Sewell v. Prince George's County Department of Social Services

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-2009
STARSHA SEWELL,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 12-2140
STARSHA SEWELL,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the District
of Maryland, at Greenbelt. Deborah K. Chasanow, Chief District
Judge; Alexander Williams, Jr., District Judge. (8:12-cv-02402-
DKC; 8:12-cv-02522-AW)
Submitted: January 9, 2013 Decided: February 1, 2013
Before MOTZ, DUNCAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
No. 12-2009 dismissed; No. 12-2140 affirmed by unpublished per
curiam opinion.
Starsha Sewell, Appellant Pro Se. Stephanie A. Lewis, OFFICE OF
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
In these consolidated appeals, Starsha Sewell appeals
the district court’s orders remanding her first action (No. 12-
2009) and dismissing her second action (No. 12-2140) for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.
No. 12-2009: With respect to the district court’s
order remanding Sewell’s first action, we grant Appellee’s
motion to dismiss for lack of appellate jurisdiction. A
district court’s remand order is generally not reviewable on
appeal or otherwise. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2006). While an
exception applies for civil rights cases removed pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1443 (2006), the exception requires the removal
petitioner to allege: (1) the denial of a right arising under
federal law providing for specific civil rights stated in terms
of racial equality, and (2) that she is denied or cannot enforce
the specific federal rights in the state courts. Johnson v.
Miss., 421 U.S. 213, 219 (1975). Because Sewell relies on 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (2006), a provision of general applicability, she
cannot satisfy the first prong of Johnson. * See Ga. v. Rachel,
384 U.S. 780, 792 (1966). We therefore lack authority to review
the district court’s remand order.
*
We also lack jurisdiction to review the remand order
because the plain language of § 1443 provides that removal is
available only to defendants, not plaintiffs.
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No. 12-2140: With respect to the district court’s
order dismissing Sewell’s second action, because Sewell provides
no argument in her informal brief addressing the district
court’s dispositive holding that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction, Sewell has forfeited appellate review of the
court’s dismissal order. See 4th Cir. R. 34(b). Accordingly,
we affirm the district court’s order. We also grant leave to
proceed in forma pauperis, deny as moot Sewell’s motion for
relief from judgment, and deny her motion for default judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
No. 12-2009 DISMISSED;
No. 12-2140 AFFIRMED
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