United States v. Digsby

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-4895
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
DARRELL EUGENE DIGSBY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad, Jr.,
District Judge. (CR-04-304)
Submitted: June 5, 2006 Decided: June 15, 2006
Before TRAXLER and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Aaron E. Michel, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Gretchen C. F. Shappert, United States Attorney, Jonathan A. Vogel,
Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Defendant-Appellant, Darrell Eugene Digsby appeals from the
district court’s judgment of conviction for one count of felon in
possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). A
review of the record, the parties' briefs and the joint appendix
revealing no error, we affirm the conviction.
I.
Shortly after 2:00 a.m. on July 26, 2004, officers William
Stanley Cook and Piotr Ignaczak of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police
Department responded to a call to investigate gunshots fired near
Tuckaseegee Road in Charlotte, North Carolina. As the officers
were passing a residence at 1106 Pryor Street, a naked black male,
later identified as Ronald Logan, flagged them down. Logan, who
was bleeding from a head injury, told the officers that he had been
in a bedroom of the residence with his girlfriend, later identified
as Qunzina Dillard, when an individual unknown to him kicked in the
bedroom door. The individual threatened to kill him and ordered
him out of the residence. The individual struck Logan in the head
with a weapon as Logan passed through the hallway and fired a shot
into the air as Logan exited the residence.
As the officers approached the residence, several people
exited through the front door onto the porch, screaming that a man
was in the house with a gun. The police later identified two of
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the people exiting the house as Ray Davis and Yolanda Larkin, both
of whom resided at the home. Davis and Larkin requested that the
officers enter the residence to remove the armed individual.
Ignaczak instructed everyone to get off the porch.
Cook proceeded to the side of the residence. As Cook
approached a door that opened into the kitchen, he observed Digsby
open the door and begin to exit. Digsby held a gun in his right
hand. Cook ordered Digsby to drop the weapon and get on the
ground. Instead, Digsby retreated back through the door and locked
it behind him. By this time, Ignaczak had joined Cook at the side
of the residence.
Both officers returned to the front of the residence and
entered through the open front door. The officers discovered
Digsby in the hallway near the kitchen. They ordered him to get
down on the floor, and Digsby complied. They then handcuffed and
frisked him but found no weapon. Ignaczak led Digsby from the
residence, leaving Cook and a supervisor to conduct a search. Cook
subsequently found a Hi-Point .45 caliber handgun, consistent with
the weapon he had seen in Digsby's possession at the side of the
residence, underneath a bag of french fries in the kitchen freezer.
Although the freezer was operational, the handgun was not cold when
Cook found it. No other weapons were found in the residence.
Subsequent analysis of the handgun revealed that it had been
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manufactured in Ohio and, at some point, had been sold in South
Carolina.
Following his indictment for felon in possession of a firearm,
Digsby moved to suppress the handgun, arguing that he resided at
1106 Pryor Street, and that the entry into and search of his
residence violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The
magistrate judge who conducted the suppression hearing concluded
that the evidence did not support Digsby's residency claim.
Instead, it established that Digsby was an intruder in the
residence who lacked standing to contest the officers' entry into
and search of the residence.
Prior to trial, Digsby moved to "bifurcate the trial or limit
the evidence to the fact of a prior felony conviction without
disclosing to the jury the specific offense or offense conduct."
J.A. 13. The district court instructed Digsby that the crime
charged consisted of two distinct elements, a prior felony
conviction and possession of a firearm, and that, if he elected to
stipulate to the felony conviction, the government would not be
permitted to present evidence of the conviction. Otherwise, proof
of the conviction became an essential element of the government's
case. Digsby elected to stipulate to the felony conviction.
Just prior to jury selection, the venire of potential jurors
accidentally may have seen Digsby and other defendants in custody
as they were brought up from the holding cell. Digsby's counsel
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expressed "some concern" about what the jurors "might have seen,"
though he noted that Digsby would not have been prejudiced by his
attire because he was not dressed in orange. J.A. 105d-105e. The
district court instructed Digsby that he could ask the jurors about
the issue during voir-dire and offered to give a corrective
instruction. Digsby declined both of these offers because of their
potential to highlight what the jurors might have seen.
At the close of the government's case, Digsby moved for
judgment of acquittal pursuant to Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. The district court denied the motion.
Digsby proposed the following jury instruction concerning the
"in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce" element of a
§ 922(g)(1) violation:
The term "in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce"
means that the possession by the defendant must have
occurred as part of interstate or foreign commerce or
substantially affected interstate or foreign commerce.
In other words, the possession of the firearm must be
commercial or economic in nature and it must
substantially affect interstate or foreign commerce. It
does not include purely interstate commerce unless the
activity has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
J.A. 265c. The district court rejected this instruction. Instead,
the district court instructed the jury as follows:
The phrase "in or affecting commerce" includes commerce
between anyplace in a state and anyplace outside of that
state. The government may meet its burden of proof on
the question of being in or affecting commerce by proving
to you beyond a reasonable doubt that the firearm
identified in the indictment at any time had traveled
across a state boundary line.
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J.A. 259.
At the close of the trial, the jury found Digsby guilty of the
single count in the indictment. The district court entered a
judgment of conviction and sentenced Digsby to 120 months
imprisonment. Digsby now appeals his conviction.
II.
Digsby claims that the district court (1) violated the Fourth
Amendment by denying his motion to suppress the handgun, (2)
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment by limiting
the remedy for the possibility that the jury venire viewed Digsby
in custody and shackles, (3) violated Rule 403 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence by limiting the remedy for the criminal history
information alleged in the indictment to a stipulation that Digsby
had a prior felony conviction, (4) violated the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment by admitting hearsay evidence and (5)
erred in rejecting his proposed jury instruction concerning the "in
or affecting interstate or foreign commerce" element of a
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§ 922(g)(1) violation.1 We review each of these claims individually.
A.
Digsby first argues that the district court violated his
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and
seizure by denying his motion to suppress the handgun. When
reviewing a district court's denial of a motion to suppress
evidence, we review its factual findings for clear error and its
legal conclusions de novo, construing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the government. United States v. Perkins, 363
F.3d 317, 320 (4th Cir. 2004).
The district court properly denied Digsby's motion to suppress
the handgun because he lacked standing to challenge the validity of
the search. A defendant lacks standing to challenge the validity
of a search unless he "has a legitimate expectation of privacy" in
the location to be searched. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143
(1978). The defendant bears the burden of establishing that
1
Digsby also argues that, even if none of the district court’s
individual errors rise to the level of reversible error, the
combination of those errors violated his due process rights under
the cumulative error doctrine, and that the district court erred in
denying his motion for judgment of acquittal. Because we find no
error in the district court’s rulings, we need not consider
Digsby’s cumulative error doctrine argument. Digsby fails to
develop any argument, separate from his argument that the district
court erred in denying his proposed jury instruction, concerning
the denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal. Accordingly,
Digsby has abandoned that claim. See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(9)(A);
United States v. Smith, 441 F.3d 254, 274 (4th Cir. 2006).
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expectation. United States v. Kitchens, 114 F.3d 29, 31 (4th Cir.
1997). Here, the magistrate judge found, and the district court
agreed, that Digsby was an intruder, not a resident or a guest, in
the home where the search occurred. That finding is not clearly
erroneous. As an intruder, Digsby had no legitimate expectation of
privacy in the residence.
B.
Digsby next argues that the district court violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment by limiting the remedy for
the possibility that the jury venire viewed Digsby in custody and
shackles to jury selection voir dire. This argument lacks any
merit. Although the Fifth Amendment prohibits the use of physical
restraints visible to the jury unless, in the trial court's
discretion, interests such as physical security, escape prevention
or courtroom decorum make such measures necessary; Deck v.
Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 628-29 (2005); the record contains no
indication either that the jury actually saw Digsby in shackles or
that the district court understood Digsby's issue to be the
possibility that the jury venire had seen him in shackles.
Digsby's counsel did not refer to shackles or physical restraints
when he raised his "concern" to the district court. Moreover, he
did not object when the district court offered either to permit
voir dire on what the potential jurors had seen or to instruct the
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jurors "that merely because someone is detained for trial is
nothing that they can consider." J.A. 105f. He merely declined
both of the remedies for fear that they might do more harm than
good. On this record, the district court committed no error.
C.
Digsby next argues that the district court violated Rule 403
of the Federal Rules of Evidence by denying his motion to bifurcate
the trial and limiting the remedy for the criminal history
information alleged in the indictment to a stipulation that Digsby
had a prior felony conviction. We review the district court's
rulings on bifurcation for abuse of discretion. See United States
v. King, 582 F.2d 888, 890 (4th Cir. 1978). We also review the
district court's application of Rule 403 for abuse of discretion,
"examin[ing] the evidence in the 'light most favorable to its
proponent, maximizing its probative value and minimizing its
prejudicial effect.'" United States v. Love, 134 F.3d 595, 603
(4th Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Simpson, 910 F.2d 154,
157 (4th Cir. 1990)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by requiring
that Digsby stipulate to a prior felony conviction in order to
prevent the government from presenting evidence of the conviction.
This approach conforms with the approach approved by the Supreme
Court in Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997). The
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holding in that case permits a defendant, by stipulating to a prior
felony conviction, to avoid the potential prejudice associated with
the government's efforts to prove the conviction. Id. at 190-92.
In effect, Digsby received what he requested, the evidence was
limited "to the fact of a prior felony conviction without
disclosing to the jury the specific offense or offense conduct."
J.A. 13. He was not entitled to prevent the government from
proving the prior felony conviction element of the § 922(g)(1)
violation without stipulating to that element.
D.
Digsby next argues that the district court violated the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment by admitting hearsay
evidence. Specifically, Digsby argues that the statements admitted
by the district court constitute the type of testimonial statements
that the Supreme Court held, in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36(2004), violate the Sixth Amendment. We disagree. None of the
statements identified by Digsby as inadmissible hearsay2 implicate
2
Digsby alleges four instances of inadmissible hearsay: (1)
Cook's testimony concerning what Logan reported to him when he
arrived at the residence; (2) Cook's testimony concerning
Ignaczak's instructions to individuals at the residence to get off
the porch; (3) Cook's testimony concerning what the individuals on
the porch were saying about the intruder in the residence when he
approached the porch; and (4) the testimony of the government's
expert concerning what he had been told about the make and model of
the handgun found in the freezer.
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the concerns raised in Crawford, and the district court properly
applied the Federal Rules of Evidence in admitting the statements.
E.
Finally, Digsby argues that the district court erred in
rejecting his proposed jury instruction concerning the "in or
affecting interstate or foreign commerce" element of a § 922(g)(1)
violation. Again, we disagree. As noted in Digsby's brief to this
court, the jury instruction given by the district court reflects
the law of this circuit. Moreover, this court has repeatedly
rejected the argument advanced by Digsby that United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) dictates a different result. See e.g.,
United States v. Gallimore, 247 F.3d 134, 138 (4th Cir. 2001);
United States v. Nathan, 202 F.3d 230, 234 (4th Cir. 2000); United
States v. Crump, 120 F.3d 462, 466 n.2 (4th Cir. 1997). We
continue to reject that argument.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the
district court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts
and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the Court, and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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