United States v. Moore

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 97-4528
DONALD MOORE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of South Carolina, at Charleston.
Patrick Michael Duffy, District Judge.
(CR-96-243)
Submitted: December 11, 1997
Decided: December 31, 1997
Before HALL and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and
PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.
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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
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COUNSEL
J. Robert Haley, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Charleston, South
Carolina, for Appellant. Brucie Howe Hendricks, OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, South Carolina, for
Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
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OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Donald Moore appeals his conviction and sentence on a guilty plea
for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18
U.S.C.A. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(e)(1) (West Supp. 1997). Moore's attor-
ney has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738 (1967), claiming three errors, but concluding that there are
no meritorious grounds for appeal. Moore was notified of his right to
file an additional brief, which he failed to do. In accordance with the
requirements of Anders, we have examined the entire record and find
no meritorious issues for appeal.
Moore first claims that the district court erred in counting as predi-
cate offenses under § 924(e), certain offenses of which Moore was
convicted when he was a juvenile. Because Moore was tried as an
adult for these convictions, this claim has no merit. See United States
v. Lender, 985 F.2d 151, 155-56 (4th Cir. 1993).
Second, Moore claims that the district court erroneously deter-
mined his prior convictions for felonious breaking and entering and
second degree burglary to be violent felonies. However, a § 924(e)
enhancement for burglary is proper where the defendant makes an
unlawful or unprivileged entry into or remains in a building or struc-
ture with the intent to commit a crime regardless of the exact defini-
tion of the crime charged. See Taylor v. United States, 110 S. Ct.
2143, 2158-59 (1990). In addition, this court has held that convictions
under North Carolina's breaking and entering statute are burglary
convictions for § 924(e) purposes. See United States v. Bowden, 975
F.2d 1080, 1084-85 (4th Cir. 1992). Hence, this claim is likewise
without merit.
Finally, Moore alleges that the district court erred in determining
that his escape conviction was a violent felony. We find that this
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claim also must fail. See United States v. Hairston, 71 F.3d 115, 118
(4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1699 (1996).
Accordingly, we affirm both Moore's conviction and sentence.
This Court requires that counsel inform his client, in writing, of his
right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If the client requests that a petition be filed, but counsel
believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may
move in this Court for leave to withdraw from representation. Coun-
sel's motion must state that a copy thereof was served on the client.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal conten-
tions are adequately presented in the materials before the Court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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