United States v. Raymond Chestnut

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-6641
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RAYMOND EDWARD CHESTNUT, a/k/a Snoop, a/k/a Ray,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. R. Bryan Harwell, District Judge.
(4:05-cr-01044-RBH-1)
Submitted: July 18, 2013 Decided: July 23, 2013
Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Raymond Edward Chestnut, Appellant Pro Se. Robert Frank Daley,
Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina;
Arthur Bradley Parham, Assistant United States Attorney,
Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Raymond Edward Chestnut seeks to appeal the criminal
judgment entered on May 18, 2007, following his guilty to one
count of conspiracy to distribute cocaine base, in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006), and one count of using and carrying a
firearm during and in relation to, and possessing a firearm in
furtherance of, a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 924(c) (2006). 1 The Government has moved to dismiss the
appeal as untimely. We grant the Government’s motion and
dismiss the appeal.
In criminal cases, a defendant must file his notice of
appeal within fourteen days after the entry of judgment. 2 With
or without a motion, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good
cause, the district court may grant an extension of up to thirty
days to file a notice of appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(4);
United States v. Reyes, 759 F.2d 351, 353 (4th Cir. 1985).
Appeal periods are not jurisdictional in criminal cases, but are
court-prescribed “claims-processing rules” that do not affect
1
Chestnut initially filed a direct appeal in May 2007, but
voluntarily dismissed it. United States v. Chestnut, No. 07-
4562 (4th Cir. July 12, 2007) (unpublished order).
2
At the time judgment was entered, the appeal period was
ten days. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A)(i) (2008). On December 1,
2009, the appeal period was extended to fourteen days. Fed. R.
App. P. 4(b)(1)(A)(i) (2009). Chestnut’s notice of appeal is
untimely under either standard.
2
this court’s subject matter jurisdiction. See Rice v. Rivera,
617 F.3d 802, 810 (4th Cir. 2010) (stating that non-statutory
claim-processing rules are not jurisdictional); United States v.
Urutyan, 564 F.3d 679, 685 (4th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he non-statutory
time limits in Appellate Rule 4(b) do not affect subject matter
jurisdiction.”). However, we may still enforce the appeal
period when the Rule 4(b) time bar is invoked by the Government
or sua sponte when judicial resources or administration are
implicated or the delay in noting the appeal has been
inordinate. United States v. Mitchell, 518 F.3d 740, 744, 750
(10th Cir. 2008).
The district court entered the criminal judgment on
May 18, 2007. Chestnut filed his notice of appeal in April
2013, nearly six years beyond the appeal period, and he failed
to obtain an extension of the appeal period. Accordingly, we
grant the Government’s motion to dismiss and dismiss the appeal.
Chestnut’s motions for appointment of counsel, for a transcript
at Government expense, for bail or release pending appeal, and
to expedite are denied. We also deny Chestnut’s request to
dismiss the Government’s motion to dismiss. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED
3