart, 499 F.3d 360, 363 (4th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks
omitted). Further, “there is little or no discretion to abstain
in a case which does not meet traditional abstention
requirements.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
In Younger, 401 U.S. 37, the Supreme Court held that a
federal court should not enjoin a state criminal prosecution
begun before the institution of a federal suit except in rare
circumstances. The Supreme Court held that even the possibility
of a “chilling effect” on First Amendment freedoms does not by
itself justify federal intervention. Id. at 51. Later cases
have articulated a three-part test for evaluating Younger
abstention claims: “Absent a few extraordinary exceptions,
Younger mandates that a federal court abstain from exercising
jurisdiction and interfering in a state criminal proceeding if
(1) there is an ongoing state judicial proceeding brought prior
to substantial progress in the federal proceeding; that (2)
implicates important, substantial, or vital state interests; and
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(3) provides adequate opportunity to raise constitutional
challenges.” Nivens, 444 F.3d at 241 (footnote omitted).
In Younger, which concerned an underlying state criminal
case, the Supreme Court did not address abstention in the
context of civil proceedings. But the Supreme Court later
carried Younger into the civil arena, and even to administrative
proceedings. See, e.g., Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S.
1 (1987) (civil proceedings); Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton
Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619 (1986) (administrative
proceedings). The Supreme Court noted that Younger was based on
concerns for comity and federalism—concerns “equally applicable”
to “civil proceedings in which important state interests are
involved[,]” so long as those proceedings provide the federal
plaintiff with “a full and fair opportunity to litigate [its]
constitutional claim.” Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n, 477 U.S. at
627.
The Supreme Court’s application of Younger abstention in
Pennzoil is particularly relevant to our analysis here. In that
case, Pennzoil had obtained a state court verdict against Texaco
for over $11 billion. Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 4. Under Texas
law, it appeared that the only way Texaco could prevent
enforcement of the judgment while challenging it was by posting
a bond for more than $13 billion, a bond that Texaco could not
have obtained. Id. at 5.
6
Texaco brought a federal action arguing that application of
the Texas bond and lien requirements would deny it various
constitutional and statutory rights. Id. at 6. Texaco sought
an injunction restraining Pennzoil from taking any action to
enforce the judgment pending appeal to the Texas appellate
courts. Id. Notably, the State of Texas was not a party to the
case. The district court granted, and the appellate court
affirmed, injunctive relief for Texaco. Id. at 7-9. The
Supreme Court reversed.
The Supreme Court focused on the notion of comity: “This
concern mandates application of Younger abstention not only when
the pending state proceedings are criminal, but also when
certain civil proceedings are pending, if the State’s interests
in the proceeding are so important that exercise of the federal
judicial power would disregard the comity between the States and
the National Government.” Id. at 11. The Supreme Court noted
that its opinion “does not hold that Younger abstention is
always appropriate whenever a civil proceeding is pending in a
state court.” Id. at 14 n.12. Nevertheless, the Court applied
Younger to civil proceedings in which the state was not a party
without setting clear guidelines. As a consequence, “the lower
courts will have to work out for themselves what limits, if any,
there are on the sweep of Younger.” 17B Fed. Prac. & Proc.
Juris. § 4254 (3d ed. 2011).
7
Against this backdrop, the district court here applied the
three-part Younger test: (1) was there an ongoing state
proceeding, (2) did the proceeding implicate important state
interests, and (3) did the state proceeding provided an adequate
opportunity to raise federal claims. Nivens, 444 F.3d at 241
(addressing Younger in the context of state criminal proceeding
but recognizing that Younger has been extended beyond criminal
cases). As to the first factor, the district court determined
that “it is undisputed that there is an ongoing state proceeding
through which Defendant seeks documents from Plaintiff pursuant
to FOIA. Thus, Plaintiff concedes that the first Younger factor
is satisfied . . . .” J.A. 83. This is indeed undisputedly so,
and the first Younger factor is clearly met.
Moving, for the moment, to the third Younger factor, i.e.,
whether the state proceeding provided an adequate opportunity to
raise federal claims, the district court held that “Plaintiff is
free to raise its First Amendment defenses in state court.
Plaintiff’s various alternative arguments may, likewise, be
presented to the state court.” J.A. 83. If this were in any
way previously unclear, supplements to the joint appendix filed
with this Court show that SCASA did in fact raise the very same
First Amendment arguments underlying its federal complaint
before the state court. In Disabato’s state court action, SCASA
moved to dismiss, arguing that Disabato’s claim must fail
8
“because the FOIA’s definition of a ‘public body’ cannot
constitutionally embrace a corporation, like SCASA, engaged in
political speech or issue advocacy. In other words, SCASA
asserts that the FOIA’s definition of ‘public body’ . . .
unconstitutionally burdens the First Amendment rights of freedom
of speech and association of issue advocacy organizations like
SCASA.” J.A. 108.
Notably, the state court granted SCASA’s motion and
dismissed Disabato’s suit. The state court held that “the
FOIA’s open meeting and records disclosure requirements restrict
SCASA’s political speech and issue advocacy without a
substantial relation to the purpose of the FOIA, and where
narrower means are available to achieve the FOIA’s purpose. As
a result, the First Amendment prohibits the application of the
FOIA’s requirements to SCASA, and the Plaintiff’s claim must
fail . . . .” J.A. 119. Clearly, then, SCASA had an adequate
opportunity to raise its First Amendment arguments before the
state court, and the third Younger factor is met.
That leaves the second factor, i.e., whether the proceeding
implicates important state interests. The district court
concluded that “the state has significant interests in
interpreting and applying FOIA, including with regard to
entities such as Plaintiff which have mixed private and public
attributes, the latter based on receipt of public funds and the
9
statutory assignment of duties.” J.A. 83. Indeed, this case
revolves around the interpretation and constitutionality of a
state statute that the state legislature deemed “vital”:
The General Assembly finds that it is vital in a
democratic society that public business be performed
in an open and public manner so that citizens shall be
advised of the performance of public officials and of
the decisions that are reached in public activity and
in the formulation of public policy. Toward this end,
provisions of this chapter must be construed so as to
make it possible for citizens, or their
representatives, to learn and report fully the
activities of their public officials at a minimum cost
or delay to the persons seeking access to public
documents or meetings.
S.C. Code. Ann. § 30-4-15. And South Carolina’s Attorney
General has successfully intervened in the state suit at the
appellate stage, stating that he has “a strong interest in
defending the constitutionality of the application of FOIA . . .
.” J.A. 123. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the
district court abused its discretion in abstaining from SCASA’s
federal suit in favor of the earlier-filed state action. 2
SCASA points out that there are some exceptions to Younger
abstention. The Supreme Court has indeed indicated that federal
2
We note that the district court also ruled that “[a]t
least to the extent [SCASA] argues that state law is vague,
[Railroad Comm’n of Tx. V. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496 (1941)]
abstention also applies.” J.A. 83 (footnote omitted). Because
we affirm the district court’s abstention under Younger, we need
not address whether abstention under Pullman would also have
been appropriate.
10
courts need not abstain under “extraordinary circumstances” such
as where a statute is “flagrantly and patently violative of
express constitutional prohibitions in every clause, sentence
and paragraph, and in whatever manner and against whomever an
effort might be made to apply it.” Younger, 401 U.S. at 53-54
(quotation marks omitted). Abstention may also be inappropriate
where there has been a “showing of bad faith, harassment, or any
other unusual circumstance that would call for equitable
relief.” Id. at 54. SCASA contends that these exceptions apply
here. We cannot agree.
As to the first exception, SCASA seeks, with its complaint,
a declaration that “the FOIA violates the First Amendment and is
unconstitutional in so far as its definition of public body
encompasses private corporations engaging in political speech
and issue advocacy . . . .” J.A. 12. This limited declaration
essentially concedes that the SC FOIA is not “flagrantly and
patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions in
every clause, sentence and paragraph, and in whatever manner and
against whomever an effort might be made to apply it.” Younger,
401 U.S. at 53-54 (quotation marks omitted).
As to the second exception, SCASA claims that it has been
pursued by political forces, including former Governor Sanford,
under the SC FOIA, and that Disabato’s attorneys in this case
have repeatedly represented its challengers. What SCASA has
11
not, and apparently cannot, argue, however, is that Disabato has
repeatedly brought SC FOIA suits against it. (This appears to
be his first such challenge against SCASA.) SCASA does not
contend that Disabato is a straw man for another party who has
previously brought SC FOIA claims against it. And SCASA cites
no support for the notion that looking to the lawyers instead of
the parties is appropriate in evaluating its harassment
contention; under the circumstances of this suit, we decline to
do so.
III.
In sum, SCASA has already obtained the relief it sought
with this federal suit through its participation in an earlier-
filed state suit. 3 The district court did not abuse its
discretion in determining that abstention in favor of that state
suit was appropriate under Younger. We therefore affirm the
district court’s dismissal of SCASA’s federal complaint.
AFFIRMED
3
We express no opinion as to the merits of SCASA’s First
Amendment claims.
12